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Abstract 
This thesis uses three key episodes from the career of the fourteenth-century Alsatian 
nobleman, Bruno von Rappoltstein (c.1335-1398) to paint an image of noble power and 
aristocratic self-consciousness in a border region between Francophone and German speaking 
spheres of influence in one of the traditional heartlands of the Holy Roman Empire. 
Bruno von Rappoltstein came to prominence in the second half of the fourteenth century. 
This was period of significant change in the wake of the Black Death. Bruno was an 
inveterate feuder and became involved in a series of disputes which occupied most of his 
adult life and which brought him into conflict with a range of powerfiil authorities. The 
marmer in which Bruno conducted himself in the face of threats and pressure from the city of 
Strassburg, the Empire, Richard II of England, the Pope and other greater lords and the ways 
in which a nimiber of these sought to use the circumstances to further their own agendas 
provides an insight into the realities of political power within the Empire at that time. 
Bruno's mentality and his sense of personal and dynastic identity are explored. His inability 
to adapt behaviour that was acceptable within his own domain to his dealings with greater 
authorities is shown to have been a leading cause of his ultimate failure which left his heirs 
with substantial debts and which may be seen as the beginning of a process leading to the 
family coming increasingly under Habsburg control over the following century. 
The thesis also considers the extent to which Bruno was manipulated in his feuding by more 
powerful princes in the context of recent scholarship (most notably that of Dr. Hillay Zmora) 
which suggests that such manipulation was an important factor in princely state-building. Dr. 
Zmora's thesis is based on a study of noble feuding in Franconia in the sixteenth century. 
This thesis finds nothing to contradict Zmora's views but raises a question as to the extent to 
which they are necessarily valid outside of the period and region of his research. 
An appendix to the thesis details the career of the English knight. Sir John Harlestone, who 
played a central role in one of Bruno's disputes and who is an interesting figure in his own 
right. 
Conteets 
Acknowledgements 4 
Abbreviations 5 
Linguistic Note 6 
Frontispiece 7 
Introduction 9 
Chapter I Alsace - Early History to 1262 14 
Chapter I I Alsace - Later History (1262 - 1362) 27 
Chapter III The First Rappoltsteins 35 
Chapter IV The Later Rappoltsteins 39 
Chapter V The Case Studies 47 
Case Study 1: Bruno and Count Rudolf IV von Habsburg-Laufenburg 50 
Case Study 2: Bruno and Sir John Harlestone 62 
Case Study 3: Bruno and the City of Strassburg 78 
Chapter VI Bruno's Sense of Identity 87 
Chapter VII Bruno's Relationship with Kings and Princes 95 
Chapter VIII Bruno's Relationship with Strassburg 117 
Chapter IX Bruno von Rappoltstein - Knight or Pawn? 121 
Appendix 1 The Rappoltstein Genealogy 139 
Appendix 2 Sir John Harlestone - Biographical Note 146 
Bibliography 162 
Manuscript Sources 162 
Printed Primary Sources 162 
Secondary Sources 162 
Page 2 
Table of Figures 
Figure 1 The Topography of Alsace 16 
Figure 2 The Three Rappoltstein Castles 19 
Figure 3 Urban Density in the Alsace Region 20 
Figure 4 Alsace at the end of the Middle Ages 25 
Figure 5 The Rappoltstein Armorial 36 
Figure 6 The Rappoltstein Crest 41 
Figure 7 Laufenburg 50 
Figure 8 Medieval Rappoltsweiler 52 
Figure 9 Bruno's Route in 1369 65 
Figure 10 Bruno's Properties in Burgundy 67 
Figure 11 The Via Francigena 70 
Figure 12 Hoh Rappoltstein 71 
Figure 13 Routes Through the Vosges Mountains 112 
Page 3 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to acknowledge the support, encouragement and practical assistance 
given to me by my supervisor, Dr. Len Scales, throughout my period of study. His 
encyclopaedic knowledge and vast private library have so often helped me to 
investigate areas which I would otherwise have struggled to cover. I would also like 
to thank my fellow Durham medieval history postgraduates for their constant good 
humour and collective support. 
My thanks are also due to a number of academic historians worldwide with whom I 
have been in contact by email and via specialist mailing lists. They have been 
unfailingly helpfiil in answering my questions. Similarly I must thank the staff at the 
British Library where I have spent many happy hours reading the only copy in this 
country of the Rappohstein family archive. 
Finally, I would never have completed this work without the love and support of my 
partner, Jane, who has shared her life with a belligerent late medieval Alsatian 
nobleman for far too long. 
Page 4 
Abbreviations 
CCR Calendar of the Close Rolls 
CPR Calendar of the Patent Rolls 
CIPM Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem 
RU Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch 
SU Urkunden und Akten der Stadt Strassburg 
Page 5 
Linguistic Note 
Any study of medieval Alsace is forced to confront the issue of language, especially 
as it relates to the names of people and places. Alsace has always been a mixed 
language community by virtue of its geography. In this dissertation I have followed 
the convention preferred by many scholars (writing in English) of using the form of 
name that would have been used by an individual for him / herself or by the 
inhabitants of a place during the later medieval period, allowing for the inevitable 
orthographical variations. Thus, I have preferred the German form 'Strassburg' to the 
modem French form 'Strasbourg'. Similarly I have used the German form 'Bruno 
von Rappoltstein' in place of the French 'Brun de Ribeaupierre'. The exception to 
this is that I have not changed the names of people or places where they appear within 
a direct quotation. 
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Frontispiece 
The image on the cover page of this dissertation is taken from the online image library 
of the Bibliofheque Nationale de France. No detail is given beyond the bare 
description that it is the tomb cover of a Rappoltstein knight. The records of the 
library indicate that the image was deposited in 1858 and is thus most probably an 
engraving. It is knovra from contemporary sources that Bruno von Rappoltstein was 
buried in the building known as the 'hospital' in Rappoltsweiler - 'und leit begraben 
im Spital bey seinem wib'.' While this building is preserved and may be visited in 
modem Ribeauvilld, the Rappoltstein family tombs were destroyed at the time of the 
French Revolution and the whereabouts of any surviving fragments is unknown.^  
The armour depicted on the tomb cover includes full plate covering for the legs and 
arms and a bassinet-style helm which together suggest the later medieval period. The 
following piece from the Mefropolitan Museum of Art in New York might almost 
have been written to describe the image. 
By the fourteenth century, the improved crossbow was able to pierce shields 
and mail armor. To coimter this, knights first wore a poncho-like coat with 
small rectangular plates riveted to it, while articulated plate armor was 
developed for the legs, arms, and hands. The small, square, convex shield of 
the time (the targe) was eventually relegated to use in tournaments, since 
improved body armor made it unnecessary. A new form of helmet joined the 
all-encompassing great helm and the wide-brimmed chapel-de-fer (war hat). 
This was the more streamlined, close-fitting bascinet, with a curtain of mail 
(camail) from chin to shoulders, which frequently had a movable visor. By the 
late 1300s, solid breastplates first appeared to protect the chest as part of the 
' Julius Rathgeber, Die Herrschaft Rappoltstein. Beitrage zur Geschichtskunde des Ober-Elsasses 
(Strassburg: Freidrich Wolff, 1874), pp. 28-29 and 33-34. The quotation is from a lost Latin chronicle 
{Chronicon Alsatiae) attributed to Herman Peter von Andlau and written whilst he was in Cohnar. The 
chronicle was completed after Andlau's death in 1500 and Rathgeber suggests it was finished by one of 
his retainers. Two extracts of a German translation survive. The first extract shows that the chronicle 
was in the tradition of universal chronicles begiiming with an account of the Creation. The second 
extract (reproduced by Rathgeber) |s from a section concerning the history of the Rappoltstein family 
{Varia Rappolteinensia). Andlau was a native of Alsace, a Humanist and an important figure in the 
foundation of the University of Basel. His biographical details may be found at Claudio Soliva, 
Historisches Lexicon der Schweiz: Peter von Andlau ([cited); available from http://www.hls-dhs-
dss.ch/textes/d/D 12467.php. 
^ Paul-Andr6 Bechler, Les Couloirs du Temps de Ribeauville (Ingersheim: BECHYPSOFT, 2005), p. 
34. 
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short, tight-fitting coat of plates called a brigandine, while smaller plates 
covered the abdomen, hips, and back.^  
The figure is resting its head on a tournament helm which bears a bearded human 
figure as a crest. The use of human figures for crests was a popular feature of late 
medieval German heraldry."* In the case of the Rappoltstein family, the crest appears 
to have been in use for a long time and to have continued well beyond Bruno's 
lifetime. See Figure 6 below for an early representation of the crest. In a recent 
article, Helmut Nickel suggest that the crest used by the family varied in the early 
years and that different crests were used to identify particular family members.^  
There can be no way of knowing the subject of this image. The prime candidates 
would appear to be either Bruno von Rappoltstein or his eldest son, Smassmann, who 
outshone his father in almost every way. Smassmann died in 1451 but the site of his 
burial is not recorded. 
^ This extract accompanied an illustration of armour on exhibition. Unfortunately the piece was 
transient and is no longer to be found on the museum's web site. 
4 
5 
Stephen Slater, The Illustrated Book of Heraldry (London: Hermes House, 2002), p. 59. 
Helmut Nickel, 'A Theory about the Early History of the Cloisters Apocalypse,' Metropolitan 
Museum Journal 6 (1972): p. 67. 
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Introduction 
The region of Alsace is perhaps best known to English-speaking readers as one half of 
that composite entity 'Alsace-Lorraine' which figures so often in modem history fi-om 
1870 to 1945 as a constant bone of contention between France and Germany. Little 
has been written in English of the earlier history of Alsace in general and of the 
medieval period in particular. Such works as exist tend to concentrate on the pre-
Reformation and Reformation periods when Strassburg, the principal city of Alsace, 
was first an important centre of Humanism, home to such important figures of that era 
as Sebastian Brandt and Jakob Wimpfeling and the birthplace of Gutenberg, and 
second an early adherent to the new church of Martin Luther. Even in these cases, 
historians have preferred to focus on Strassburg rather than the wider region of 
Alsace. The one recent exception is Tom Scott's book Regional identity and 
economic change : the Upper Rhine, 1450-1600 which is concemed primarily with 
economic history.^ There is nothing of substance available in English which deals in 
any detail with Alsace prior to the fifteenth century. 
When considering the modem historiography of Alsace in other languages one finds 
that the majority of works are of French origin. Perhaps inevitably these works tend 
to devote less energy to the period prior to the seventeenth century when Alsace was 
first incorporated into France by Louis XIV. The medieval period is frequently 
treated in less depth and the work tends again to concentrate on a small number of key 
issues as in the English historiography. 
There would seem to be no substantial treatment of Alsace in the period prior to the 
fifteenth century in either French or German. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to redress this situation in some small way by 
examining the life and times of one of the leading nobles of late fourteenth-century 
Alsace, Bruno von Rappoltstein. By a consideration of Bruno's known life which 
occupies almost exactly the second half of that century and his role as head of one of 
* Tom Scott, Regional Identity and Economic Change : the Upper Rhine, 1450-1600 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 11. 
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the oldest and most important families of the regional nobility, it is possible to draw 
out a number of themes which are of interest in the context of the wider history of the 
Empire at that time.^  
First will be a consideration of Bruno's sense of his own identity and the extent to 
which he may have seen himself as something more than just the senior member of an 
'old' family. Within this context will be an examination of Bruno's relationships with 
other centres and figures of power, ranging fi-om his complex dealing with the local 
city of Strassburg through to his involvement with more powerful princes and 'states'. 
Such was the nature of Bruno's constant series of disputes that he came into contact 
with a wide range of powerful forces and it is his manner of dealing with these which 
is of interest in terms of what it may reveal about the nature of power relationships at 
this time. Finally, it is interesting to consider Bruno as an exponent of the 'feud' in 
the later medieval Empire and to examine this in the context of recent research. 
Overall, a picture thus emerges of how a locally powerful noble fits into the wider 
social and political landscape of the period. 
The chosen means of illustrating these themes is to consider in some detail a series of 
incidents fi"om Bruno's life by way of three case studies. These incidents are 
interconnected and, taken together, form the backdrop to the last thirty years of 
Bruno's life. They shaped his destiny and that of his family and had a significant 
impact on events within the wider region. 
From a consideration of these incidents it may be possible to draw some conclusions 
as to how Bruno perceived himself and his family and to discuss the impact of this on 
his relationships with those of significance with whom he had to live and deal on a 
daily basis. This in turn may throw some small light on the nature of elite life in this 
period of the Empire's history. 
Finally, it is interesting to consider Bruno's subsequent reputation as a leading 
exponent of the feud in the context of the recent work on that topic by Hillay Zmora. 
' Bruno is first mentioned in the archive in 1344 and his death occurred in 1398. Both events are 
referenced in more detail within the body of this dissertation. 
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Zmora's book State and nobility in early modern Germany: the knightly feud in 
Franconia, 1440-1567 has taken scholarship in this area forward by seeking to 
analyse and understand the motivation of fenders and the role played by the feud in 
the process of state-building in the late medieval Empire.^  Given that Bruno, i f he is 
mentioned at all, most frequently appears in the historiography by reference to his 
feuding activities, it is of interest to examine the extent to which Zmora's core thesis 
can be shown to apply in a different region and at an earlier time. 
As mentioned above, there is something of a dearth of modem secondary literature 
available in any language which covers the matters under consideration in this 
dissertation. I f this is true of Alsace in general, it is even more the case with the 
Rappoltstein family in particular. Of such scholarship as relates to the events of 
Bruno's life, much is contained in obscure French regional history journals of the 
nineteenth century which are sometimes referenced (often not very precisely) in other 
works of the same period and which have proved impossible to locate easily. Of 
other, more modem scholarship, most is again concemed with a later period in the 
family's history. Some of these works do include consideration of the fourteenth 
century by way of introduction and context but none of them extends beyond a 
general and relatively superficial analysis of the period.^ 
* Hillay Zmora, State and Nobility in Early Modern Germany: the Knightly Feud in Franconia, 1440-
/567 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
' There is only a handfiil of publications that touch upon the matters in hand. They are: Rudolf Brieger, 
Die Herrschqft Rappoltstein. Ihre Entstehung und Entwickelung, [Beitrdge zur Landes- und 
Volkeskunde von Elsass-Lothringen. Hft. 31.J (Strassburg, 1907), Ursula Huggle, Fiir unser' Miih' und 
Arbeit nit ein Korn : dorflicher Alltag im 16. Jahrhundert: Eschbach bei Staufen unter der Herrschaft 
Rappoltstein: Dorfordnungen im Anhang, Themen der Landeskunde ; 7 (Buhl/Baden: Konkordia, 
1996), Benoit Jordan, La Noblesse d'Alsace entre la Gloire et la Vertu : les Sires de Ribeaupierre, 
1451-1585, Collection "Recherches et documents"; 44 (Strasbourg: Editions Societe savante d'Alsace : 
Diffusion, Libr. Oberlin, 1991), Fr6d6ric Auguste Ortlieb, 'Histoire de la Reformation dans la ci-devant 
Seigneurie de Ribeaupierre : Pr6c6d6e d'une Notice Historique sur cette Seigneurie avant le Seizidme 
Sidcle : Th6se' (Strasbourg, 1842), Rathgeber, Die Herrschaft Rappoltstein, Louis SUss, Geschichte der 
Reformation in der Herrschaft Rappoltstein (Zabem i. E.: A Fuchs, 1914). Each of these works has 
been consulted but has proved of limited value. Potentially the most promising is Brieger's study of 
the development of the Rappoltstein lordship. However, he is concemed with Herrschaft in the sense 
of its physical assets and his study comprises a detailed consideration of the territories and rights of the 
lordship with little or nothing concerning the people. In his introduction (Ibid p. 13) he is clear that his 
only concern is to investigate the question of the family's relationship to the Reich and the 
Landgrafschaft. This does nonetheless provide some interesting insights into the status of the family 
and their view of themselves and is discussed at the relevant points below. One modem work is 
missing from this list. There exists today in Cologne a Catholic Student Society which was founded in 
the nineteenth century in Strassburg and which takes its name from the Rappoltstein family - KDStV 
Rappoltstein Strafiburg zu Kdln. Although it has no special association with the Rappoltstein family 
per se other than having purloined the name at its foundation, the society has recently celebrated its 
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In the absence of a substantial secondary literature it has been necessary to work 
extensively fi-om primary sources. Chief amongst these is the nineteenth century 
collection in five volumes of the Rappoltstein family archives and other documents 
related to the family by Karl Albrecht under the title of Rappoltsteinisches 
Urkundenbuch .^'^ 
Two other primary sources have provided some further useful information. First is 
the contemporary city chronicle of Strassburg written by a member of the chapter of 
St Thomas in Strassburg, Jakob Twinger von Konigshofen and published in a 
scholarly edition in the nineteenth century which has been more recently republished 
in facsimile." 
hundredth anniversary with the publication of a Festschrift. Within this publication is a detailed 
chronicle of the Rappoltstein family from its earliest origins to the modem day. This chronicle has also 
been made available via the society's website. Although not strictly a work of professional historical 
scholarship, the information has been carefully assembled and is fully referenced to a professional 
standard. This publication does not pretend to go much beyond an assembly of chronological data and 
a brief summary of some of the published literature but, as such, has proved invaluable as a pathfinder. 
The author, Dr. Fritz Ortwein, has additionally been helpful in my direct email exchanges with him on 
specific points. This publication, Friedrich J. Ortwein, "Chronik Rappoltstein," (Cologne: 2005)., may 
be found at http://www.afv-asgovia.de/RapHerrenl/index.html. 
Karl Friedrich Hermann Albrecht, Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch, 5 vols. (Colmar: 1891). Within 
this work Albrecht has collected a range of documents and documentary fragments which are presented 
in the original medieval languages (German, French and Latin) with the normal scholarly apparatus 
concerning manuscript variations etc. The documents are presented chronologically and each is 
sequentially numbered within its own volume. Such documents are referenced by volume and number 
throughout this dissertation which follows the practice of historians who have written about the family. 
Apart from occasional footnotes related mainly to dating issues and a brief rubric summarising the 
content in very general terms at the head of some documents, there is no commentary. The 
Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch, of which there is only one copy in this country held at the British 
Library, has been the principal source for the case studies of Bruno's life. 
" Jakob Twinger von KOnigshofen, Die Chroniken der Oberrheinischen Stddte : Strassburg, ed. C 
Hegel, 2 vols. (GSttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1961). Twinger was bom in 1346 which makes 
him a close but slightly younger contemporary of Bmno. He was ordained priest in 1382 and in 1395 
he became a canon of the chapter of St Thomas in Strassburg. He remained in this position until his 
death in 1420. In the clerical hierarchy of Sfrassburg at this time, the chapter of the cathedral was 
reserved exclusively for members of the great families of the German landed nobility while the chapter 
of St Thomas was populated largely with the sons of the Strassburg urban nobility and was the second-
ranking religious institution in the city. Little is known of the detail of Twinger's life but it is clear 
from contemporary records that by the time of his death he was a well-regarded member of the clerical 
community. His memorial can still be seen in the church today. During his time at St Thomas he was 
entrusted with the care of the archives. He was both Apostolic and imperial notary and his name 
appears in a number of documents in various capacities. J n addition to his vernacular chronicle, 
Twinger was the author of a number of Latin works. It is clear from the tone of Twinger's chronicle 
that he wrote primarily as a man of Strassburg or, at least, that his intended audience was a group 
within that city that would wish to have its local history written with Strassburg as hero. As to the 
identity of that group, Twinger states in the introduction to his chronicle that he has chosen to write in 
German so that his work would be accessible to die kluogen legen and not just to gelerte pfaffen. He 
fiirther makes it clear that this audience's interest is primarily in nuwen dingen rather than more 
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Finally, the published medieval archive of the city of Strassburg has provided fiirther 
useful material.'^ This selection of documents was similarly collected and published 
in a scholarly edition during the nineteenth century in a similar manner to the 
Rappoltstein archives. 
ancient matters. This, however, is all within the context of the larger chronicle which follows the 
tradition of universal chronicles which attempt to summarise the history of mankind from the Creation. 
(For a discussion of the typology of medieval monastic chronicles see Steven Vanderputten, 'Typology 
of Medieval Historiography Reconsidered:a Social Re-interpretation of Monastic Annals,Chronicles 
and Gesta,' Historical Social Research, 26, no. 4 (2001).) The chronicle also includes a summary of 
the lives of the popes, emperors and bishops of Sfrassburg, derived from a range of well-known 
medieval sources. In describing these in the context of the recent history of Sfrassburg and Alsace he is 
forcefiilly outspoken in his defence of the city's freedoms whenever they are threatened by outside 
forces, whether religious or secular, popes, bishops, emperors and nobles are all criticized at various 
points. Given that the chapter of St Thomas in Strassburg at this time was drawn extensively from the 
families of the local urban governing classes and was thus viewed more favourably by the city 
authorities than the cathedral chapter which was associated with the landed nobility, it may be 
reasonable to suppose that Twinger's vernacular historical writings were directed primarily to that 
audience, irrespective of the detail of his own origins. While it is not especially likely that he would 
have known Bruno personally, he may well have been acquainted with Bruno's older brother Hugo 
who was, for much of the period under consideration, the provost of the cathedral chapter. He would, 
almost certainly, have known some of the main characters in the key events surrounding Bruno's 
disputes with the city of Sfrassburg which he describes in considerable detail. His perspective on these, 
albeit clearly partisan, are an important addition to the picture revealed in the documents of the 
Rappoltstein archive. In addition to the mformation given by Hegel in his infroduction to Twinger's 
chronicle, the current state of knowledge of Twinger's life is summarised in Klaus Kirchert, Stddtische 
Geschichtsschreibubg und Schulliteratur. Rezeptionsgeschichtliche Studien zum Werk von Fritsche 
Closener und Jakob Twinger von Konigshofen, vol. 12, WissensUteratur in Mittelalter (Wiesbaden: Dr 
Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1993), pp. 1-19. See also Kurt Ruh, Wolfgang Stammler, and Karl Langosch, 
Die Deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters : Verfasserlexikon, 2., vOllig neu bearbeite Aufl. / ed. (Berlin: 
De Gruyter, 1978), ix, col 1183 
Johannes Fritz, Urkundenbuch der Stadt Strassburg. Bd.6, bearb. von J. Fr/Yz (Strassburg: 1899). 
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Chapter I Alsace - Early History to 1262 13 
When Ulrich VII von Rappoltstein died in 1377 his youngest brother Bruno found 
himself, perhaps unexpectedly, in sole control of the principal lordships of one of the 
leading noble families in the Alsace region of the Empire.Bruno's father, Johannes 
III, had fathered nine children by his wife Countess Elisabeth von Geroldseck Lahr, 
of which five were boys. Three sons had found important ecclesiastical positions in 
the cathedral chapters of Basel and Strassburg, leaving Johannes V to hold the 
primary lordships of Rappoltstein and the youngest, Bruno, to pursue a life which 
involved service at the court of Philip the Bold (duke of Burgimdy 1363-1404), 
participation in tournaments and military service (with Philip) against the English.'^ 
With the death of Johannes V in 1368, his brother Ulrich Vl l had given up his 
position in the cathedral chapter of Strassburg and had returned to the secular life. 
The family lordships were then partitioned between Ulrich VII and Bruno.'* When 
Ulrich VII died in 1377 Bruno was probably between thirty-five and forty-five years 
of age (the date of his birth is unrecorded but there is some evidence for his age - this 
is discussed briefly below), another brother had died and his last surviving brother 
Hugo held the important position of Domprobst, head of the cathedral chapter, in 
Strassburg: a powerful office that he would have been unlikely to renounce to become 
involved in the management of the family estates when an experienced altemative 
The following sections relating to the history of Alsace make subsantial use of: Philippe Dollinger, 
Histoire de I'Alsace, Univers de la France et des pays francophones, histoire des provinces 
([Toulouse]: Privat, 2001), Chapters 3-5, Rodolphe Reuss, Histoire d'Alsace, Nouvelle 6d. rev., cor. et 
augm. ed., Vieilles provinces de France. (Paris: Boivin & cie, 1920). For a detailed study of the early 
medieval history of Alsace see Hans J. Hummer, Politics and Power in Early Medieval Europe : 
Alsace and the Prankish realm, 600-1000, Cambridge studies in medieval life and thought. 4th ser. ; 
65. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
In common with many others, the Rappoltstein family made frequent re-use of forenames. In the 
literature relating to the family it is common practice in to refer to holders of one or more of the 
Rappohstein lordships by a combination of the forename and a designatory number. I have followed 
this convention. Where a forename is borne for the first or only time in this way (as is the case with 
Bruno von Rappoltstein) many authors omit the numeric designator. Again, I have followed this 
convention. Members of the family who did not hold family lordships are referred to simply by their 
forenames. 
" The structure of the Rappoltstem family lordships is extremely complex with various partitions and 
reunifications prior to the partition of 1368. The most comprehensive study of the structure and 
development of the Rappoltstein lordships remains Brieger, Die Herrschaft Rappoltstein. Later authors 
have disputed specific points of detail but none has attempted a similarly comprehensive study on the 
scale of Brieger's work. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 54. 
Page 14 
was available.'^  It is at this point that Bruno begins a series of feuds and quarrels 
which were to be the defining features of the next thirty years of his life until his 
death in 1400 and which form the core of this discussion. 
To gain some understanding of Bmno's behaviour during this period and to consider 
this in the broader context of feuding in later medieval Germany it is necessary to 
look in some detail at the history of Alsace and the place within that history occupied 
by the Rappoltstein dynasty. 
I have split this background into two sections. The period to 1262 comprises the early 
history of Alsace and the origins of the Rappoltstein family vAthin the region up to the 
period of Interregnum following the demise of the Hohenstaufen dynasty and the 
battle of Hausbergen which saw the city of Sfrassburg remove itself from the 
overlordship of its bishop. The second period from 1262 to 1362 traces the century 
prior to the death of Joharmes III von Rappoltstein, Bruno's father, and provides a 
sense of the immediate world into which Bmno was bom and the circumstances of 
Bruno's formative years. 
According to Twinger, the province of Alsace owed its origin to settlement by three 
peoples: first, those of Trier whose origins he traces back to the founders of Babylon; 
second, the Romans and other Italians and finally, the Franks whose forefathers, 
Twinger recounts, were the descendants of Troy. It was not uncommon for 
chroniclers to seek to trace the ancestry of their region back to the great heroes and 
peoples of the ancient world and while there is some substance to his view, the reality 
is rather more prosaic. 
Bounded on two sides by the dominating natural features of the Rhine and the Black 
Forest mountains to the east and the Vosges mountains to the west, Alsace has found 
itself a border region for most of its history with a topography that does not naturally 
connect it to the greater territories that lie to the east and the west, as shown in Figure 
1. It has not always been clear whether Alsace was the border of the German-
" Ibid., 2, Stammtafel pp 694 - 695. 
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speaking territories with the French-speaking or vice versa. This ambiguity has 
remained to the present day. 
• PIRMASENSiD: 
GUEMINI 
SAINT^E 
l !EIBURG I B (D) 
Figure 1 The Topography of Alsace 18 
Alsace was conquered by JuHus Caesar in the middle of the first century BC and 
remained a part of the Roman empire for the next six centuries. Following the 
withdrawal of the Romans, the region was subject to invasion and settlement by the 
Alemanni, a Germanic tribe, in the fifth century who in turn were conquered and 
subjected to the control of the Frankish king, Clovis. ft was subsequent to the 
conversion of Clovis in 498 that orthodox Christianity first came to Alsace. 
During the period of Frankish rule the inhabitJints and territory were first described 
respectively as Alsacii and Alsatia. 
Society Alsacienne d'Entomologie - The map may be found at: 
http://claude.schott.free.fr/images/alsace.ipg 
Page 16 
The period following the death of Charlemagne in 814 saw a lengthy struggle 
between his grandsons for control of the imperial territories. Alsace suffered directly 
from the ravages of this civil war and was the site of an important battle between the 
rival parties near Sigolsheim in 833. In 841, in the aftermath of the battle of Fontanet, 
Strassburg was the venue for the agreement that was to led to the Treaty of Verdun in 
843.'^  Under the agreed terms of the treaty, Alsace fell within Lotharingia, part of a 
narrow middle strip of imperial territories granted to one of Charlemagne's grandsons, 
Lothar. When Lothar's son died without a legitimate heir, a second division in 870 
under the Treaty of Mersen placed Alsace in the hands of Louis the German where it 
was organised as two coimties, frequently referred to as Nordgau (in the north) and 
Sundgau (in the south). 
In 925, during the reign of the first Saxon king of Germany, Henry the Fowler, Alsace 
became a part of the Duchy of Swabia at the time of the incorporation of the Duchy of 
Lorraine into the German-speaking territories. This largely removed from Alsace the 
immediate threat of attempted invasion from the west. Despite some half-hearted 
attempts to reclaim the territory by the last of the French-speaking Carolingians, 
Alsace remained a German-speaking territory and subsequently a part of the Holy 
Roman Empire from this point until control passed to the French in the seventeenth 
century. 
The dukes of Swabia styled themselves additionally as the dukes of Alsace, a practice 
continued intermittently until the fall of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. 
During the eleventh century Alsace remained partitioned into the two great counties 
created during the Frankish era. The landgraves, holders of the ruling office 
associated with these counties were unable to exercise complete authority within their 
territories which were composed of many smaller lordships, each of which had its 
own established privileges. At the beginning of the twelfth century the Frankish 
coimties of Nordgau and Sundgau were replaced by the landgraviates of Upper and 
" The record of this agreement, known as the "Oath of Strassburg", is one of the oldest known written 
examples of both French and German. 
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Lower Alsace, each with its own regional court.^ '' This division also marked the 
border between the dioceses of Basel and Strassburg and has remained imtil the 
present day. 
It appears that this reorganisation under Lothar III (1125-38) was intended to reaffirm 
the authority of the counts as a means to counterbalance the growing power of the 
neighbouring Hohenstaufen dukes of Swabia. In Upper Alsace the title of Landgrave 
was held by the counts of Habsburg from the beginning of the twelfth century while 
in Lower Alsace the title passed through several hands and was eventually held by the 
counts of Ottingen until they sold most of their rights and possessions in the title to 
the bishops of Strassburg in 1359. In neither case, however, did it prove possible to 
establish imified political control comparable to the neighbouring lordships of 
Lorraine and the Palatine. Even at this early stage, Dollinger comments 'I'Alsace 
etait vouee a un morcellement territorial croissant'. '^ 
With the coming of the Hohenstaufen dynasty Alsace was constituted as a single 
imperial province and alongside the landgraviates, the rights of the king within the 
province were administered by provincial governors, sometimes generally in respect 
of the whole province, sometimes separately for Upper and Lower Alsace and 
sometimes with a more specific jurisdiction as in the case of the governors of 
Hagenau and Kaisersberg.'^ ^ The thirteenth century was a period of great activity in 
the construction of castles in Alsace and generally. Dollinger estimates that some five 
hundred were built by the Alsatian nobility in this period thus reinforcing the 
fi-actured nature of local territorial control. In several cases groups of castles were 
constructed close together, often as a result of the successive partitions of noble 
The designation 'Upper' and 'Lower' relates to the topography of the region - Upper Alsace equates 
to the former Sundgau and Lower Alsace to the former Nordgau. 
^' DoWinger, Histoire de rAlsqce, p. 87. 
For more detailed background to this period see Benjamin Arnold, German Knighthood, 1050-1300 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). and Karl Bosl, Die Reichsministerialitat der Salier und Staufer: ein 
Beitrag zur Geschichte des hochmittelalterlichen deutschen Volkes, Staates und Reiches, Monumenta 
Germaniae Hislorica. Schriften; Bd. 10. (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1950). and Hartmut Boockmann, 
Stauferzeit und spates Mittelalter: Deutschland 1125-1517, 2. Aufl. ed., Das Reich und die Deutschen. 
(Berlin: Siedler, 1993). 
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estates. The Rappoltstein family is a good example of this with three castles being 
built at different points on the same hillside as shown in Figure 1?^ 
Hoh- Rappol ts tei n 
Ulrichsburg 
Figure 2 The Three Rappoltstein Castles 
Of equal significance was the development of towns throughout Alsace. At the start 
of the twelfth century there existed just one town, Strassburg. By the first half of the 
thirteenth century this number had risen to forty. A fiirther twenty eight towns were 
created in the second half of the century following the demise of the Hohenstaufen, by 
which time Alsace had become one of the most urbanised regions of the Empire.^ '* 
This is shown quite clearly in Figure 3. 
The naming of the three castles has changed over the years. The labels in Figure 2 give the present 
names. The detailed topography (as given in Ortwein, "Chronik Rappoltstein," p. 637.) is: 'Die 
nordliche, auf der Bergspitze gelegene Burg ist Hoh-Rappoltstein (642 Meter Uber NN), genannt bis 
zum Bau der Ulrichsburg: Rappoltstein, danach auch Altenkastel, Alter Kasten, Hohen-Rappoltstein, 
Oberes SchloB, Hohe Veste Rappoltstein. Die mittlere, Giersberg (528 Meter liber NN), wurde 
bezeichnet als: Sten, Burg Stein, der Stein, Klein-Rappoltstein. Die sOdliche, die Ulrichsburg (530 
Meter ilber NN), wurde genannt: SchloB Rappoltstein, GroB-Rappoltstein, Niederburg, UnterschloB, 
GroBe Veste Rappoltstein.' The image has been sourced from the online version of the Chronik. 
Dollinger, Hisloire de I'Alsace, p. 111-112. 
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Figure 3 Urban Density in the Alsace Region 25 
The concentration of urban settlements in the Alsace region contrasts with the much 
more widespread distribution of towns in the neighbouring areas. Du Boulay 
describes the south and west of late medieval Germany as covered 'by a fairly large 
number of substantial towns of the second rank which ... were within four to five 
'^ Based on the map appearing in Scott, Regional Identity, p. 80. 
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hours' ride of each other'.'^ ^ This just serves to point up the very different picture in 
Alsace at that time. The greater concentration of settlements (as shown in Figure 3 
above) in very close proximity and frequently under the control of different lords, 
created a fertile ground for disputes, such as that between the Rappoltsteins and the 
Giersbergs. 
At some point in the first half of the thirteenth century the Rappoltsteins had 
constructed a second castle overlooking the settlement at Rappoltsweiler for their own 
occupation. Originally referred to simply as der Stein, it is today known as the 
Giersberg - see Figvire 2?^ During the same period the Rappohsteins had acquired as 
a fief fi-om the bishop of Basel, a village in the nearby Munster valley (some twelve 
miles to the southwest of Rappoltsweiler) and had commenced the building of a new 
fortress there. The Giersbergs, a family of imperial ministeriales, held a fortress 
overlooking the same village and were unhappy at the arrival of the Rappoltsteins 
whom they considered a threat. Following a period of feuding which extended over 
several years, during which the Giersberg family fragmented into a number of 
weakened branches, the more powerful Rappoltsteins were able to obtain a settlement 
that enabled them to purchase the original family castle of the Giersbergs in the 
Munster valley in exchange for the primary branch of the Giersbergs receiving der 
Stein as a fief fi-om the Rappoltsteins. The Giersbergs were thus now situated 
between the two main Rappoltstein castles at Rappoltsweiler. Peace was not 
maintained for very long and violent disputes between the two families continued 
imtil the castle at Rappoltsweiler finally reverted to the Rappoltsteins in 1422. 
This rapid urban development within Alsace was driven by two factors: first, a desire 
on the part of the local population to live in a protected area fi-om where they could 
carry on their trade and commerce and, second, the encouragement of the nobility, 
from the sovereign downwards, who saw the growth of towns as a means to increase 
both their power and their revenues and who encouraged their growth by the granting 
F.R.H. Du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages (London: Athlone, 1983), p. 118 citing, C. T 
Smith, An Historical Geography of Western Europe before 1800 (1967). 
A l b r e c h t , l , N o . 6. 27 
Guy Trendel, La Region de Ribeauville : Saint-Ulrich, Haut-Ribeaupierre, Girsberg, Reichenstein, 
Bilstein-Aubure et Ribeauville, Decouvrir les chateaux forts des Vosges ; fasc. 7 (Sarreguemines: 
Pierron, 2001), pp. 42-44. 
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of various privileges. This growth in urban development was not unique to Alsace, ft 
has been estimated that the number of towns in Germany as a whole increased tenfold 
during the thirteenth century.'^ ^ 
While many of these new towns were of very limited size in terms of population, their 
defining featiire was the possession of defensive walls and fortifications. It is the 
permission to create a stone wall that is most often seen in the foundation statutes of 
the Alsatian towns and it is this defensive fimction that best explains the creation of so 
many towns very close together but under the jurisdiction of different lords. As the 
towns grew in size and prosperity the desire of the population for an increasing 
measure of autonomy developed commensurately. Those towns originally promoted 
by and dependent directly on the emperor (Reichsstddte) were able to make greater 
progress than those which remained under the control of a local lord, {Landstddte). 
The exception was Strassburg which had remained the most important urban centre of 
the region. 
During the eleventh and twelfth centuries the city of Strassburg was firmly under the 
control of its bishop. In this period of conflict between pope and emperor the city 
generally gave its support to the emperor and was rewarded by the grant of various 
immunities and prerogatives. Over the following forty years the city continued to 
gain an increasing measure of independence which was unwelcome to its bishops. 
Alongside the growing ambitions of the urban patriciate, the bishops had to contend 
with another constraint on the power - that of the chapter of the cathedral of 
Strassburg. In the tenth century the chapter had been fully under the bishops' control 
but by the middle of the thirteenth century the nature of the chapter had changed from 
that of a monastic cormnunity to a powerfixl body which recruited its membership 
more and more exclusively from the ranks of the higher nobility and which delegated 
most of its day-to-day spiritual functions to canons of less illustrious birth. The role 
of the chapter in diocesan affairs grew over time to the point where it was able to limit 
certain episcopal acts without its consent and to impose conditions prior to the 
election of new bishops. Politically the chapter was strong enough to take a position 
Du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages, p. 115. 
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in support of the papacy, contrary to that of the bishops, in the Investiture Crisis and 
to support the town of Strassburg in its disputes with the bishops throughout the first 
half of the thirteenth century. Over time the chapter became increasingly exclusive in 
terms of whom it would admit to membership. In later times Erasmus would write 
that the cathedral chapter at Strassburg was so exclusive that not even Jesus himself 
would have been considered noble enough for admission.^ *^  
Despite these issues the fall of the Hohenstaufen appeared to provide the bishops of 
Strassburg with an ideal opportunity to create an ecclesiastical principality in Alsace. 
By this time the bishops were already the richest and most powerful lords in the 
region. It is estimated that some two himdred villages were episcopal fiefs and there 
was hardly a noble family in Lower Alsace that did not hold property from the 
bishop. '^ To increase this power base ftirther, the Hohenstaufen possessions in Alsace 
were appropriated by the bishops and it was at this time, in the absence of a viable 
imperial authority, that they adorned themselves with the title of Landgrave of the 
whole of Alsace and were recognised as such, at least within Lower Alsace. 
However, they lacked the material resources to consolidate this position and to build a 
fiefdom to compare with those of Trier, Mainz or Cologne. This period was fertile 
ground for both the ambitions of the local nobility and the aspirations towards 
independence of the urban communities, assisting fiirther the dislocation of Alsace 
into a mass of ecclesiastical and secular lordships which persisted throughout the 
medieval period. This dislocation of the region is important to the following 
discussion of the life of Bruno von Rappoltstein. Figiire 4 clearly illustrates the point. 
Although this map is drawn at the end of the medieval period, the position throughout 
the preceding period would not have been significantly different with the main 
exception that those areas marked as Territories autrichiens (the Habsburg 
possessions) would not have been as extensive for the earlier part of period. Of the 
wider south-west of the Empire during the Middle Ages, Benjamin Arnold has said. 
There were five bishoprics in the south-west, Strassburg, Basel, Constance, 
Augsburg and Chur. There were about forty comital dynasties; nearly fifty 
imperial towns defending their independence upon the last shreds of the royal 
^"For a brief overview of the "closed shop" nature of German cathedral chapters see Zmora, State and 
Nobility, 81-82. 
'^ Dollinger, Histoire de I'Alsace, p. 95. 
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fisc; and over fifty substantial monasteries as well as numerous imperial 
ministeriales with their own castles and fiefs. All of these landowners were 
establishing viable territorial autonomy in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries.^  
Benjamin Arnold, Princes and Territories in Medieval Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p 272. 
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La mosaique territoriale 
A la fin du Moyen Age est installee la mosaique qui n'6voluera plus que t r ^ peu jusqu'en 1789. 
L'Alsace est morcelte en une quarantalne d'entltfc polltlques de quatre types : les principautfc 
eccleslastiques (^vechfe de Strasbourg et de Spire, abbaye de Murbach), les princlpautfe lalques 
(Habsbourg, Hanau-Lichtenberg, Wurtemberg, Palatinat Ribeaupierre, Fleckenstein), les onze villes 
libres, les possessions des chevaliers d'Empire, d'un d une deml-douzaine de villages. 
Landau 
I'irniaM-iis 
L O R i j 
Wiwembonrg 
Biti.hf 
„ • 
lla)!ucnau 
IN Baden 
Baden 
Strasbonrg kcHI 
Ohcinai 
I I Pililinat Dnii Ponti 
I I Hanau-lichlenbeig 
• EviclKdeSlrufaoun! 
Q RcpubliquedeSlraAourj 
•1 ClKvalknd'Eiiipirc 
1^1 Ribcaupifrre 
CH VllkalibtC! 
I I TerritotrM autrichicTw 
• Wuitembeis^blDndxIiaid 
^1 Fleckcnstfin 
W I R T K M B I R I . 
lanoaux-Min 
iitkolsheim 
Brisach 
• Fribourg 
KIIVCII 
tnsisheii 
Mullinuse • 
B R 1 S G ^ 
• l t . - l lnt t D 
FRANCHE-
COMTE 
Bale 
CONFEDERATION HELVETIQUE 
L'Alsace avant 1648. 
Figure 4 Alsace at the end of the Middle Ages 
Thus, by the middle of the thirteenth century a pattern of multiple small lordships 
lacking an overarching territorial prince and a growing number of urban settlements 
seeking some measure of independence had been established in Alsace. This pattern 
Bernard Vogler, Histoire de 1'Alsace (Rennes: Editions Ouest-France, 2002), p. 19. 
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was remforced in the years immediately preceding Bruno's birth, contributing, as will 
be seen, in no small measure to his self-view and the manner in which he related to 
those with whom he later came into conflict. 
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Chapter II Alsace - Later History (1262 - 1362)^ '* 
In his introduction to the later medieval period of Alsatian history, DoUinger writes 
'En regard des siecles luminaires des Hohenstaufen, la fin du moyen age apparait pour 
r Alsace, ainsi d'ailleurs que pour toute 1'Europe, comme une periode de catastrophes 
et de miseres.''^ ^ He goes on to give a conventional list of the woes of the period -
epidemic illness, depopulation of the countryside, massacres of the Jews, urban 
revolution, invasions from external forces and the 'rule of the fist'. Another historian 
of the region, Lucien Sittler, describes this period as 'une periode de troubles et 
desordres" and goes on to say, "Les puissances locales agissaient a leur guise ; les 
seigneurs-brigands ... commettaient de nombreux mefaits, et le pays etait abandonne 
aux violences et aux pillages"^^ Of Germany as a whole, James Bryce wrote in his 
classic study of the Empire, "Every floodgate of anarchy was opened: prelates and 
barons extended their domains by war: robber-knights infested the highways and 
rivers: the misery of the weak, the tyranny and violence of the strong, were such as 
had not been seen for centuries."^^ 
Recent studies of this period question the extent to which this view is supportable. 
This is an issue which will be considered in more detail below in the context of 
violence and feuding and, in any event, it should be contrasted with the more positive 
developments in terms of the growth of commercial activity, the spread of a more 
democratic mode of local goverrmient within the major urban areas and a number of 
significant cultural achievements, most notably the construction of the gothic 
cathedral of Strassburg. It is clear, nonetheless, that this was a challenging time in 
which to have been bom and would be expected to have produced individuals who 
would be conditioned by the world in which they lived. 
It is during this period that a number of themes arise which are directiy relevant to 
Bruno's various disputes. The rise of Strassburg and its relationship with the bishops 
The sources for the general history in this section are the same as for the previous chapter. 
" Dollinger, Histoire de I'Alsace, p. 133. 
Lucien Sittler, L'Alsace, Terre d'Histoire (Cohnar: Editions Alsatia, 1984), p. 77. 
" James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire (London: MacMillan, 1904), p. 214. 
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of Strassburg; the development of the city government of Strassburg and the city's 
rather inward-looking and self-centred world view. 
In general terms, the demise of the Hohenstaufen, who had spent much time in the 
region, led to Alsace being largely ignored by future German rulers who visited only 
rarely and thus exercised little direct influence in the region with the exception of 
successive emperors granting further privileges to Strassburg and to the various 
imperial towns of Alsace. The exception to this was the Habsburg Rudolf I (king of 
the Romans 1273-1291) whose family originated in the region and who held the 
office of landgraves of Upper Alsace. Rudolf took a prominent role in stemming the 
ambitions of the bishops of Strassburg and, as will be seen below, had a direct and 
sometimes difficult relationship with the Rappoltsteins. 
The growing ambition of the bishops of Sttassburg, their appropriation of much of the 
Hohenstaufen property within the region and their continued attempts to forge an 
ecclesiastical principality of Alsace following the end of the Hohenstaufen dynasty 
inevitably brought conflict with the leaders of other important noble families within 
the region, most notably the Habsburgs under the leadership of Rudolf who had also 
acquired properties in Lower Alsace by marriage. Similarly opposed to such an 
extension of the bishops' power were the towns, especially those imperial towns 
(which had valuable privileges to defend and which were now protected by their 
recently-built walls), the city of Strassburg and the cathedral chapter in Strassburg. In 
1246 bishop Heinrich von Stahleck seized and demolished two imperial castles. His 
successor, Walther von Geroldseck, proved even more aggressive and the conflict 
spread to all parts of Alsace. Towns and castles were besieged, taken and re-taken 
with Rudolf of Habsburg leading the opposition to the bishops' attempts to establish a 
dominant hold over the region. 
It was inevitable that this tension between the bishops and the factions opposing them 
would finally be resolved on the battlefield. In 1260 civil war broke out between the 
bishop and the Constojler of Strassburg.^ ^ The bishop attempted to gain the support 
Constofler (sometunes Constoffler) was the local term for the urban patriciate of Strassburg, 
deriving from their membership of private drinking clubs known as Constofel. 
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of the city burghers but failed to win them over. They joined with the Constofler and 
the bishop was defeated by their combined forces at the battle of Hausbergen in 1262. 
This defeat marked the end of the bishop's political authority over the city of 
Strassburg and as a part of the settlement he was required to leave the city and reside 
in his castle at Dachstein, some ten miles to the west, maintaining only administrative 
offices within the city gates. This custom of non-residence of the bishop of 
Strassburg was to continue until 1681 when Catholicism was restored to the city by 
Louis XIV and after the settlement of 1263 the relationship between the bishop and 
the city was to remain strained. 
The bishopric remained the largest and the most important lordship in the region but 
there was no longer the possibility of the bishops exercising any form of political 
control in Alsace generally. Sources of conflict between the bishops and the city of 
Strassburg continued to mirror larger disputes between the Empire and the papacy. 
The removal of the bishops as overlords of the city of Strassburg was mirrored 
elsewhere within Alsace as the larger towns sought to increase their independence. 
The developments within Strassburg are, however, of particular interest in that they 
have a direct bearing on the later feuding activities of Bruno von Rappoltstein. In 
particular the stance taken by the city when it became embroiled in the dispute which 
is the subject of case study 2 below and the subsequent dogged pursuit of Bruno by 
the city authorities described below in case study 3, need to be understood against the 
background of the way in which the city had developed in the preceding century. It 
thus worthwhile to describe this development briefly here. 
Much has been written about the history of medieval Strassburg, most notably 
perhaps by the early twentieth century scholar, Rodolphe Reuss. More recently the 
American scholar Miriam Usher Chrisman has written extensively on this topic and it 
is from her various publications that I have largely derived this summary.^ ^ 
The works in question are Miriam Usher Chrisman, Lay Culture, Learned Culture. Books and Social 
Change in Strasbourg 1480 -1599 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 14-27, 
Miriam Usher Chrisman, Strasbourg and the Reform. A Study in the Process of Change (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1967), Introduction: pp. xxiii-xxx. The most comprehensive 
English study of the evolving political structure of Strassburg is Thomas A. Brady, Ruling Class, 
Regime and Reformation at Strasbourg 1520-1555 (Leiden: Brill, 1978). 
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The new-found political independence of the city did not bring peace. Having taken 
power from the bishop, the Constqfler showed little inclination to share it with the 
burghers who had supported them. They grew increasingly arrogant and autocratic 
and sought to associate themselves with the local landed nobility (which would have 
included the Rappoftstein family), thus distancing themselves from their urban origins 
and from the burghers whom they considered to be inferior in all aspects. 
This attitude brought inevitable conflict with the powerful city guilds which had a 
tradition of maintaining their own administrative and judicial structures. The 
burghers had no wish to be subjected to new centralized city courts and accused the 
Constofler of abusing their position for their own aggrandizement. In 1332 the 
burghers seized control of the city goverrmient and a new structure was created which 
gave effective political control to the guilds but which permitted the Constofler to 
play a reduced role primarily concerned with the city's external relationships. 
It was now the turn of the leaders of the burghers to abuse their political power for 
selfish ends. In 1349 some younger elements of the Constofler families exploited the 
general climate of uncertainty caused by the arrival in the city of the Black Death to 
rouse the wider membership of the guilds against the three main city officials, who 
were deposed. As a result, the Constofler regained a degree of political status in the 
city and the remainder of the fourteenth century saw political office fluctuating 
between the two groups until matters were finally settled in 1422 with the Treaty of 
Speyer. Having said that, the overall political ascendancy of the burghers during this 
period was never seriously undermined. 
In the other major urban settlements, the imperial cities of Alsace, there were 
developments in local govermnent that were more or less analogous to those of 
Strassburg with control of the cities passing into the hands of the guilds following 
struggles between factions based upon the urban nobility and the guild-based urban 
patriciate. 
Over the same period, many smaller commvmities rose to the status of town, joining 
those that had enjoyed such elevation many years previously, including those towns 
such as Colmar and Schlettstadt which had been designated as imperial by earlier 
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emperors and kings. The majority of these newly created towns were of little 
importance. Reuss sums it up thus, 'bientot L'Alsace fiit remplie de ce qu'on 
pourrait appeler des embryons de cites, dotees tout au moins d'un mur d'enceinte, 
d'un marche, d'un statut municipal.'"'^  A few were able to move towards a measure 
of independence but the majority remained as small towns under the control of their 
territorial lord. Others declined back to no more than village status. 
The larger towns of Alsace continued to grow and to receive further imperial 
privileges. Politically, the imperial cities remamed of greater importance than those 
under the control of local lords. Unlike their counterparts in Switzerland or Italy 
however they showed little interest in asserting their influence by policies of territorial 
growth. Of more concern to the city authorities than territorial expansion was the 
fear that an emperor, short of cash, might pledge them by way of mortgage to a 
territorial prince with a consequent loss of independence and privilege. This concern 
was one cause of creation of a number of town leagues for mutual defence, most 
notably the league that has been subsequently labelled as the Decapole, founded in 
1354, nominally under the auspices of the emperor Charles IV.'*' Strassburg itself 
remained outside of such leagues. The Decapole was to prove a lasting and 
stabilising feature of the Alsatian political landscape but never attempted to exert a 
wider political influence in the relationships between the emperor, the city of 
Strassburg and the local dynasties. This is reflected below in case studies 2 and 3. 
Economically, the first half of the fourteenth century was a period of growth in 
Alsace. The geographical position of Strassburg and technological developments in 
barge-building were the drivers of this growth which centred around trans-shipment 
of goods between the rivers 111 and Rhine as a part of the trade route between Italy and 
northern Europe. Of the local goods exported from Alsace to other parts of Europe in 
this period, the most important was wme.'*^  Wine was produced throughout the region 
and exported through four major centres, Guebwilier, Colmar, Schlettstadt and 
Strassburg plus Cologne where major contracts were negotiated. It is estimated that 
Reuss, Histoire d'Alsace, p. 36. 
DoUinger, Histoire de I'Alsace, p. 144. 
For a detailed study of viticulture in the region in this period, see Tom Scott, 'Medieval Viticulture m 
the German-speaking Lands,' German History 20 (2002). 
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the total wine production of Alsace in the fourteenth century was of the order of one 
million hectolitres per annum. The quality of the wine was considered to be of the 
highest order and it is known that Alsatian wine was drunk as far afield as England, 
Russia and Scandinavia. There is some evidence of the export of wheat and barley 
but artisan-produced manufactured goods were sold mainly within the local markets.'*"' 
The conflict between Strassburg and its bishop had, as mentioned above, attracted the 
support of Rudolf of Habsburg on the side of the city authorities. When Rudolf 
succeeded as duke of Habsburg in 1250 he maintained a policy of strengthening the 
family's holdings in the Upper Rhine region. This process involved conflict with the 
bishops of both Basel and Strassburg in order to appropriate parts of the Hohenstaufen 
patrimony that had been lost upon the extinction of that line. He fought, and won, a 
number of local wars with the cadet branch of the family, the Habsburg-Laufenburgs 
and he was active in purchasing fiefs from impoverished neighbours.'*'* Thus the 
election of Rudolf as king of the Romans in 1273 may initially have appeared 
threatening to the local nobility but as Rudolfs attentions were soon to be directed 
much more to the east, such fears proved groundless and Rudolf remained popular in 
Alsace."*^ 
Without doubt, the most significant event of this period was the arrival of the Black 
Death in Alsace during 1349. In his chronicle, Twinger refers to it thus, "von disem 
sterbotte sturbent uf 16 tausent menschen zuo Strosburg, und starb men doch niit also 
vaste zuo Strosburg also anderswo." Twinger's estimate of sixteen thousand deaths 
may be an exaggeration based on public rumour at the time, given that the estimated 
population of Strassburg prior to the outbreak was of the order of twenty thousand but 
it is clear from his accounts that the plague had a substantial impact in Strassburg and 
the surrounding areas, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent than in other parts of Europe. 
This initial outbreak was followed by further sporadic epidemics in 1358, 1365 and 
1381.''^ 
For a detailed analysis of the economic activity within the region, see Scott, Regional Identity. 
The weakened position of the Habsburg-Laufenburg family is at the heart of case study 1 below. 
For more detail on the role of Rudolf see Oswald Redlich, Rudolf von Habsburg. Das deutsche Reich 
nach dem Untergange des alten Kaisertums (Innsbruck, 1903). 
"•^  DoUinger, Histoire de I'Alsace, p. 135. 
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The impact of the Black Death had a lastmg unpact on the rural economy of Alsace. 
There is evidence of a substantial decline in the number of villages in the region. In 
some cases it would appear that small villages were completely wiped out. In others, 
there is evidence of the survivors within one village moving to a neighbouring village 
whilst continuing to cultivate their existing land. DoUinger cites a number of other 
causes of this desertion of villages but concludes that the Black Death and succeeding 
epidemics were the principal cause. A fiirther phenomenon of the period, by no 
means confined to Alsace, was the fall in cereal prices which remained at a low level 
from the middle of the fourteenth century to the middle of the fifteenth century. 
Different lords reacted in different ways to these problems but in Alsace it was most 
notably by forcing peasants off the land which could then be given over to the more 
profitable (because less labour-intensive) cultivation of vines for wine-making. 
The question of the consequences of these events for the German nobility has been a 
matter of much discussion and debate and views have changed over time. This has 
been summarised recently by Tom Scott.'*^ The prevailing view for many years was 
that of a nobility fallen upon hard times by a combination of declining rural 
population and low grain prices and thus, 'forced to resort to brigandage to keep 
themselves and their families afloat, or else they hid behind threadbare notions of 
honour to launch feuds against other nobles, or more often towns, to rectify alleged 
slights and injustices, but in reality to hold them to ransom.''*^ This picture of 'robber 
barons' is still to be found in many works on late medieval Germany. Scott examines 
more recent scholarship and discredits this view as simplistic. Following a detailed 
analysis of the arguments based on the latest research he writes, 'What emerges from 
this analysis is a much more complex and less clear-cut image of the German nobility 
in the wake of the late medieval demographic and agrarian crisis.' Citing the research 
of Regina Gomer, he concludes, 'there was no general impoverishment or loss of 
political function' as regards the late medieval west German nobility.'*^ Scott then 
examines this view in the context of noble feuding, an issue which is considered in 
Tom Scott, Society and Economy in Germany, 1300-1600, European studies series (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2002), pp. 153-160. 
Ibid., p. 157. 
Ibid., p. 164. Scott cites Regina Goeraer, Raubritter: Untersuchungen zur Lage des 
spdtmittelalterlichen Niederadels, besonders im suedlichen Westfalen (Muenster: Aschendorffsche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1987). 
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more detail below. Suffice perhaps, at this stage, to record that both DoUinger and 
Reuss refer to the constant feuding of the Alsatian nobility as a feature of this period, 
and tend towards the established "robber knight" view but both decline to write at any 
great length on this topic, claiming it to be of little interest. 
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Chapter I I I The First Rappoltsteins 
Turning now to the Rappoltstein family, the following sections should be read in the 
context of the detailed genealogy contained in Appendix 1. 
The earliest reference to the settlement known in present times as Ribeauville and in 
the medieval period as Rappoltsweiler occurs in the eighth century as 
Ratbaldouilare.^ *^ The origins of the Rappoltsteins themselves are, however, obscure 
and of limited interest except as far as they contribute to the subsequent perception of 
the family's standing within the region. 
In the late medieval period, the family appears to have presented itself as directly 
descended from the Ursini, Italian dukes of Spoleto exiled as a consequence of their 
support for the emperor against the pope and compensated with the grant of 
substantial lands in Swabia where one branch constructed the castle of Urslingen and 
in Alsace, with another branch taking the title of Herr von Rappoltstein in place of 
that of duke of Spoleto. This version is most notably contained in the De Nobilitate et 
Rusticitate Dialogus written in the mid fifteenth century Felix von Malleolus von 
Zurich (known more generally as 'Hemmerlin').^' Different writers have placed this 
story in different periods but this genealogy has been treated as dubious by historians 
due to a lack of any supporting evidence and certain inconsistencies of dates. To the 
family, however, this link appears to have been of some importance in their view and 
presentation of themselves. There is evidence that Maximillian I I , grandson of Bruno, 
visited Italy towards the end of the fifteenth century, telling the inhabitants of Spoleto 
that he was of direct descent from their formers dukes, and that this genealogy was 
repeated at the beginning of the sixteenth century by William 11.^ ^ 
A l b r e c h t , l . N o s . Iff. 
A digitised copy of the full text of this work is to be found at http://diglib.hab.de/inkunabeln/139-
quod-2f-1 /start.htm. This copy is held in the collection of the Herzog Albert Bibliothek, Wolfenbtittel. 
The specific section detailing the origms of the Rappoltstein family is to be found at Image ID 110 
within the digitised document. 
Albrecht, RU, 1, XII. Albrecht expresses the view that the link to the dukes of Spoleto probably 
arises through the younger line and their connection to the von Urslingen family. 
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A few sparse references to the family exist for the period fi-om the late tenth century 
to the end of the twelfth century. The majority of these arise in antiquarian writings 
from the late medieval and early modem periods and are not supported by surviving 
primary evidence. The consensus, supported by the two main authorities, Karl 
Albrecht and Rudolf Brieger, however is that the original family died out in the male 
line towards the end of the twelfth century with the demise of three Rappoltstein 
brothers in the Second Crusade. According to family legend the commemoration of 
the death of these three brothers is the basis for the Rappoltstein armorial of three red 
inescutcheons on a white background (argent, three inescutcheons gules) shown in 
Figure 5 although the earliest depiction of this armorial is not found until almost a 
century later on the seal of Anselm I I (1277 - 1311). 
Figure 5 The Rappoltstein Armorial 
It was during the time of the older line that reference first appears (in 1084) to a castle 
overlooking the village of Rappoltsweiler.^^ Although there is no information 
concerning the building of the first castle, it is clear from what evidence survives that 
it was an imperial possession at the end of the eleventh century. It has been suggested 
that the castle may have been constructed and then extended as a counter to the castle-
building in the Nordgau of the Eguisheim-Dabo family who were supporters of the 
" Ibid., 1, Nos. 6-8. There is some debate amongst writers as to which of the two main Rappoltstein 
castles (icnown today as Hoh Rappohstein and Ubichsburg - see Figure 2 above) is the older. 
Albrecht, in his introduction the Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch, is firmly of the view that 
Ulrichsburg is the older (Ibid., 1, Einleitung XIII) but other writers disagree and the commanduig 
position of Hoh Rappoltstein with its panoramic view across the plains of Alsace and its dominance of 
the entrance to the Strengbach valley through the Vosges mountains towards France, would appear to 
have been a more likely strategic site for a first castle. 
Page 36 
papacy. In 1084 the castle and the village of Rappoltsweiler were given by the 
emperor to the bishop of Basel but taken back into imperial possession again in 1114 
before being returned to the bishop in 1162 by the Hohenstaufen emperor, Frederick 
I . There is no clear information surviving as to when or how the Rappoltstein 
family came into possession of the castle and village, but from the end of the twelfth 
century these possessions were held by the family as a fief from the bishops of Basel. 
It was with the marriage of Emma von Rappoltstein, sister of the three deceased 
brothers, to Egenolf von Urslingen that the younger line of the family commenced. 
It is only at this point that a clear connection with the Urslingen family can be 
demonstrated and it is this connection that appears to have been embroidered in later 
times to boost the noble origins of the Rappoltstein dynasty. 
In the four generations from this point to the fall of the Hohenstaufen, the 
Rappoltsteins were not prolific in the production of children and there is little 
surviving detail of their activities. Some indication of the standing of the family can 
nonetheless be gleaned from these few references. Egenolf s son Heinrich I is 
mentioned as a member of the cathedral chapter of Strassburg in 1185 and in 1186 
Egenolf and his son, Ulrich I , are recorded as acting as witnesses to a document 
sealed by emperor Frederick I . ^ ^ Ulrich I is later mentioned as acting as witness for 
the emperor Heuirich V I (king of the Romans 1169-1197, emperor from 1191) in 
1193 . In 1219 Anselm I is recorded as having entered into a military alliance with 
Duke Theobald of Lotharingia^^ and in 1241 there is reference to Ulrich I I 
pronouncing the sentence of death in respect of a local malefactor.^'' This latter item 
is of some importance in that it indicates that Ulrich I I had, in at least a part of the 
Rappoltstein lordship as it was constituted at that time, the power of hohe 
Gerichtsbarkeit, the highest judicial authority which permitted him to impose capital 
sentences. This in turn suggests that he may have possessed some degree of territorial 
sovereignty, in that area at least, which is a significant indicator of the family's status. 
Trendei, La Region de Ribeauville, pp. 4-6 and 12-15. 
"Albrecht, RU, 1, Nos. 7 and 24. 
Ibid., 1, Stammtafel pp. 706-707. 
" Ibid., l,No. 43. 
''Ibid., l,No.48. 
''Ibid., l,No. 51. 
*°Ibid., l,No. 75. 
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Brieger considers this aspect in some detail in his study of the lordship. This is 
considered in more detail below. The first record of the descendants of Egenolf 
specifically styling themselves as lords of Rappoltstein occurs in 1219 - 'Ego, 
Anselmus dominus de Rabapierre et frater meus Enguelos'.^' 
Despite the paucity of surviving Rappoltstein family documents from this period and 
any uncertainty about their origins, it is nonetheless clear that by the mid thirteenth 
century the Rappoltstein family was already long established in the region and was 
firmly seen by itself and others as an important member of the Uradel, old nobility, of 
Alsace. 
" Ibid., l,No. 50. 
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Chapter IV The Later Rappoltsteins 
This section deals with the Rappoltstein family in the period immediately preceding 
Bruno's birth. These are events that would have taken place during his grandparents ' 
and parents' lifetimes and represent the stories that he would have grown up with and 
the directly formative experiences that wil l have shaped Bruno's early years. As 
such, they are vital to an understanding of Bruno as a person and as background to 
his own life and exploits as detailed below. 
It is under the rule of Rudolf of Habsburg, following his election as king of the 
Romans in 1273, that evidence first appears of the Rappoltsteins as office-holders 
with Ulrich (probably IV but possibly III) mentioned as a regional judge in Alsace 
towards the end of the 1270s.^ ^ hi 1280 Rudolf installed Ulrich IV and his brothers 
Anselm I I and Heinrich IV with the royal office of castrensis at Kaisersberg as a part 
an extended reorganisation of imperial fortresses held by loyal vassals.^ ^ The 
Rappoltsteins had, in fact, held the castle at Kaisersberg, which is close to 
Rappoltsweiler, earlier in the thirteenth century, but had sold this to Heinrich V I I in 
1227.^ '* In the following year Rudolf visited the brothers and stayed in their castle.^ ^ 
Rudolfs relationship with the family was, however, not to remain on such a friendly 
basis. Ansehn I I was noted for his aggressive nature. In 1287 he launched an assault 
against Duke Frederick I I of Lorraine with whose family the Rappoltsteins had been 
associated for many years. He occupied the castle at St Hippolyte and burnt it down. 
He then drove deeper into Lorraine and is credited with the burning of some 120 
villages. He was involved in fiirther disputes with the town of Colmar and the lord of 
Horbourg 
In 1281 Rudolf was obliged to step in and resolve a family dispute arising from 
Anselm's refusal to partition the Rappoltstein estate with his brother (whom he 
*^  Redlich, Rudolf von Habsburg, p. 574. 
Ibid., p. 475. 
*^  Albrecht,/?i7, l,No. 63. 
" Trendel, La Region de Ribeauville, p. 17. 
^ Ibid. 
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expelled from his castle), his nephew and a female cousin. Rudolf ordered Anselm to 
proceed with the partition but he continued to refuse, with the result that Rudolf 
turned to military action against him and laid siege to Gross Rappoltstein. After three 
days, Rudolfs provost abandoned the siege in the absence of promised support from 
the citizens of Colmar and Kaisersberg. Attempts to negotiate a settlement between 
Anselm and his various enemies (including the lord of Horbourg) failed and Anselm 
proceeded to lay waste to Horbourg's lands. Rudolf now took charge of matters 
directly and laid siege to Gross Rappoltstein personally. Whilst in his camp, Rudolf 
was subject to an assassination attempt which he survived but which led to his 
departure from the area, leaving his forces to ensure that Anselm was cut of f from all 
sources of supply. Anselm was thus forced to make peace which was concluded in 
1288 at Colmar in the presence of Rudolf, the bishop of Strassburg, and 
representatives of the major noble families and towns of Alsace.^^ The involvement 
of such a distinguished group in the settlement speaks, in itself, of the importance of 
the family within the region. 
The peace agreed at Colmar did not, however, put an end to Anselm's military 
adventures. In 1293 he became party to the succession conflict between Rudolfs son 
Albert I and Adolf von Nassau. A supporter of Albert, Anselm seized the imperial 
town of Colmar. In response, Adolf pillaged the Rappoltstein lands, laid siege to both 
Colmar (where Anselm had taken refuge) and Rappoltsweiler, and blockaded the 
Rappoltstein casfles. After seven weeks of siege, the citizens of Colmar turned on 
Anselm, captured him and delivered him to Adolf Anselm was imprisoned and his 
lands were declared forfeit to Adolf In 1296 he was released and the lands were 
restored, subject to the partition that had been the cause of the earlier dispute.^^ 
Following the victory of Albert I and the death of Adolf at the battle of Gollheim in 
1298, the Rappoltsteins appear to have re-established their close ties to the new king 
who visited Rappoltsweiler in 1300 and whose wife, Elizabeth, stayed with the family 
" Ibid., pp. 17-18 citing Adam Walther Strobel and L. Heinrich Engelhardt, Vaterlaendische 
Geschichte des Elsasses von der fruehesten Zeil bis zur Revolution 1789, nach Quellen bearbeitet von 
A. W. S.,... fortgesetzt, von der Revolution 1789 bis 1815, von L. H. Engelhardt. Zweite Ausgabe (6 
Thie. Strassburg, 1851), pp. 88-91. 
Trendel, La Region de Ribeauville, pp. 18-19 citing Strobel and Engelhardt, Vaterlaendische 
Geschichte des Elsasses, pp. 101-111 and Auguste Scherlen, Perles d'Alsace (1926 - 1934), p. 424. 
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in May 1302.^ ^ In 1311, both Anselm I I and his brother Heinrich IV were in the 
entourage of the Swiss Minnesanger Count Werner von Homberg as a part of the 
expedition to Italy launched by the new king of the Romans, Heinrich V I I , to secure 
his coronation as emperor. The participation is recorded in one of the miniatures of 
the Manessische Handschrift, the great compilation of Middle High German verse 
produced circa 1300. The miniature in question, reproduced in Figure 6, depicts 
Count Werner on this expedition and was added at a later date by the so-called. 
Master of the Third Addition, probably in the decade between 1320 and 1330. 
Figure 6 The Rappoltstein Crest 
Trendei, La Region de Ribeauville, p. 19. 
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The third knight in the back row of the group following Count Werner has been 
identified as a Rappoltstein by the crest.^ *^  The participation of the two brothers is a 
ftirther indication that the family was, once again, in good standing with the Empire 
and of their significance. 
From the beginning of the fourteenth century the family archive becomes more 
extensive. Two documents indicate something of the standing of the Rappoltsteins at 
this point. A list of Anselm II's vassals compiled around 1300 lists thirty men 
(sometimes indicating that brothers and other family members are also to be 
included), while a similar list for his son Johannes I I compiled a few years later lists 
fifty five men on a similar basis.^' Further indications of the growing strength and 
importance of the family within the region are illustrated by a large number of 
surviving documents reproduced in the family archive. 
™ Nickel, 'Cloisters Apocalypse,' pp. 59-72. The article is concerned with the early history of the 
manuscript known as the 'Cloisters Apocalypse'. In constructing his argument, the author refers to the 
illustration in Figure 6. It would appear that he has identified the Rappoltstein knight by the crest and 
by cross-reference to the Zuricher Wappenrolle which is also shown for comparison. (See Thomas 
Woodcock and John Martin Robinson, The Oxford Guide To Heraldry (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), p. 78.) The crest may also be clearly seen as the knight's pillow in the Frontispiece. 
'^ Albrecht, RU, 1, No. 466 A & B. 
Ibid. The principal examples are : 
2, No. 536 1343 - Johannes III, Ulrich V and Johannes II enter into an alliance with the towns of 
Colmar and Selestat against anyone except the emperor and the empire. 
2, No. 559 1344 - Duke Rudolf of Lorraine acknowledges a debt of 509 Tours pounds ('kleine 
schwarze Tourer Pfiind') to Ulrich V and Johannes III. 72 
2, No. 610 1349 - Johannes III and his sons Johannes V and Ulrich VII are party to an agreement 
between the city of Strassburg, the bishop of Strassburg and the major of noble families of Alsace by 
which these agree to support the city if it is attacked on account of its treatment of the city's Jews. 
2, No. 627 1351 - The bishop of Metz acknowledges a debt of 600 Tours pounds to Johannes III. 
2, No. 635 1351 - Johannes III pledges support to the bishop of Metz in his war against the duke of 
Lorraine and others. He engages to provide 30 knights and squires (to include his son Ulrich VII) 
together with a company of 100 cavalry and 1,000 foot soldiers. Details of wages and payments as 
indemnity against losses are included. 
2, No. 641 1351 - Johannes II is present at Ensisheim with the bishops of Strassburg and Basel and the 
duke of WUrttemberg to witness a transaction between Duke Albrecht II of Austria and the abbotess of 
the convent of NiedermUnster. No witnesses beyond these four are mentioned. 
2, No. 648 1352 - Johannes 11 and his sons, Johannes V and Uhich VII are party to a 5-year alliance 
for the maintenance of order. Other parties include the bishop of Strassburg, the city of Strassburg and 
the most important towns of Alsace. 
2, No. 656 1352 - Rudolf II Pfalzgraf bei Rhein and duke of Bavaria appoints Hugo von Hohenberg, 
imperial Landvogt in Alsace and Johannes II, on behalf of the Empire, to arbitrate in a dispute between 
the imperial town of Cohnar and certain individuals who have been expelled from the town. 
2, No. 674 1353 - In the presence of Charles IV, king of the Romans, at Hagenau, Johannes II, 
together with the bishops of Strassburg and Basel, the Landgraf of Lower Alsace, the lords of the major 
noble families of Alsace, the cities of Strassburg and Basel and representatives of the imperial towns of 
Alsace form an alliance for three years to preserve peace in the region. 
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There are several other examples mainly involving the witnessing of important 
documents, frequently for the Habsburg Rudolf IV (duke of Austria 1358-65). 
A fiirther indication of the standing of the family can be derived from the marriages 
that were concluded by the Rappoltstein sons and daughters. These have been 
analysed by the French historian Benoit Jordan.^ ^ Although mainly concerned with a 
later period, Jordan simmiarizes the marriages of the earlier Rappoltsteins. Of the 
male marriages he concludes, ies sires de Ribeaupierre prennent femme dans le 
milieu comtal des 'freien Herren'. L'absence de ce titre dans leur designation ne 
semble pas avoir pose de probleme'. He notes that the majority of these marriages 
are within the local circle of nobility with the exception of Bruno and his brother 
Ulrich V I I . Bnmo's first wife was the daughter of a Burgundian family while Ulrich 
VII's bride originated in Donaueschingen. The marriages of the girls of this period 
appears similarly confined to the local titled nobility. As mentioned in the quotation 
above, the lack of a title did not seem to have diminished the perception of the family 
either in the eyes of their peers or in their own. Benoit quotes a (possibly apocryphal) 
family saying that reads: 
Ich mag nicht Graf noch Herzog sein 
74 Ich bin der Herr von Rappolstein 
In material terms, by the middle of the fourteenth century, the Rappoltstein family 
domain had increased to the point where they were the second largest holder of 
property in Upper Alsace with only the Habsburgs having greater possessions.^ ^ 
Culturally, the family has also left a mark from this period with the so-called Alsatian 
Parzival, a slightly extended version of Wolfram von Eschenbach's Arthurian 
masterpiece which has been described as 'One of the most beautifiil of all Middle 
Jordan, La Noblesse d'Alsace, Chapter II. 
Ibid., p. 127. There is little information on the origins of this supposed 'motto'. A similar phrase is 
said to have been used by the French de Coucy family: 'Roi je non suis, ne prince ne due ne comte 
aussi; je suis le sire de Coucy'. This derives from Andre Du Chesne, Histoiregenealogique des 
Maisons de Guines, d'Ardres, de Gand, et de Coucy, et de quelques autres Families, quiy ont este 
alliees ( Paris, 1631), p. 205. If the story is true at all it seems likely that this an idea borrowed from 
elsewhere, quite possibly after the medieval period given the comments earlier regarding 'constructed' 
geneaology. 
' Jordan, La Noblesse d'Alsace, p. 68. 
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High German manuscripts' and which was produced at the Rappohstein castle of 
Ulrichsburg between 1331 and 1336.^ ^ Interestingly, Heller comments that the 
manuscript founds its way 'at an undetermined time' to the renowned library of the 
Prince of Furstenberg at Donaueschingen. It seems likely that this may, in fact, have 
been cormected in some way with the marriage of Herzlaude von Furstenberg to 
Ulrich V I I mentioned above. 
At this point, Bruno begins to appear in the archive as an active member of the family 
and it is an appropriate moment to take stock and to attempt to summarise the world 
into which he had entered. 
There is no recorded date for Bruno's birth. His mother, countess Elisabeth von 
Geroldseck-Lahr, died in February 1341.^' The first recorded mention of Bruno is in 
a document of 1344 in which Bruno's father Johannes I I , his two brothers Johannes 
IV and Ulrich VI I and Bruno himself agree on matters relating to the partition of the 
family estate upon the death of Johannes 11.^ ^ In this document Bruno is referred to 
by the diminutive form 'Brunlin' and is stated to be 'vnder sinen jaren'. The age of 
majority at this time was largely a matter of custom and practice with regional 
variations and there is no evidence of what was customary within the Rappoltstern 
family. In a document of 1349 Bruno is no longer indicated by the diminutive form 
and is party to a property transaction alongside his father and brothers, Ulrich V I I and 
Johannes V, indicating that he was of an age to enter contractual arrangements.^^ In 
contrast, a document of 1359 names Bruno as standing as guarantor for 2,400 silver 
marks on behalf of the counts of Wurttemberg, in which case he must by then have 
come of age but the document refers to him as 'Brunlin'.^° Such references to him in 
the diminutive form have ceased in documents of the early 1360s. Taking an age of 
majority of 14 (which was not uncommon for European nobles), it is reasonable to 
Edmund Kurt Heller, 'The Story of the Sorcerer's Serpent:A Puzzling Mediaeval Folk Tale,' 
Speculum 15, no. 3 (1940). 
" Albrecht, RU,2, No. 518. 
'Mbid.,2, No. 551. 
"Ibid., 2, No. 612. 
Ibid., 2, No. 725. 
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place Bruno's birth towards the mid-1330s, recognising that this could be wrong by 
several years each way. ^' 
Amongst the few historians who have written at any length about the Rappoltstem 
family in the fourteenth century, it is generally held that this period represented a peak 
for the family. The troubles that had arisen in the lifetime of Anselm I I towards the 
end of the thirteenth century had been forgotten; the family was long-established 
Uradel within the region; members of the family had held important offices, both 
secular and ecclesiastical and participated in the high politics of the region, 
comfortable in the presence of kings, bishops and great magnates alike; good 
marriages had been made with families of equal or better standing; the family estates 
had continued to grow and the family casties at Rappoltsweiler and elsewhere had 
been extended and improved. 
A l l of this, however, stood in the shadows of the well-documented troubles of the 
early fourteenth century in Europe. Difficult weather conditions and a growing 
population had brought famine which was followed by the Black Death. 
On the dating suggested above, Bruno would have been in his early teens by the time 
of arrival of the Black Death in Alsace. There is nothing in the archive that refers to 
the plague having impacted directly upon the Rappoltstein family or their estates but 
it is unlikely that it passed them by entirely and impossible to imagine that the young 
Bruno was unaware of what was happening. One of his elder brothers, Heinrich V I I , 
was a member of the chapter of Strassburg cathedral at the time, and as noted above, 
the family was party to an agreement to support the city of Strassburg in the event of 
action following the persecution of its Jewish population. Tales of the strange 
flagellant penitents seen in the city in the aftermath of the plague would probably 
have reached Rappoltsweiler soon enough.^ ^ The impact of such a disaster upon a 
For a discussion of the age of majority in medieval Germany, see Thilo Offergeld, Reges Pueri: das 
Konigtum Minderjahriger im friihen Mittelalter{Hannoyer: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2001), pp. 11-
21. Offergeld is unable to form any firm conclusions in the absence of clear evidence - the age of 
majority might have fallen anywhere from 12 to 21 years of age. The topic is also covered, from the 
British viewpoint, in Nicholas Orme, Medieval Children (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 
2001). 
For a contemporary account of the flagellants in Strassburg see KOnigshofen, Strassburg, Vol. 9, pp. 
764-768. 
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young boy can barely be imagined. On the one hand he would have grown up fully 
conscious of the importance of his family and personal position while on the other 
hand he would have been only too aware of the ephemeral nature of himian existence. 
There was no shortage of those who would interpret such disasters as a precursor of 
God's final judgement. How much these experiences, on top of the loss of his mother 
while still a small child, would condition his behaviour in later years, is impossible to 
estimate but it difficuh to imagine that these experiences did not have an impact at 
some level. 
From this overview of the world into which Bnmo von Rappoltstein emerged towards 
the middle of the fourteenth century, it is time to consider Bruno's life in greater 
detail and to consider, in particular, his pattern of aggressive and violent behaviour in 
the context of the current scholarship in this area of late medieval German 
historiography. 
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Chapter V The Case Studies 
The three case studies that follow have been chosen for a number of reasons. First, 
each throws some light on Bruno's life and personality in the context of the themes 
outlined above in the Introduction. Second, each is a long-running affair stretching 
over several years and is well documented in the Twinger chronicle and the 
Rappoltstein family archive. Third, each dispute draws in a broad range of other 
actors and thus serves to illuminate the nature of Bnmo's external relationships. 
Taken together, these episodes cover the majority of Bruno's adult lifetime. 
Each case study raises issues that are relevant to several or all of the themes to be 
considered. For that reason they are set out in a largely narrative form with limited or 
no discussion of how they relate to the themes. The material from each case study 
will then be called upon in the succeeding chapters which discuss the themes one by 
one. 
These cases are not the only instances of Bruno's feuds and disputes but limitations of 
space prevent the inclusion of others, none of which would do more than reinforce the 
conclusions which may be drawn. 
As mentioned in passing above, those historians who have chosen to refer to Bruno at 
all tend to do so in the context of his feuds or military prowess. Rathgeber introduces 
his brief comments with, 'Gegen Ende des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts begegnen wir 
Herm Bruno von Rappoltstein, dessen Ansehen so gross war, dass Koenig Karl V 
von Frankreich ein Buendniss mit ihm schloss imi die „Englaender" zu 
bekaempfen.'^'' His reference to 'ein Buendniss', is perhaps rather overstating the 
matter which wil l be mentioned in more detail in case study 2 below. Ortlieb goes 
Bruno was involved at an early age in a dispute with the city of Colmar together with his father and 
two of his brothers. The matter was settled by arbitration of the bishop of Strassburg in 1356. See 
Albrecht, RU, I , No. 698. Twinger refers to a dispute with the city of Strassburg concerning Bruno's 
alleged sheltering of a wanted man. See Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 108. Following the death of his brother 
Ukich VII in 1377 and the inheritance of part of the lordship by his niece, Bruno became involved in a 
bitter dispute with Herzlaude's husband, Heinrich III von Saarwerden over the inherited property. See 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 240. Subsequently, Bruno began a long-runnmg feud with Hans von Lupfen, 
Herzlaude's second husband, over the same part of the lordship that had passed out of direct family 
control. The matter was not settled until after Bruno's death. See Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 646. 
^ Rathgeber, Die Herrschaft Rappoltstein, p. 4. 
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further, saying 'Brunon conclut, en 1386, avec le roi de France Charles VI, un traite 
contre le roi d'Angleterre. C'est dans cette guerre qu'il se couvrit de gloire en 
combattant sous le drapeau fran9ais.'*^ He cites no evidence to support his claim for 
Bruno's 'glorious' combat under the French flag and none has come to light in the 
research for this dissertation. Bruno's sole involvement in the Hundred Years' War 
appears to consist of being captured and ransomed some years later in 1369 / 70 as 
discussed below in case study 2. 
Little is known of Bruno's early life from his first mention in the archive in 1344 to 
the commencement of the first case study in 1372. As mentioned above, there is no 
evidence for the date of his birth. His marriage to Jeanne de Blamont, Dame de 
Magnieres (referred to in German documents as Johanna von Blankenberg) is known 
but a variety of dates are given in the secondary sources without any clear evidence to 
support them. Bruno was Jeanne's second husband, following the death of her first, 
Henri III de Faucogney, Vicomte de Versoul at Poitiers in 1356.^ ^ The marriage 
cannot thus have occurred before this date (which renders most of the dates given in 
secondary sources incorrect) and may have been much later given evidence that the 
first of their three (all female) children was not bom until 1369.*^  The earlier 
estimation for Bruno's birth (mid 1330s) would thus suggest that he married 
somewhere between the end of his twenties and the end of his thirties. As noted 
above, Jeanne de Blamont was the daughter of a French noble family from the County 
of Burgundy. Blamont itself is situated only some sixty miles fi-om Bruno's seat at 
Hoh Rappoltstein, while Magnieres is closer still at only some forty miles distant. As 
Benoit Jordan has pointed out, marriage into a French family appears to represent a 
change of policy by the Rappoltstein family but in the absence of any evidence, it is 
impossible to know if this was deliberate or simply a matter of circumstances due, 
perhaps, to a lack of other suitable candidates. 
Ortlieb, 'Histoire de la Reformation', p. 11. 
^ It has proved impossible to find a reliable reference for this fact which is reported on the web site 
describing the remains of the family's castle. The marriage is between Bruno and Jeanne is 
documented in the archive (see below) but this first marriage, while plausible, cannot be considered as 
firm. It is of relevance in estimating Bruno's age below. 
" Albrecht, RU, 2, Stammtafel p. 694. 
Jordan, La Noblesse d'Alsace, p. 38. 
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One consideration may have been Bruno's position as the youngest of five brothers. 
At the time of his marriage Bruno's expectations would still have been limited and 
certainly his bride brought a number of properties to Bruno.*^ It is these properties 
that are at the heart of the incidents which set off the feud with Sir John Harlestone, 
discussed below in case study 2. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, Nos. 102 and 103. In these lengthy documents Bruno and his sister-in-law, 
Margaretha von Blankenberg, list the properties that they hold jointly as undivided fiefs of the king of 
France. 
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Case Study 1: Bruno and Count Rudolf IV von Habsburg-Laufenburg 
In 1372 Ulrich VII von Rappoltstein entered into an agreement with Count Rudolf FV 
von Habsburg-Laufenburg for the betrothal of Ulrich's daughter, Herzlaude, to 
Rudolfs son, Johann IV. The agreement is recorded in a document dated 9 December 
1372 which sets out the detail of the betrothal contract entered into by Count Rudolf. 
9(1 
The Habsburg-Laufenburgs were a subsidiary branch of the Habsburg dynasty arising 
from the partition of the family possessions in 1232 between the brothers, Albrecht IV 
and Rudolf III with the latter becoming the founder (as Rudolf I) of the new branch. 
The Habsburg-Laufenburg possessions centred on Laufenburg itself which is close the 
Habsburg family heartland in present-day Switzerland (see Figure 7). 
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The Habsburg-Laufenburgs proved unable ever to develop their side of the family into 
anything more than a local lordship. By the middle of the fourteenth century the 
family was growing increasingly impoverished and was forced to sell much of its 
possessions, primarily to the main branch of the family. The family's core lordship of 
Laufenburg was sold to Leopold III of Austria in 1386 and received back as a fief. 
Within little more than twenty years from this date, the Habsburg-Laufenburg branch 
of the family would be extinct with the estates reverting to the main Habsburg line. 
Little has been written in detail about the Habsburg-Laufenburgs with the exception 
of a doctoral thesis in the University of Zurich by Christoph Bnmner £ind a brief entry 
in the online edition of the Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, from which most of this 
background information has been sourced.^ ' 
Friendly contact between the Rappoltsteins and the Habsburg-Laufenburgs had 
certainly existed for some time but the motive for the proposed marriage appears to 
have been primarily political and financial as might be expected at this time.^ ^ The 
contract referred to above required that Rudolf IV settle his son and new daughter-in-
law with the castle of Herznach (which is close to Laufenburg) and ten thousand 
guilders. In addition, a further one thousand guilders would be paid to Herzlaude 'ze 
einer rechten morgen gabe' on the morning following consummation of the 
relationship. 
For the Habsburg-Laufenburgs the attraction of the marriage is clear to see. By 1372 
there were just two young male heirs, Johaim IV and his cousin Johann III, and thus 
the marriage of these to suitable brides with the prospect of producing much-needed 
male children would seem to have been a priority. However, by the middle of the 
fourteenth century the family was in financial difficulties. Aside from corrunent in the 
secondary sources previously cited, this emerges unambiguously from the betrothal 
settlement. While the castle of Herznach itself appears to have been available to be 
" Christoph H Brunner, Zur Geschichte der Grafen von Habsburg-Laufenburg. Aspekte einer 
siiddeutschen Dynastie im spdten Mittelalter (Samedan: Hango Rellstab, 1969), Peter Hersche, 
Historisches Lexicon der Schweiz . Die Linie Habsburg-Laufenburg ([cited); available from 
http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/. 
Brunner, Zur Geschichte der Grafen von Habsburg-Laufenburg, p. 121 Brunner refers to an incident 
involving Bruno's father who had described Johann IV's uncle as a "Verwandte". 
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assigned to the couple, the ten thousand guilders (which Brurmer considered a 'hohe 
Summe') was another matter.^ ^ The document proposed assignment of a debt owed 
by the bishop of Constance amounting to 6,500 guilders with the balance to come 
from other, undefined, sources. The majority of the document is, in fact, concerned 
with arrangements for the security of the cash element of the settlement which 
include, in extremis, the surrender of Rudolf and five of his associates as hostages 
against payment of the due amount. Ulrich evidently had some doubts as to the 
ability of Rudolf to fiilfil his promises. The settlement included a provision that 
Rudolf should be able to require of Ulrich (or if he has died, Bruno) 'die 
vorgenannten Herczlavden vnserm svune ze gebende vnd zuo legende' at any time 
after he had produced evidence of the ten thousand guilders being available, but this 
seems not to have occurred for a number of years and its eventual timing is, of itself, 
interesting for reasons explained below. 
By way of a counterweight to the substantial proposed settlement, which was a 
potentially serious burden on what was left of the family fortune, the opportunity 
existed for the acquisition of new territory by means of the proposed marriage. 
Herzlaude was the sole child of Ulrich VII and, at the time of the betrothal, stood to 
inherit the principal Rappoltstein castle, Ulrichsburg, the castle of Hohenack and one 
half of the town of Rappoltsweiler plus a number of smaller interests. For the manner 
in which the town of Rappoltsweiler was divided, see Figure 8. 
rstaot 
Figure 8 Medieval Rappoltsweiler, 94 
Ibid., p. 121. For Gregory XI see J. N. D. Kelly, The Oxford Dictionary of Popes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988, 1986), pp. 225-227. 
The town of Rappoltsweiler was divided into the Oberstadt and the Unlerstadt. Each of these was 
further sub-divided into two parts. Each quarter had its own walls and gates. Control of the town or 
parts thereof varied over time - see the genealogy in Appendix I. The map is an amended version of 
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Herzlaude's position as heiress stemmed fi"om the concerns of her father and her 
imcle, Bruno, that there might be no male heirs to the Rappoltstein lordship. By 1371 
Bruno's first marriage had produced two girls who, alongside Herzlaude, were the 
sole children in the direct line and Hugo, Ulrich VII and Bruno's sole surviving 
brother, was unlikely to add to their nimiber (legitimately at least) given his position 
as provost of the Strassburg cathedral chapter. In 1371 the family's principal 
territorial lord, the bishop of Basel, agreed that inheritance might pass through the 
female line in the absence of male heirs and this was confirmed in 1372 by Pope 
Gregory XI (1370-78) in Avignon, with the proviso that any subsequent male children 
would have their rightful precedence.^ ^ Thus, there was a possibility of new 
possessions which would have extended the interests of the Habsburg-Laufenburgs 
beyond their homeland and brought much-needed new wealth to the family. 
The settlement mentions nothing as regards a dowry Irom the Rappoltstein side and 
no mention of this appears in any other surviving document. It is possible that the 
potential inheritance itself was sufficient or that the need for heirs was so pressing that 
this could be waived. Ulrich's first wife had died in 1363 and his second marriage (in 
1364) was childless after seven years and was to remain so. 
It is not clear what would have transpired had Ulrich fathered more children, 
especially boys, in the light of the proviso made by Pope Gregory XI, as mentioned 
above. This may be a further reason why nothing more was heard of this arrangement 
for some time after the date of the contract. Of course, it might also be the case that 
the ages of the betrothed couple had some bearing on this. There is nothing to 
indicate the age of either Johann or Herzlaude in 1372. Herzlaude's mother died in 
1363 and is first mentioned in 1353. Her daughter could thus have been anywhere 
from nine to nineteen at the time of the betrothal. As for Johann IV, Bruimer refers to 
him as 'unmiindig' and also as 'den ungefahrlichen dreizehnjahrigen' without making 
that appearing in Francois J. Himly, Atlas des Villes Medievales d'Alsace, Federation des societes 
d'histoire et d'archeologie d'Alsace: Publications; 6 (Strasbourg: Federation des societes d'histoire et 
d'archeologie d'Alsace, 1970), p. 99. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 98. 
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clear the basis for his view. His youth and / or a possible mismatch in ages may have 
some bearing on what was to follow. 
The atfraction of the marriage for the Rappoltsteins is less easily understood. There 
are no further surviving documents relating to the betrothal and, in particular, no 
record of any contract or other agreement entered into by Ulrich VII or, following his 
death, Bruno. As mentioned above, there had been some prior relationship between 
the two families but without further source material it is impossible to know why this 
match would have been considered suitable for the potential heiress of a large part of 
the Rappoltstein possessions at a time when the weakness of the Habsburg-
Laufenburgs must have been apparent. It is possible that the opportunity to ally the 
family to a part of the Habsburg dynasty appealed to Ulrich VII but it seems equally 
likely that he would have been aware of the weaknesses of that branch. 
The next reference to the proposed marriage occurs in two docimients. The first, 
dated is a retrospective justification in the voice of Bruno for his actions in respect of 
the proposed marriage.^ ' The second document, undated, is a third-party account of 
the same matters and is different both stylistically and linguistically.^ ^ This account is 
written in a narrative style which suggests a that it may be an extract from an 
unknown chronicle which is supported by signs that it may be the work of a cleric. 
The quotations in this chapter are taken from these two documents unless otherwise 
referenced. 
At one point within the body of the document the author writes 'dann babst Gregorius 
seinen stuel vndt hoff von Auinion wider nach Rohm in dilJem jahr verlegt hatt' and 
at another m reference to a sum of money '(so zu derselbigen zeitt nicht klein war)'. 
At the end of the preserved section he writes 'wie hiemach folgen wirdt.' These, and 
other, stylistic elements are suggestive of the narrative style of a chronicle. Further, 
the fact that the author feels it necessary to point out that a particular sum of money 
was a substantial amount 'zu derselbigen zeitt' is an indication that this document 
Brunner, Zur Geschichte der Grafen von Habsburg-Laufenburg, pp. 121-122. 
Albrecht, KU, 2, No. 157a. The document is dated by the editor of the Rappoltsteinisches 
Urkundenbuch as 'nach 1378 Juli 4'. 
Ibid., 2, No. 157b. 
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may well date from some time after the date of the events that it describes. The 
continuation of the story, as promised by the closing words quoted above is 
imfortunately lost. 
The evidence for a possible clerical author is twofold. First, at one point he uses a 
Latin phrase, ^propter defectum naturalem' when describing the alleged sexual 
failings of Johannes von Habsburg-Laufenburg (which will be described below) and 
second, he is reluctant to describe in any detail the more salacious elements of the 
story while Bruno is quite explicit to the point of crudeness. This author passes over 
one such section with the words '(allhie zu melden ohnotig)' and generally omits 
sexually related detail where Bruno provides it with a degree of relish! 
As to content, the two sources are largely but not completely the same in their 
description of the key events and the sequence of these. There are two main points of 
difference. Both documents refer to the death of Ulrich VII. Bruno's accoimt makes 
no mention of the cause whereas the other accoimt specifically relates his death to the 
events imder discussion. Thus, Bruno simply says 'do wart min bruder selige siech, 
vndt do er sterben wollte zu StraBburg' whereas the second author says (referring to 
the events surroimding Herzlaude) 'dann ihn difies sehr bekiimmerte vndy daruber 
kranckh worden'. This may of course just be adornment by the second author. 
However, at a later point when describing Herzlaude's subsequent marriage to Count 
Heinrich III von Saarwerden, the second author includes more detail than is to be 
found in Bruno's account. It is possible that there are other lost sources for this 
incident but it is also probable that the second author had knowledge of Bnmo's 
account since he writes 'wie sich wohlermeltter herr Bnmo in einem schreiben gegen 
graff Rudolffen entschuldiget.' 
The sequence of events as related by both Bruno and the second author, are as 
follows. 
In 1372 Count Rudolf had exercised his right under the betrothal agreement to send 
for Herzlaude, indicating that he had been able to demonstrate the availability of the 
various elements of the settlement previously agreed. Herzlaude duly fulfilled her 
obligation and the two then shared a bed (prior to marriage) ' wol vf ein halb jor' 
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without the relationship being consummated. At the end of this period Johannes 'wolt 
ir ir ehre habe genummen uf ungebuerlich wyse' which caused Herzlaude to flee his 
bed and to return to her father. 
Having returned home, Ulrich VII forbade her to return to Johannes and, at this point, 
he became ill and was taken to Strassburg, at his own request, to die. On his 
deathbed, Ulrich VII told his brother Hugo that Herzlaude was not to return to 
Johannes or ever again share a bed with him unless the latter had proved that he was a 
man. If this were to prove impossible, then Ulrich VII wished her to marry the count 
of Saarwerden instead. Bruno was not present during these discussions since, in his 
own words 'do getoerste ich nicht gen StraBburg inkommen.' On the same point, the 
second author comments 'Vndt aber dazumahlen herr Bruno mitt der statt nicht wohl 
standt.' 
Following Ulrich VII's death. Count Rudolf von Habsburg-Laufenburg accompanied 
by a number of his supporters arrived in Rappoltsweiler to demand that Herzlaude be 
" The practice of a "trial marriage" involving a sexual relationship prior to marriage appears to have 
been a widespread custom in certain areas, notwithstanding its clear conflict with the canon law of the 
period. In Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychology of Sex, 2 vols. (New York: Random House, 
1937)., the author writes extensively on this topic pp. 379ff. Citing Dr Ehrhard ''Auch Ein Wort zur 
Ehereform", Geschlecht undGesellschaft, Jahrgang I, Heft 10, he quotes „ ... the primitive custom of 
trial-marriage which, in the Middle Ages, was still practised even in the best circles". The British 
Library holds a copy of an eighteenth century pamphlet which takes the episode of Herzlaude and her 
betrothed as its central example: Friedrich Christoph Jonathan Fischer, Uber die Probendchte der 
teutschen Bauermddchen (Berlin, 1780). In summary, Fischer states that the custom of trial marriage 
was mainly confined to Swabia and especially the Black Forest. The practice is described as being the 
final stage of a process of courtship which had defined rules and which was not considered a sign of 
immorality. If the liaison resulted in pregnancy then the marriage would proceed but if the union was 
unproductive then the marriage might be abandoned. If pregnancy did not result and the couple 
decided to terminate the relationship it was not held to be detrimental to the girl's reputation and a new 
suitor could begin the process again. Too many repeated cycles of the process would, however, begin 
to raise questions! On the suitor's part, it was considered unacceptable to terminate the relationship if 
the girl were to become pregnant. Fischer cites the same document(s) as are reproduced in the 
Rappoltstein archive as his prune example. He also cites the relationship of emperor Friedrich III ( 
king of the Romans 1440-93, emperor from 1452) and Eleanor of Portugal as a further example 
together with those of a number of other princes and nobles . Pope Pius II (1458-64) is cited as having 
stated that trial marriages were a common practice amongst the German nobility. In conclusion, 
Fischer traces the practice back to early medieval times and refers to similar customs in Africa and 
New Zealand by reference to Captain Cook. He ends by claiming that traces of the practice is to be 
found in most societies and that it is a fundamental ancient custom of humanity. (In modem times 
there is a well-known Bavarian Lustspiel entitled 'Die Probenacht' by Julius Pohl which is still 
performed . Although set in the first half of the twentieth century it invokes the old practice of trial 
marriage as the central feature of the comedy.) The overall import is to suggest that fertility was more 
important than virginity at the point of marriage. Certainly, this was a key concern to both the 
Rappoltstein and the Habsburg-Laufenburg families. For Pius II see Kelly, The Oxford Dictionary of 
Popes, pp. 247-249. 
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returned to Joharmes and that the marriage be completed. At this point, of course, 
Herzlaude's inheritance has become secure and it can be assumed that Coimt Rudolf 
was thus now very keen to resolve the matter. Bruno and Hugo explained that this 
was not possible and repeated Ulrich VII's deathbed wishes in the matter. They 
offered to fetch ' zweintzig oder drilJig frouwen (wenne eine etweiuie einer mag vndt 
der andere ntit)' and if Johannes were able to demonstrate that he could consimunate 
a relationship then they would deliver both their niece and her in heritance. Rudolf 
refixsed the offer and it was agreed that the parties would meet at Nuremberg with a 
view to resolving the matter. Bruno describes how he expressed his wish that, 
whatever the outcome, the 'gross frundtschaft' between the two families would 
continue. 
At the meeting Bruno describes how he and Hugo again expressed their wish that, 
whatever the outcome, the friendship between the two families would continue. This 
wish, whether genuinely meant or not, was not be fialfilled. Bruno again offered a 
'test' of Johannes' ability to consummate the relationship. For this test he suggested 
summoning one hundred women 'sollten wuer sie joch Koelle holen' and if Johannes 
proved himself with just one of these then they would deliver Herzlaude and her 
inheritance. Count Rudolf again refiised on the grounds that Johannes did not wish to 
be vinfaithful. The matter was unresolved and it was decided that the matter would 
now be referred to the bishop's court in Basel. The bishop, as mentioned above, was 
the superior lord in respect of a significant part of the Rappoltstein estates. 
Despite his agreement to this referral. Count Rudolf did everything he could to delay 
the proceedings. When the hearing did eventually take place. Count Rudolf expressed 
himself unwilling to have the matter heard and proposed that the whole issue should 
now be referred to the pope in Rome. Having done this he promptly left 'das er jagen 
sollt.' At this point, Bruno comments 'Do weip menglich wohl, daP in disen loeffen 
mir noch miner mummen nuet fiieglich was gen Rom ze farende, weime wuer 
gefangen vndt erstochen werent, ob wuer dar oder dannen werent kommen.' The 
basis for this fear is never explained in either account. 
With matters still unresolved, Hugo von Rappoltstein was approached by Count Egen 
von Freyburg, one of Count Rudolfs supporters and a witness to the betrothal 
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agreement, with the suggestion that he might marry Herzlaude. Bruno was brought 
into the discussions which included Count Egen's assurance that he could resolve the 
matter with Count Rudolf in three or four weeks. Nothing appears to have come of 
this and the matter is not mentioned further. 
In the meantime. Count Rudolf had set in train further attempts to prove his son's 
virility. Johannes was given into the care of Heinrich von Sachsen in Strassburg, 'der 
der beste meister ist, den man finden kan', for a series of radical treatments which 
included, ointments, plasters, baths and the suspension of a lead weight 'wol fimfzig 
pfundt schwer' from the non-performing part of Johannes' anatomy. None of this 
however served to overcome the problem and demonstrate that Johannes could 
perform sexually. 
While this was taking place, the matter was resolved by the marriage of Herzlaude to 
the alternative suggested by her father on his deathbed. Count Heinrich von 
Saarwerden, brother of the archbishop of Cologne and cousin to the archbishop of 
Trier. Bruno's account passes over this in a few words. The second author however 
gives more detail of the negotiations surrounding the marriage as mentioned above. 
In both accounts however there is mention of the payment of a sum of twelve 
thousand guilders to Bruno by the two archbishops and the bridegroom's father. 
The second author recites in a few sentences that it was suggested that Bruno had 
'sold' Herzlaude and that Bruno denied this. Bruno's own account, as might be 
expected, goes into much more detail and characterises his document as a rebuttal of 
these accusations. Bruno makes it clear that the twelve thousand guilders were by 
way of a loan to him and to Herzlaude to permit them to redeem debts for which his 
property and the property comprising Herzlaude's inheritance had been pledged. He 
points out that the loan would have to be repaid and emphasises that if he had wanted 
to sell his lordship he would not have done so even for one himdred thousand guilders 
and indeed, he would have much preferred to have held the whole of the Rappoltstein 
estates himself. 
With this denial, the two accoimts come to an end. The second author, probably 
writing some time later as suggested above and adopting a point of view which is 
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clearly favourable to Bruno, recalls how Count Rudolf was not prepared to let matters 
rest and that he proceeded to take action against Bruno 'secretly' and, ultimately, 
without being able to prove any wrongdoing on Bruno's part. 
The action taken by Count Rudolf (which can hardly be considered as secret) 
comprised a suit in the imperial courts that resulted in Bruno being placed under the 
imperial barm in February 1379."^° Bruno sought to have this sentence overturned 
and was successfiil in persuading Wenzel of Brabant, the uncle of King Wenzel, to 
agree to this in June 1380." '^ Count Rudolf however was not prepared to let the 
matter rest and in October 1382, Primissel, duke of Teschen ruled that the original 
verdict should stand and that the subsequent ruling of Wenzel of Brabant was of no 
effect.'"^ Bruno was once again under the imperial bann. As will be discussed below, 
the practical effect of this punishment is difficult to discern and, as will also be seen, 
this was not to be the only sentence of outlawry that would be passed on Bnmo.'"^ 
The fact of these sentences is listed in a table of entries from the imperial Achtbuch 
compiled by Friedrich Battenberg in his modem study of the imperial bann."''' There 
is no record in the Achtbuch of Bnmo being released from this second sentence nor, 
perhaps more interestingly, of his being placed in the Aberacht, the second and 
definitive stage of outlawry which might be invoked if the convicted person had not 
resolved the matter to the court's satisfaction with a year and a day.'°^ Julius 
Rathgeber quotes from a translated fragment of the previously mentioned lost Latin 
chronicle by the Peter von Andlau 'disser brun ... ist gestorben in ach', which may be 
a confirmation of this but may also relate to the fiirther sentence of outlawry which 
Albrecht, /?f/,2,No. 164. 
Ibid., 2, No. 184. 
'"^Ibid., 2, No. 215. 
'"^  Bruno's further sentence will be considered in case study 2. The impact of this is discussed in the 
consideration of Bruno's relationship with the empu-e. 
'"^  Friedrich Battenberg, Reichsacht undAnleite im Spdtmittelalter: ein Beitragzur Geschichte der 
hochsten kdniglichen Gerichtsbarkeit im Alien Reich, besonders im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, Quellen 
und Forschungen zur hochsten Gerichtsbarkeit im alten Reich; Bd 18 (Koln: Bohlau, 1986), pp. 567-
568. In compiling what he considers to be a complete list of known Acht processes Battenberg has 
used a wide variety of manuscript and archive sources. These are described at length at pp._540ff. 
Much of the data in this book is referenced back to his previous study: Friedrich Battenberg, Das 
Hofgerichtssiegel der Deutschen Kaiser und Konige 1235-1451 (K6ln, Wien: B6hlau Verlag, 1979). 
The original source for many of the entries in the list can only be found be cross-reference to pp. 209-
287 in the second work. 
'"^  The imposition and effects of both the Acht and the Aberacht are considered in greater detail below 
when discussing Bruno's relationship with the Empire. 
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will be considered in the second case study below. '^ ^ Certainly, Battenberg considers 
that the writing up of proceedings in the Achtbuch was far more than a simple 
bureaucratic exercise. He suggests that the process might have been linked, in the 
medieval mind, with the Book of Life at the Last Judgement and that the addition or 
removal of a name would have been of great concern to both the original complainant 
and the accused.'"' As late as 1388 Wenzel refers to Bruno as being under hoihAcht 
and Aberacht as a result {inter alia) of the complaint by Count Rudolf and given that 
this matter was still unresolved shortly before Bruno's death, as described below, it 
may well be true that he died while still under sentence of outiawry.'"^ 
There is no evidence that Count Rudolf sought to act against Bruno in any tangible 
way following these proceedings. The placing of an individual in the Acht gave the 
complainant a free hand to pursue a feud against him and, Battenberg suggests, was a 
principal motivation for having the Acht pronounced. Writing after Count Rudolfs 
death, Bruno complains that he was obliged to follow him 'gen Prag, gen Lutzelburg, 
gen Franchenfurth undt um andt um' at a cost of ten thousand guilders as a result of 
the court action and Brunner suggests that the proceedings would have cost Count 
Rudolf at least as much."*' Given the time and cost involved it seems unlikely that 
Count Rudolf would have failed to press home his advantage. The most likely cause 
of his inaction is a lack of resources, given the family's fmancial problems as 
mentioned above, and possibly ill health. Count Rudolf died in 1383. The 
unfortunate Joharm IV continued to pester Bruno but there is no evidence that he 
posed any real threat or took any tangible action against him. The matter was still an 
issue between the parties in 1396 shortly before Bruno's death. In a letter dated 
October 1, 1396 Count Hans (as Joharm IV von Habsburg-Laufenburg styles himself) 
wrote to confirm peace with Bruno, but only until the following Fastnacht, March 11 
1397. This is the last reference to this matter in the archive prior to Bruno's death in 
1398. 
Rathgeber, Die Herrschaft Rappoltstein, p. 33. 
Battenberg, Reichsacht undAnleite, p. 273. 
Albrecht, RU,2, No.303. 
Battenberg, Reichsacht undAnleite, p. 372ff. 
Brunner, Zur Geschichte der Grafen von Habsburg-Laufenburg, p. 122. 
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Johann IV was never able to find a wife of suitable status. Eventually he married a 
low-bom wife who was raised to the nobility by Wenzel in her own right at Johann 
rV's request. Bmtmer suggests that his inability to make a better match may have 
been due to the parlous financial state of the family but the earlier episode, which 
must have been common knowledge within the region at least, may have played a 
part. When Johan FV died in 1408 the Habsburg-Laufenburg line came to an end.'" 
As a postscript, it is ironic that Bnmo's son Ulrich VIII von Rappoltstein married a 
female Habsburg-Laufenburg. It is suggested that this may have been a daughter of 
Johannes IV but this is imclear and it may have been the daughter of his cousin."^ 
"'Ibid., p 123. 
'" Ibid., p. 122. See also Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 157 Note 1. 
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Case Study 2: Bruno and Sir John Harlestone 
On 19 June 1369 Philip the Bold, duke of Burgundy, married Margaret, daughter of 
the count of Flanders, in Ghent. Present at the wedding and the subsequent 
tournament was Bruno, together with fifty followers. This, and Bruno's involvement 
in the subsequent events of that year, are recorded in a memorandtmi. Carl 
Albrecht suggests that this memorandum was compiled directly from Bruno's 
personal record of the events and places it within the sequence of docimients from 
1369 in the family archive."'* However, since the document concludes with a 
reference to events that took place in the 1380s, it is clear that it was written many 
years after the events to which it refers. The purpose of the docimient is unclear but, 
given its later dating, it may well have formed a part of Bruno's subsequent attempt to 
justify the actions that are described below when the consequences began to escalate 
to dangerous levels. This is not to suggest that the memorandimi is necessarily an 
inaccurate record of what occurred as many of the details correspond closely to the 
account of the same events given in Froissart's chronicle but the document is clearly 
written to show Bnmo in the best light as a young knight performing 'sehr mannlich 
imdt dapffer' in the toumament and as an active combatant in the Himdred Years 
War."^ 
The summer of 1369 saw the failure of the extended tmce between England and 
France that had followed the Treaty of Bretigny in 1360. A dispute arose from the 
Black Prince's attempts to raise cash by imposing new taxes in his territory of 
Aquitaine An appeal was ultimately made to the French king, Charles V, by certain 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 63. Although the memorandum is written in the first person and in the 
vernacular, there is no evidence that Bruno was literate and even if he were, it is highly unlikely that he 
would have written such a document himself Indeed, there is specific evidence that Bruno could not 
read. During the course of a dispute with his brother-in-law, Heinrich von Saarwerden, in 1384, it is 
recorded that the two men confronted each other in the streets of Rappoltsweiler. Bruno states that his 
brother-in-law 'vorderte er an mich, daB ich einen brieff, den er dazumal wolte, solte horen lesen;...' 
See Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 240. It would have been uncommon at that time for a noble such as Bruno to 
be literate, Reading and writing were seen as separate skills, and literacy referred to the ability of some 
to read while leaving the mechanical chore of writing to a scribe. It is also the case that literacy often 
related specifically to the ability to read Latin as opposed to the vernacular. It is difficult, of course, to 
imagine how anyone could write without being able to read. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 63 Note 1. 
Jean Froissart and J. M. B. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Chroniques, Oeuvres de Froissart (Bruxelles: 
Devaux, 1871), VII, 438. 
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nobles who were unwilling to pay and when Charles V agreed to hear the appeals and 
thus exercise sovereignty within Aquitaine, Edward III resumed use of the title 'king 
of France' by way of retaliation."^ The stage was set for a new round of conflict. 
The wedding of Philip the Bold had itself caused friction between England and 
France. Philip's bride, widowed at the age of twelve upon the death of Philip of 
Rouvres, was heuess to the five counties of Flanders, Burgundy, Artois, Nevers and 
Rethel. In 1362 Edward III had sought to obtain her for his son Edmund Langley, 
Earl of Cambridge. The prospect of having one of Edward Ill's sons ruling a large 
area on the north-eastern borders of France did not appeal to Charles V, given that he 
already had the Black Prince in a similar position on his south-western frontiers. In 
1364 a marriage treaty was concluded between Edward III and Margaret's parents but 
the marriage required a papal dispensation as it was within the forbidden four degrees 
of consanguinity. Pope Urban V, a Frenchman, refiised his consent in January 1365 
in line with the wishes of Charles V. In 1367 the pope issued a dispensation 
permitting Philip the Bold to marry any of his relatives within the third or fourth 
degrees of consanguinity, thereby permitting exactly what he had denied to Edmund 
Langley. Philip the Bold had emerged as the French candidate for Margaret's hand in 
1365, strongly backed by his brother Charles V . " ' The conclusion of the marriage 
represented, in Vaughan's words 'a step in the recovery of her [France's] position in 
Europe as a whole' and thus a substantial setback to the English cause."^ 
The wedding was a lavish affair chiiracterised by Philip's 'generosity and 
magnificence'."^ Bruno's memorandum explains that after the wedding celebrations, 
he accompanied Philip to Paris to attend the French king, Charles V. On 15 July he 
departed with the king and Philip to Normandy where a fleet was in preparation at 
Harfleur for an attack on England. It would appear that Bruno expected to be a part of 
Christopher Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, c. 1300-c. 1450 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 21-22. There are numerous general and specific 
works that cover the Hundred Years War. The most comprehensive account of the period up to 1369 is 
to be found in the two volumes so far published of Jonathan Sumption's study: Jonathan Sumption, The 
Hundred Years War, vol. I Trial By Battle (London: Faber, 1990), Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred 
Years War, vol. II Trial By Fire (London: Faber, 1999). 
'" Richard Vaughan, Philip the Bold: the Formation of the Burgundian State, New ed. ed. 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2002), pp. 4-6. 
"*Ibid., p. 7. 
Ibid., p. 6. 
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this expedition which was to be led by Philip. The plan was interrupted by news of 
the landing of John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster at Calais in early August and the 
latter's devastation of the surrounding countryside. Philip and his forces were 
despatched to deal with this incursion and, after a period of stand-off near 
Toumehem-sur-la-Hem, some ten miles southeast of Calais, which included an 
example of what Vaughan describes as 'those futile and unrealistic, though 
chivalrous, negotiations which characterize the annals of feudal warfare' Philip (who 
was not renowned as a military commander) withdrew some fifty miles to the 
southeast and sent a company of knights, including Bruno, to occupy the town of 
Abbeville.'^" Upon learning of Philip's withdrawal Lancaster departed towards 
Harfleur with the intention of burning the assembled French fleet. Having failed to 
achieve this, Lancaster retraced his steps and in an engagement close to Abbeville 
(probably during the month of September) he captured Hugo de Chatillon, the French 
Master of the Artillery and a nimiber of his company, including Bruno. The prisoners 
were taken to Calais where Bruno was held for several months awaiting payment of 
his ransom. In the final sentence of the memorandum (written as noted above many 
years later) the author complains 'undt stehen heem Brunen nuch uff den heiittigen 
tag wegen des konigs in Franckreich gemeltenn zugs halber irm die 8000 franckhen 
seiner besoldung aus'. A concern for money (or more often complaint at the lack of 
it) is a recurrent theme in Bruno's life. 
It is not clear how and why Bruno came to be in the service of Philip the Bold. As 
mentioned above, Bruno had married Jeanne de Blamont, Dame de Magnieres some 
time between 1356 and 1369. As a part of this marriage he had acquired properties in 
France and specifically in areas under Burgundian control.'^' It seems likely, 
recognising the absence of tangible evidence of any prior such relationship on the part 
of the Rappoltstein family, that the link between Bruno and the Burgundian court had 
its origins in this marriage. 
Ibid., p. 8. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 246. This document is by way of a memorandum prepared by Bruno to justify 
his actions in the capture of Sir John Harlestone. It is most probably addressed to the city authorities m 
Strassburg. To avoid unnecessary footnotes, this document may be taken as the source of the 
description of Harlestone's capture unless otherwise noted. 
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It was during his adventure in France that Bruno appears to have first encountered the 
EngUsh knight. Sir John Harlestone.'^^ In Bruno's later account, he describes an 
initial encounter with Harlestone as having taken place at this time. He explains that 
he had captured Harlestone but was forced to release him because Harlestone's men 
had taken 160 prisoners (some of whom belonged to Bruno's wife) in the town of 
Schexye and had threatened to kill them i f Harlestone were not released In these 
circumstances Bruno felt he had no choice but to comply. The two parted on bad 
terms and Bruno states in his memorandvmi 'vnnd ist [er] auch vor vndt seitmahlen 
allgewenn mein offen feindt gewesen, wiewohl ich wieder den konig vonn Engellandt 
nie gewesenn bin.' Bruno's claim not to have opposed the English king may have 
been true in the narrow sense that the incident most likely occurred whilst he was en 
route to visit the French king in Paris, having not previously fought for the French and 
at a point before the resumption of hostilities in the Hundred Years War, but his main 
point appears to be that there was no reason for Harlestone to have a prior grudge 
against him. 
Bruno's route, following the marriage of Philip the Bold in Ghent, is shown in blue in 
Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 Bruno's Route in 1369 
'^ ^ Sir John Harlestone is an interesting ctiaracter. A detailed biographical note is to be found in 
Appendix 2. The background provided in this appendix provides an explanation of why Harlestone's 
capture by Bruno developed into a major diplomatic incident. 
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Locating the town of Schexye would be of assistance in considering the logistics of 
Bruno's claims. There are a number of potential sites in modem France. The most 
promising candidate is the village of Chuignes which is situated close to the route 
from Ghent to Paris and marked on the map as the possible site of Bruno's capture. It 
must be admitted, however, that there is no firm evidence to confirm the identity of 
this village as medieval 'Schexye', but its location is persuasive. Despite Bruno's 
suggestion that Harlestone had some pre-existing animosity towards him, it seems 
more likely that this was a chance encounter with a party of English knights engaged 
in foraging for supplies or, quite possibly, in general looting and destruction. Bruno 
makes the point specifically that the kings of England and France were still at peace 
and that Harlestone was acting as 'ein gesellschafft man'. Either way, Harlestone 
was not prepared to accept his capture in any chivalrous maimer and his alleged 
behaviour reflects perhaps the reality of such small-scale skirmishes as opposed to 
what might be expected in the course of a more formal engagement. I f indeed, 
Harlestone was engaged is less than chivalrous activities on his own behalf, this might 
account for his failure to accept his capture. 
Following this encounter ' in dennselbenn zeiten', as Bruno puts it, Harlestone 
allegedly attacked several of Bruno's French properties. The exact timing is unclear 
but Bruno states that at that time 'dir konige von Franckhreich vnd Engellandt friedt 
vnd friedtliche stallung miteinander hatten.' A formal state of war between England 
and France did not begin until the French confiscation of Aquitaine in November 
1369 and thus the attacks most likely took place between the end of June and 
November, possibly while Bruno was incarcerated in Calais. Bruno's accusations are 
very detailed. He names six villages as having suffered from Harlestone's attentions. 
These are, 'Runtiny'; 'Buschey' and 'Buschen' in Burgundy; 'Humbescort'; 'Vrvil 
v f f der Mamen' and 'Ruffier' in Champagne. He claims that a total of more than 
twenty men were murdered and details the method of their demise 'erschlugent, 
ertranckehit vnndt ann die baum hangent.' He also mentions one more fortimate man 
who merely had his teeth knocked out! He accuses Harlestone and his companions of 
'^ ^ There is evidence that he was active in this way within Champagne but at a slightly later date. For 
details of this and a more general consideration of Harlestone's alleged activities as a routier, see 
Appendix 2. 
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raping and carrying of f a number of women and young girls as well as the theft of 
many animals (large and small) and of other moveable property. In each case he 
states that the village was burnt along with one church and one monastery, from 
which the treasury was stolen. He spells out the financial cost to him of these 
depredations in some detail. 
Of the villages that Bruno mentions it is possible to locate two of those in modem 
Champagne with some confidence. 'Humbescort' is probably modem Humbecourt 
and Vrvil vft"der Mamen is probably modem 'Eurville-Bienville' which is close by 
and on the bank of the Mame. These are shown on the map at Figure 10. 
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Figure 10 Bruno's Properties in Burgundy 
The red flags indicate those properties which, Bruno claims, were attacked by 
Harlestone. The locations of'Buschey' and 'Buschen' is tentative. The possible 
location of 'Runtiny' seems even more doubtfiil, given its distance from the others 
properties and it has proved impossible to find a location for 'Ruffier' in Champagne. 
The green flags indicate other properties listed in two memoranda as belonging to 
Bruno by virtue of his first marriage. The first document is a statement by Bmno 
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himself and the second is a document given by his sister-in-law after the death of his 
wife.'^'* The suggested locations are, again, tentative but are certainly plausible 
within the terms in which they are defined in the documents and their general 
grouping. Bruno's seat at Hoh Rappoltstein in Alsace is also shown on the map. It 
appears, from the maps, that Harlestone was prepared to travel a considerable distance 
to seek out properties held by Bruno. I f the locations are at all accurate it suggests 
that these attacks were not just coincidence in the course of normal raiding and 
looting. The distances covered suggest that Harlestone had information permitting 
him to seek out specific properties, indicating that the attacks were personal. 
At this point, the archive is silent. There is no indication of any action by Bruno at 
the time. No mention is made of Sir John Harlestone in the Rappoltstein archive for 
many years but other sources record him as being appointed captain of Guisnes in 
1370. '^ ^ Over the following decade Harlestone appears regularly in the sources and 
his military career flourished. 
In 1384, a full fifteen years after their initial encounter, the paths of Bruno and 
Harlestone were to cross again.'^^ In the early part of this year, Harlestone began a 
pilgrimage to Loreto via Rome which Fowler cites as an example of someone seeking 
absolution for past sins against the church.'^^ Such a journey was in compliance with 
a papal bull of 16 November 1366 which specified pilgrimage to Rome as one of the 
acceptable penances.'^ * Harlestone's destination and intention is confirmed by a 
letter fi-om Pope Urban V I to the city of Strassburg which was sent as a part of the 
later efforts made to secure his fi-eedom, as described b e l o w . B y the time of this 
Albrecht, RU, 2, Nos. 102 and 103. 
Anthony Goodman, The Loyal Conspiracy: the Lords Appellant under Richard II (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), p. 99. 
The dating of this can be inferred from a letter written in 1384 by Harlestone regarding his ransom. 
See Albrecht, RU, 12, No. 234. This date is accepted by Perroy in Edouard Perroy, The Diplomatic 
Correspondence of Richard II (London: The Camden Society, 1933), p. 196. Twinger sets the date as 
1388 but this is clearly wrong as is indicated by the editor in his notes. See KSnigshofen, Strassburg, 
9, p. 680. Twinger's dates continue to be wrong but not always by the same margm, despite the events 
being contemporary. 
™ Kenneth Alan Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p. 146. 
Ibid., p. 145. See also Diana Webb, Medieval European Pilgrimage, c. 700-c. 1500 (Basmgstoke: 
Palgrave, 2002), p. 50. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 230. The letter from Urban is not specific in describing Harlestone's journey 
as a pilgrimage. He simply states that he was en route to the Roman curia "pro certis suis negociis 
expediendis". Fowler as cited above is clear that this was a pilgrunage and Perroy (Perroy, Richard II, 
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journey, Harlestone was possibly in his late forties and may have begun to consider 
the fate of his soul. As Fowler suggests (writing specifically about Harlestone), ' i t is 
probable that it was only the more successfiil of the mercenaries, those who had good 
reason to safeguard their profits and were concerned about their position and 
advancement in society, who sought papal absolution'. Failure to do so would have 
left Harlestone excommunicated imder a series of measures pronounced by Pope 
Urban V I in an attempt to stem the activities of the routiersP^ 
In the course of his journey he passed through Alsace under the protection of a safe-
conduct issued by Primissel, duke of Teschen in the name of Wenzel for his passage 
through the territory of the Empire. This is attested in a number of letters 
subsequently written for the same purpose as that of Urban referred to a b o v e . I n 
addition Harlestone would have enjoyed the usual protections of the Church which 
applied to all pi lgrims.However, as Keen points out, status as a pilgrim would not 
have been enough in itself to guarantee security and the possession of a written safe-
conduct was essential.'^^ 
The choice of a route via Alsace would appear reasonable for Harlestone who would 
not perhaps have wished to run the risk of travelling through France, given his 
previous military involvement in that area. The principal pilgrim route to Rome at 
this time was the Via Francigena. A map of this route is shown in Figure 11 .'^ '^  
p. 196.) states a similar view. Urban's letter has a number of statements that conflict with other 
sources. He tells that Harlestone was with "oc/o suis sociis" whereas other accounts mention only 
three others. The source of his knowledge (presumably a letter from Richard II) has not survived. 
'^ ^ Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, p. 146. 
Richard II wrote to the Wenzel, the dukes of Lorraine and Luxembourg and the city of Strassburg 
on this matter. In each case he refers to Harlestone as having been "sub salvo conductu ducis 
tessinensis" or the equivalent. He also wrote to the duke of Teschen himself using the phrase "litteris 
vestris de salvo conducto". The letters are reproduced in Perroy, Richard II, pp. 28-31. 
'^ ^ Every criminal code included penalties for the molestation of pilgrims and from 1303 such 
offenders were included in the annual bull In Coena Domini which anathematized such behaviour. 
Despite this, medieval pilgrimage was a dangerous business. These issues are covered in Jonathan 
Sumption, Pilgrimage: an Image of Mediaeval Religion (London: Faber, 1975), p. 177ff and Webb, 
Medieval European Pilgrimage, pp. 38-40. 
'^ ^ Maurice Hugh Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages, [Studies in Political History f (pp. 
xi. 291. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London; University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1965), pp. 196-197. 
Webb, Medieval European Pilgrimage, p. 132. Webb's description of pilgrimage routes from 
England to Rome confirms that travelling south along the Rhine would not have been unusual. 
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Figure 11 The Via Francigena 
Travelling through the territory of the Empu-e (with which Richard I I had allied 
himself in 1381 following his marriage to Anne of Bohemia, the half-sister of 
Wenzel, Harlestone would have been obliged to travel through the heart of Bruno's 
territory between Strassburg and Basel, as shown in Figure 11. In July 1384 
Harlestone added his seal (together with those of three companions) to a letter 
agreeing the terms of his ransom.'"'^  Although preserved in German, it is likely that 
this is a transcription of a Latin original which has been lost. Such deeds or charters 
of ransom follow a conventional pattern according to Keen. Either in a single or 
sometimes two deeds, the prisoner would undertake to be a good prisoner; renoimce 
any right to dispute his captor's right to a ransom and invoke 'savage anathemas' 
against himself in the event of failing in his obligations.'^^ There would also be clear 
provisions relating to the amoimt of the ransom and the date of payments and, often, 
details of the conditions of captivity. The document sealed by Harlestone has only 
two of these elements - the sum and terms of payment and a lengthy list of the 
dreadful consequences that should befall him i f the terms are not met. There is no 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 234. 
• Keen, The Laws of War, pp. 167-168. 
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formal oath binding Harlestone to his captor and no agreement to waive any rights to 
dispute the ransom demand itself There is nothing mentioned in the letter as regards 
the release of the captives. Keen mentions that captives were often released 
temporarily in order to raise the ransom sum but it seems unlikely that Bruno would 
have contemplated such an idea given the somewhat dubious nature of his right to 
hold Harlestone at all. 
From the captor's viewpoint, whatever the rights and wrongs of his imprisonment, he 
would appear to have had no choice but to seal the deed. Harlestone was a long way 
from his home and his supporters, incarcerated in a formidable castle atop a steep hill 
(see Figure 12) with little or no hope of freedom other than by accepting whatever 
terms Bruno might propose. Hoh Rappoltstein was hardly a palace and Richard 
Barber relates that the Germans had a bad reputation regarding the treatment of 
prisoners, quoting Froissart's view that the Germans would shackle their prisoners 
and hold them in prison to obtain a better ransom.'^^ 
Figure 12 Hoh Rappoltstein 
Richard Barber, The Knight and Chivalry, Rev. ed. ed. (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1995), p. 242. 
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These terms demanded by Bruno were quite onerous. In return for the freedom of 
Harlestone and his three companions (a priest and two squires) Bruno required 
payment of thirty thousand gold francs 'schwehr genung von deB konigs vonn 
Franckreich gewichte', twenty 'gekronter Engelescher tucher' together with twenty 
swords and twenty daggers. Given that the companions (of whom nothing further is 
known) were of limited value as hostages, one must assume that the bulk of this 
demand was made on the basis of Harlestone himself The letter fijrther required that 
an instalment of six thousand francs be paid before October 1 1384. In the absence 
of a comprehensive modem study of ransoms, it is generally accepted by most writers 
that ransoms were expected to be reasonably within the means of the captive to pay 
and should not ruin him. An often quoted figure is that the amount should be 
equivalent to a year's income. There is no evidence that Harlestone was an especially 
rich man and Bruno's demands seem excessive, but this was not in itself unusual.'^^ 
One may assume that he had in mind the sums which he considered he had lost in 
Harlestone's attacks of 1369 plus the ransom which Bruno had paid to secure his 
release from captivity in Calais. The demands for equipment seem opportunistic but 
were not unusual.''*'' 
No detail survives as regards how the money for the first instalment of the ransom 
was raised and by whom, but later correspondence indicates that the six thousand 
francs were duly paid.''*' Harlestone's close relationship with Thomas of Woodstock, 
his recent service to Richard I I in the wake of the Peasants' Revolt and his general 
good standing and reputation as a loyal soldier over many years (See Appendix I) may 
have assisted in this regard but there is no record of this. It has been suggested that 
this initial payment was to have secured Harlestone's freedom and that Bruno reneged 
on this after receipt of the money, demanding a greater advance.'''^ As mentioned 
'^Mbid. 
™ There seems to have been no hard and fast rule as to what was a reasonable ransom. Keen indicates 
that it was based on a rough and ready assessment of what the captor thought he could get and what he 
thought the captive could pay and concludes that 'the resulting demand was nearly always excessive'. 
Keen, The Laws of War, pp. 158-159. In the case in question, Bruno is unlikely to have had any clear 
idea of Harlestone's resources and most likely therefore sought to regain his estimate of his own earlier 
losses as a starting point. 
Ibid., p. 168. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 230. Urban's letter to Strassburg mentions this point. 
'"^  Guy Trendel, 'L'Affaire de Brunon de Ribeaupierre,' Recherches Medievales 60/61 (1999): pp. 3-
20. 
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above, there is nothing in the surviving deed of ransom which could be construed as a 
promise to release Harlestone after the first payment and there would appear to be no 
other surviving documents on this matter. 
Harlestone seems to have accepted his captivity. He was first held at Hoh 
Rappoltstein but subsequentiy moved to Burgundy. In February 1387 Harlestone 
gave a letter (preserved in French) agreeing to remain as Bnmo's prisoner whilst in 
the custody of Guy de Pontaillier, the Marshall of Burgundy and fiuther promised to 
return to custody within eight days i f anyone were to free him.''*^ The letter makes 
mention of the fact that Harlestone had previously undertaken a pilgrimage to the 
shrine of Our Lady of Nazareth with Pontaillier 'au temps, que pais et Concorde 
estoient entre les roys de France et d'Angleterre' which probably refers to the truce 
between 1360 and 1369. The two were boimd by an oath of that time to assist each 
other and Harlestone had sought Pontaillier's help in ' lui extraire des mains dicelli 
messires Bnm', presumably in the hope of securing more comfortable lodgings during 
his captivity. As mentioned above, the Germans had a poor reputation in terms of 
their treatment of captives and all of the various letters written by Richard I I on 
Harlestone's behalf refer to the harsh regime of his imprisonment, although it has to 
be accepted that this may simply have been a conventional device to increase the 
impact of the appeals. 
The relationship between Harlestone and Guy de Pontaillier is unclear but their joint 
pilgrimage suggests friendship. The latter was Marshall of Burgundy from 1364 to 
1392. Alongside the Duchy and County of Burgundy, Philip the Bold's territory 
encompassed the 'terres de Champagne' (usually seen as a dependency of the 
Duchy).''*'* Some of Bruno's possessions may have fallen within this area. Bruno's 
service with Philip the Bold against the English has been discussed previously. Little 
can be said about this web of interconnection in the absence of source material, other 
than to reflect that the personal relationships forged between knights sometimes 
transcend the simple divide between warring factions and thus there may be 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 277. 
Vaughan, Philip the Bold, p. 114. 
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dimensions to the antipathy between Harlestone and Bruno that arose in ways that are 
unlikely ever to become clear. 
Bruno's connections with Burgimdy and Harlestone's fiiendship with de Pontaillier 
may have played their part in Bruno's agreement to release Harlestone from Hoh 
Rappoltstein but other factors may also have been at work. 
In Jime 1385 Richard I I of England wrote to the city authorities in Sfrassburg to seek 
their assistance in obtaining Harlestone's release. '''^ In his letter he pointed out that 
Bruno was a citizen of Strassburg and it was on this basis that he requested the 
intervention of the authorities. Bruno had, in fact, been granted status as an 
Ausburger in October 1383.'^ *^  Richard also points out in the same letter that 
Harlestone could not have been guilty of the depredations alleged by Bruno since, at 
the time, he was ' in partibus ultramarinis contra inimicos crucis Christ'. Some writers 
have seen this as suggesting that Harlestone had visited the Holy Land but there is no 
other evidence to support this and it is more likely to refer to the journey made with 
Guy de Pontaillier or, quite possibly, to be a complete invention. 
According to the Strassburg chronicler, Twinger, Bruno was summoned to appear 
before the council and to justify his capture of Harlestone. It is in this context that 
his written statement of justification mentioned previously was most likely composed. 
The matter was left in abeyance at this point. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 245. 
Ibid., 2, No. 226.There is no direct translation of Ausbiirger. The term relates to the practice of chies 
whereby "external citizenship" was granted to members of the local nobility. This arrangement was 
considered to have advantages to both sides. For the city, it gained access to the support of the noble 
and his resources in case of need in times of war or dispute. It also provided the local city patriciate 
with closer links to the nobility, to whose ranks they often aspired. For the noble (who would usually 
maintain a property within the city) came similar support and the other benefits of citizenship. For a 
brief overview see Eberhard Isenmann, Die deutsche Stadt im Spdtmittelalter, 1250-1500: Stadtgestalt, 
Recht, Stadtregiment, Kirche, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft (Stuttgait: E . Ulmer, 1988), pp. 98-99. 
'''' The following section draws on Twinger's chronicle and the direct quotes are taken from here 
unless otherwise referenced. The relevant section of the chronicle may be at found at: KOnigshofen, 
Strassburg, 9, pp. 680-682. 
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Further letters fi-om Richard were then received by the authorities, not all of which 
have survived. Eventually the authorities wrote back to Richard explaining that 
the matters giving rise to Bruno's capture of Harlestone predated his citizenship and 
that the citizenship agreement between Bruno and the city expressly excluded their 
becoming involved in such disputes which, accordingly, was nothing to do with them! 
The chronicler notes that several respected persons suggested that pressure should be 
brought to bear on Bnmo in case their failure to act were to cause problems for the 
city in the future. Others treated this view with contempt, commenting that 'es 
mueste ein lang swert sin das von Engelant untze gen Strosburg reichte.' 
In the absence of any practical help fi*om the authorities in Strassburg, Richard turned 
to others. He wrote a series of letters to his brother-in-law, Wenzel, king of the 
Romans, Pope Urban V I , Primissel duke of Teschen and the Dukes of Lorraine and 
Luxemburg. In each case Richard asked for intervention to help secure the release of 
Harlestone. At this point, the pressure began to build for Bruno and his response 
was dramatic. 
In September 1386 Bruno swore perpetual allegiance to Charles V I of France. '^ '^  In 
return for eight thousand francs Bruno pledged to hold his castles open to the king and 
to support him in his war against the king of England and the latter's allies, including 
specifically the king of the Romans. The only exclusions from Bruno's obligations 
were the duke of Burgundy, the duke of Austria (to whom Bruno had pledged 
allegiance for three years in April 1384), The duke of Lorraine, the bishops of Basel 
and Strassburg and the city of Sf rassburg .Bnmo imdertook to capture any English 
subjects or possessions that he could and also not to free any English prisoners 
without the prior approval of the king. In a fiirther document of 1388, Charles V I 
instructed Bnmo to capture any Englishman travelling without a safe-conduct issued 
by Charles or in his name.'^ ^ Thus, Bruno appears to have re-entered the Hundred 
Years' War and transformed Harlestone into a prisoner of war. The implications of 
Perroy reproduces one further letter in Perroy, Richard II, p. 30. KOnigshofen however seems clear 
that there were several letters. 
""Ibid., pp. 28-31. 
''"Albrecht, RU,2,no. 263. 
Ibid., 2, No. 233. 
Ibid., 2, No. 289. 
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Bruno's action in the context of his position as a subject of the Empire will be 
considered later. For the moment, it should however be recorded that at the time of 
entering this agreement, Bnmo was still in the Acht as a result of the dispute with the 
Habsburg-Laufenburg family and that this new allegiance may have been at the root 
of his decision to send Harlestone to Burgundy. 
Harlestone remained in Burgundy for the duration of his captivity. A fiirther letter 
dated 10 March 1388 restates his obligation as Bruno's prisoner whilst moving to a 
new location in Burgimdy. For Bruno, who apparently chose not to publicise his 
French connection, the presstire continued. Letters were written to the Strassburg city 
authorities by Wenzel, Pope Urban V I and the dukes of Lorraine, Luxemburg and 
Teschen, all of whom requested the city to use its influence with its errant citizen. 
Wenzel wrote additionally to all towns in the Landvogtei of Alsace to order them to 
press Bruno to release his captive.'^^ 
Wenzel wrote to Bruno himself in February 1387.'^ "* He refers to letters and 
ambassadors that he has previously sent to Bruno requiring him to release Harlestone 
or to present himself before the princes of the Empire to justify the captivity and to 
the fact that neither of these things has happened. This letter suggests that Wenzel is 
running out of patience with Bruno but it had no effect. In December 1387 Bruno 
received a fiirther letter from the king of France instructing him to imprison all 
English soldiers and their supporters unless they held letters of safe-conduct.'^^ 
Matters dragged on and eventually Wenzel ran out of patience and Bruno was placed 
in the Acht, again, in 1388. In a letter to the cities of Strassburg, Colmar, 
Schlettstadt, Hagenau and all other imperial Cities in Alsace, dated 27 August 1388, 
Wenzel demands that rights of citizenship be withheld from all of Bruno's subjects 
because 
der obgenante von Roppolsteine vnd all die sinen in vnsem vnd des heiligen 
Riches ohte sind vnd vor ouch frefreliche vil jore in ohte vnd aber ohte 
gewesen sint vnd noch sint von clage wegen des edeln grofe Ruodolfes von 
'^ ^ Ibid., 2, Nos. 273, 274, 275 and 278. 
Ibid., 2, No. 276. 
Ibid., 2, No. 248. 
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Habesburg seligen vnd Heinrich Wiskle von wegen der hoherbomen furstin 
frowe Arme, kiinigin zuo Engelant etc.'^ ^ 
Similar letters were addressed to other towns and cities with instructions to resume 
control of properties granted to Bruno and his subjects. 
Eventually the pressure had the desired effect. The release of Harlestone is not 
documented directly but can be implied from other sources. A document dated by 
Albrecht to early 1392 refers both to Harlestone as released and Bruno as free of the 
Acht}^^ In fact, it would seem that Harlestone had been released rather earlier as he 
was paid the arrears of his pension in England in December 1389. 
This was not, however, to be the end of the matter. Bruno's next great feud - with the 
city of Strassburg - was taking shape. 
Ibid., 2, No. 330. 
Ibid., 2, No. 337. 
Perroy, Richard II, p. 197. 
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Case Study 3: Bruno and the City of Strassburg 
While there is no evidence of general hostility between the Rappoltstein family and 
the city authorities of Strassburg, Bnmo's relationship with the authorities had been 
volatile over a long period of time prior to the events discussed above. In 1362 Bruno 
had joined in alliance with the city to defend against the incursions of the 'English'. 
The surviving evidence suggests, however, that Bruno and his brother Uhich were 
short-lived members of the alliance without indicating any possible reasons for this.'^^ 
As noted above, at the time of the death of his brother Ulrich in 1377 Bruno was 
harmed from entry into the city although the reason for this is again unclear. In his 
own words, Bnmo noted ' do getoerste ich nicht gen Strassburg inkommen.''^*^ The 
family archive contains a number of documents which suggest that there were fiirther 
disputes but also periods of co-operation between Bruno and the city.'^' None of 
these disputes had prevented Bruno from obtaining his status as an Ausbiirger of the 
city. This, of itself, gives some indication of the volatile relationship that existed 
between the city patriciates and the local nobility. 
Following the unwillingness or inability of the city authorities to effect the release of 
Sir John Harlestone as discussed previously, they were to discover that Richard I I of 
England did indeed 'have a long sword', diplomatically i f not physically. I f the 
authorities believed that they could stand aloof from that dispute on the basis that it 
was 'none of their concern' then they would appear to have been guilty of a damaging 
combination of arrogance, naivety and stupidity. None of the city's many established 
privileges and freedoms was able to protect it from the political manoeuvring of its 
enemies who saw an opportunity to profit from this matter. 
Albrecht, RU, 1, No. 744 Note 1 
Ibid., 2, No. 157a. 
161 Ibid., 2,No. 108. In this document Bruno denies an accusation from the city authorities that he had 
given shelter to Johannes Erbe 'in minen vestinen zue Welschem lande:' when the latter was sought by 
the city in respect of an attack on its possession, Herlisheim. It is possible that this dispute had led to 
Bruno being banned from the city but there is no record of this. Other documents note the involvement 
of Bruno as an arbitrator in settling various local disputes. 
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On the basis of a complaint in the name of Aime of Bohemia, Richard IPs wife and 
half-sister to King Wenzel, the city was placed under the imperial barm in 1389 in 
somewhat dubious circumstances.'^^ The city authorities claimed that they had been 
sentenced outside of their own territories and may well have had some justification, 
given that they had received a number of imperial privileges which should have 
safeguarded them from this danger.'^ ^ 
What followed from this was a war of opporttmism. Although Bruno was party to 
this, it was not his feud and the details are not relevant here. Suffice to say that the 
prime mover was the bishop of Strassburg, Friedrich von Blankenheim, who may 
have seen an opportunity to re-establish some measure of control over the city as well 
as a potentially highly profitable exercise. He enlisted the support of various princes 
and nobles with the promise of financial gain and with the connivance of Wenzel's 
Landvogt, i f not with that of Wenzel himself, an army was mustered to attack 
Strassburg. After a deal of negotiation and some indecisive military action in which 
the surroimding peasantry were, as usual, the main losers, the matter was settled by 
the payment of a substantial sum by the city to the imperial purse and the city was 
released from the Acht. During the course of these negotiations a number of 
participants had submitted accounts for "reparations", including one from Bruno for 
the sum of thirty thousand florins.'^ In the end, a payment of thirty two thousand 
florins to Wenzel w£is enough to see the lifting of the bann with the city being left to 
negotiate separately with the other parties. The bishop of Strassburg was left in a 
particularly difficult position. His supporters had gained nothing and expended 
substantial sums which he was in no position to reimburse. Some of these took 
recompense by attacking the bishop's properties on their way home and shortly after 
the conclusion of hostilities, bishop Friedrich persuaded the pope to permit him to 
exchange sees with the bishop of Utrecht. '^ ^ His successor (whose election itself 
required a fiirther bout of hostilities) was finally obliged to make a settlement with the 
city. 
'^ ^ There is evidence that the proceedings against the city were in breach of the proper practice both as 
regards the location of the hearings and the manner in which they were conducted. See Fritz, SU, No. 
687. and also Trendel, 'Brunon de Ribeaupierre,' p. 10. 
Battenberg, Reichsacht undAnleite, p. 85 and Note 381. 
Trendel, 'Brunon de Ribeaupierre,' p. 14. 
Konigshofen, Strassburg, 9, pp. 695-696. 
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One small point of interest in this affair which relates directly to Bruno is that it 
provides a rare, possibly unique, account of his involvement in direct military action. 
In an assault on the Rhine bridge, Twmger (in one redaction) writes of a captam of 
artillery 'der schoB in die brucke mit her Bumen von Roppilsteins biissen, der hette do 
duo mole die groeste von der man im Eilsas wuste zuo sagende.' The text does not 
mention that Bruno took part in the action himself but clearly he was an early adopter 
of new military technology and quite probably would have been on hand to oversee 
the deployment of his artillery. 
The settlement of the war did not led to a settlement of the animosity between Bruno 
and the city of Strassburg. The feud between the two, described as such by the city 
itself, continued until Bruno' death.'^ ^ 
The city authorities appear to have accepted a settlement with the king, their 
mendacious bishop and those magnates who had supported him as representing the 
best available outcome to a quarrel which they could not hope to win. The payment 
of a substantial 'gift' to the royal exchequer, a bribe by any other name, to secure 
release from the Acht appears to have been considered a normal transaction. Indeed, 
in one letter of instruction to their ambassadors at an early point during the 
negotiations, the city authorities made it clear that payment should be made to settle 
the matter i f at all possible.The total disruption of the city's commercial activities 
and the suspension of its privileges were far too costly to be allowed to continue. 
Bruno was an entirely different case. 
As has been discussed above, the relationship between Bruno and the city had been 
less than harmonious from time to time over many years. It is clear from numerous 
documents in the city archives and from the tone of Twinger's comments that the city 
authorities blamed Bruno entirely for the imposition of the Acht and for the 
subsequent war with the bishop and his supporters. It does not seem to have occurred 
to them that their own attitude towards the various requests made by Wenzel and 
others in the matter of Sir John Harlestone's imprisoimient was at least partly the 
'^ "^  See Fritz, S(/, No. 1151. 
Ibid., No. 602. 
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cause of their misfortune. In addition, there were other outstanding grievances 
towards Bruno which required settlement. In particular there were sums of money 
lent to the Rappoltstein family several years previously which remained unpaid and 
there was the matter of the town of Gemar which Bruno had seized from the city in 
1392.'^ ^ Previously in 1391 he had also retaken control of a part of the town of 
Ribeauville which he had pledged to the city and promised not to enter. At the time, 
the city had responded by banning Bruno from entry into the city for two years. 
For his part, Bruno maintained his own long list of grievances against the city. In his 
first statement demanding reparations, Bruno makes a point of recording that the city 
had sent two officials to him at the start of the Harlestone affair and that these had 
made it clear that they wanted nothing to do with this matter since it pre-dated the 
adoption of Bruno as an Ausburger. It would seem that Bruno was attempting to 
state, for the record, that it was not his fault that the city fell into the Acht. His other 
demands concern themselves with claims that the city had taken various actions 
which had given rise to expenses which he would not otherwise have incurred or 
which had involved violence against Bruno himself and his people, including the 
unjustified beheading of one of his men.'^ '^  By way of response the city confined 
itself to a complaint that Bruno had broken his oaths by retaking both the town of 
Gemar and a part of the town of Rappoltsweiler which he had pledged on account of 
sums borrowed from citizens of Strassburg. The point is also made that the city had, 
in fact, attempted to intervene in the matter of Harlestone's capture.'^ ' 
By September 1394 matters had not been resolved and the city began preparations for 
war with Bruno. In a letter dated 8 September 1394, the city wrote to Count Heinrich 
von Saarwerden (the husband of Bruno's niece Herzlaude) to inform him that they 
'herr Brunen von Rappoltsten und die sinen meinent zu schedigen umb das unrecht, 
das er und die sinen uns, unsem burgen and den unsem getan hant.' They made it 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 345. 
The city's complaints are repeated in several documents during the course of the feud. See Ibid., 2, 
No. 445. as an example which details the complaints regarding Gemar and Rappoltsweiler. The matter 
is mentioned in more detail below. 
™ Fritz, SU, No. 742. 
Ibid., No. 743. 
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clear in the letter that they had no wish to damage Saarwerden's property and had 
given instructions that this should be avoided. '^ ^ 
This was followed next day by a formal declaration of hostilities addressed to 
Bruno.' Six days later a meeting took place between the two sides but nothing was 
resolved. On 19 September 1394, Bruno's supporters sent their declarations of enmity 
to the city.'^ '* It is clear from various references that negotiations continued but not all 
of these are documented in the archives. In February 1395 a meeting was arranged at 
Hagenau (the seat of the Landvogt), The representatives of the city were present but 
Bruno was absent, sending in his place three representatives who suggested that a 
final settlement could not be reached without Bruno himself. In a telling intervention 
'hat der Landvogt ausgeflihrt unter Beistimmung des anwesenden Heinrich von 
Saarwerden und anderer, dass es viel gunstiger sei indirect mit Bruno zu handeln'. 
The report omits the detail of the discussions but subsequent events show that no 
settlement was reached. '^ ^ 
Discussions, truces, threats of action and further complaints by both sides continued 
with nothing being resolved. In April 1395 Wenzel wrote to the imperial cities of 
Alsace and Swabia requesting them to write to the authorities in Strassburg and to 
instruct them not to attack or damage Bruno's castles and possessions. '^ ^ Finally in 
October 1395 a comprehensive settlement was pronounced by Duke Leopold of 
Austria. '^ ^ In this document Leopold appears largely to declare that those issues 
which are documented should be settled according to pre-existing agreements and 
dismisses claims which rely on the verbal assertion of the parties. Bruno clearly did 
not find this to his satisfaction and ignored it. 
Further negotiations ensued during the following months. In April 1396 Wenzel ruled 
that matters should be resolved by the arbitration of the archbishop of Mainz and 
directed all parties to attend the meetings which the archbishop had called. Wenzel 
Ibid., No. 884. 
Ibid., No. 886. 
''*Ibid., Nos. 888 and 891. 
Ibid., No. 915. 
Ibid., No. 922. 
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also mentions that he had communicated this decision verbally to Bruno. ''^ There is 
no evidence of Bruno having travelled to Prague (from where the document was 
issued) but very shortly thereafter in May 1396 Wenzel granted Bruno the right to 
mint his own silver coins. '^ ^ This was swiftly followed by the grant of further 
privileges. In June 1396 Wenzel decreed that, in respect of property held of the 
Empire, Bruno could only be called to appear before the courts of the Landvogt in 
Alsace or the Empire itself. Further, on the same day, Wenzel decreed that no-one 
should be permitted to summon Bruno, his people or his possessions before any court 
other than that situated in the area in which they were situated. At the same time he 
declared that all previous decisions made in other courts were voided. It would thus 
appear that Bruno stood favourably in the king's view at that time. 
In early August, Bruno and his supporters met with the representatives of Strassburg 
under the auspices of three representatives of Duke Leopold of Austria. At this 
meeting, each party again set out in great detail their various grievances against the 
other and answers were given. The memorandum recording this meeting is 
lengthy.'^ "^  
On Bruno's side he repeated many of the complaints which were made at previous 
gatherings. First, however, he accused the city of having broken the peace between 
them agreed at Hagenau and of having acted generally in bad faith. This was 
followed by detailed complaints concern property rights and, m particular, the 
disputed possessions of Gemar and part of Rappoltsweiler. He also complained that 
the city has damaged and repossessed properties that belonged to him within the city. 
There were accusations of violence against people under his protection and attempted 
violence against Bruno himself, because of which he had to expend large sums 
improving his castle defences and strengthening his garrisons. Finally, he claimed 
that the city failed to attend a meeting which had been decreed as a part of the 
Hagenau settlement and that, for this reason, all of the city's claims against him are 
null and void. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 450. 
'™ Ibid., 2, No. 451. 
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The city rejected each of Bruno's points. Their defence, in simplified terms, 
comprised either the fact that Bruno was in debt to citizens and Strassburg and had 
breached agreements, so it was reasonable for them to take the actions of which he 
complained, or that the matter was nothing to do with them. Against Bruno's final 
attempt to have all of their complaints struck down, the city simply replied that they 
had attended the meeting, to which Bruno countered that this had never happened. 
The city also rejected claims it they had breached the previous peace accord and 
stated that it was Bruno who had done this. There is a sense of two parties arguing 
from fixed positions with no wish to reach a compromise. 
In its response, the city again stated its grievance over Bruno's illegal repossession of 
a part of Rappoltsweiler. In reply, Bruno gave more detail than previously recorded. 
For Rappoltsweiler he claims that while he was in the Acht, the city had plaimed to 
take Rappoltsweiler and his prisoner. Sir John Harlestone, and pass both over the 
Wenzel. Having received no reply in response to his questioning on that rumour he 
felt he had to assume that it was true. This view was reinforced when the city's forces 
appeared outside the gates of Rappoltsweiler in his absence. They were not admitted 
but given that the city itself was in the Acht at the time and thus outside of the law, 
Bruno feh that he was justified in retaking possession of the whole of the town. 
A similar degree of detail is provided in Bruno's response to the, now familiar, 
complaint that he had repossessed the town of Gemar which was pledged to a citizen 
of Sfrassburg. Bruno accepted that the pledge was made but complained that the 
citizen, Heinrich von Mulnheim, had used Gemar as a base from which to attack 
Bruno and his people and that Mulnheim intended to kill or capture Bruno i f at all 
possible. In the circumstances Bruno felt justified in putting a stop to this, after 
several warnings, by retaking Gemar. 
The city repeated its accusation that Bruno, as an Ausburger, had failed in his duty to 
them and had, in fact, damaged the city through 'mordt, brant und raub'. There is 
nothing by way of specific incident put forward to support this general complaint. 
Bruno rejected this, making the point that he had only attacked them in open warfare 
and that this had happened after the city had been placed in the Acht, at which point 
the king had declared all agreements relating to Ausburger to be void. 
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There were numerous further complaints against Bruno of greater or lesser weight -
including the accusation that he 'einer armen frauwen ... vier tonnen hering 
genoomen habe.' 
There is no record of any agreement or decision having been reach in Freiburg. In 
October, a letter from the city to Philip the Bold, duke of Burgimdy describes the visit 
of an ambassador fi-om both the duke and his brother, the French king. This 
ambassador appears to have been sent with a view to brokering a peace following 
complaint by Bruno to both the king and the duke.'^' Within the letter is an indication 
that the matter had again been referred to Leopold IV of Austria as Bruno's feudal 
overlord. Notwithstanding this, the city had decided to take direct military action by 
laying siege to the town of Gemar. A substantial force equipped with artillery was put 
into the field but Bruno's garrison stood firm using the arquebusses mentioned 
previously to kill a number of the Strassburg soldiers. The siege lasted some 20 days 
without any unpact and was then abandoned. 
For Strassburg, matters began to take a turn for the worse when news was received 
fi-om a number of sources that the duke of Lorraine was raising forces to invade 
Alsace in support of Bruno. In the interim Leopold IV of Austria had pronounced a 
final settlement which was ruinous to Bruno.'^ "^  Under the terms of this agreement, 
Bruno was required to pay twenty one thousand guilders to the city. Bruno received 
nothing for his counterclaims. Leopold himself along with Bruno's brother-in-law, 
the count of Saarwerden and others stood as guarantors and Bruno was forced to 
pledge a substantial part of his property in return. The final settlement account was 
agreed on 26 December 1396.*^ ^ Various writers have given widely varying figures 
for the total of Bruno's indebtedness at the time of his death but none of these is 
supported. In the absence of evidence an accurate figure is impossible to calculate. 
All are agreed however that it was substantial. Bruno was clearly left short of money 
Fritz, SC/, No. 1151. 
Trendel, 'Bnmon de Ribeaupierre,' pp. 17-18. There is a list of the city's expenses incurred m this 
campaign: see Fritz, SU, No. 1213. 
Fritz, SU, Nos. 1190, 1191, 1192 and 1193. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, Nos. 566 and 567. 
Fritz, No. 1214. 
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and there is evidence of fresh borrowing in the early months of 1398.'^ ^ The pledging 
of most of his dynastic assets to the Habsburgs must have been a bitter blow to Bruno. 
Within eighteen months he was dead.'^ ^ 
Albrecht, RU, 2 , No. 607. Bruno was also seeking to enforce various rights to raise cash. See 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 598. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 612. The suggested date for his death is 14 May 1398. 
Page 86 
Chapter VI Bruno's Sense of Identity 
Consider Bruno von Rappoltstein in 1377. The recent death of his brother Ulrich VI 
had left him in sole effective control of the Rappoltstein lordships, at least while his 
niece, Herzlaude, remained unmarried. This was to be the pivotal point in his life and 
in the fortunes of the family, which were now in his hands. 
To pose the question of how Bruno might have perceived himself at this point as an 
individual and as the leading secular figure in his family is, inevitably, fraught with 
danger. It has long been a matter of debate to what extent, i f at all, the historian is in 
a position to form any understanding of what might have been in the mind of 
individuals who lived in the past. Keith Jenkins rejects the notion out-of-hand thus, T 
think people in the past were very different to us in the meanings they gave to their 
world, and that any reading on to them of a constancy of human nature type, of 
whatever kind, is without foundation.' His view is that historians do not study the past 
but only what other historians have constructed about it' This is not the place for a 
discussion of the post-modernist approach to writing history. Jenkin's arguments 
against 'empathy' are logical and persuasive.Too much has changed. A modem 
historian can hardly be expected to begin to grasp what it was to be alive in the latter 
part of the fourteenth century or to understand, in any real sense, the mind-set which 
would have governed Bruno's opmions and actions.'^ *' This was a time in western 
Europe when supernatural explanations were accepted for anything which could not 
otherwise be understood; a time when God was the fimdamental causative agent in all 
human life. The Black Death in particular was seen as God at work ui the world with 
Keith Jenkins, Rethinking History, Routledge Classics (Oxford: Routledge, 2003), p. 56. 
Ibid., pp. 47-57. In this section, Jenkins sets out in detail his reasons for rejecting empathy as a 
possibility for the modem historian. The debate arising from the post-modem approach to history 
continues and has sometimes appeared to move beyond the language of scholarly debate. An opposing 
view to that put forward by Jenkins may be found in Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History: 
Knowledge, Evidence, Language (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). and also in Richard J. Evans, In 
Defence of History (London: Granta, 2001). Another view from the post-modem standpoint is to be 
found in Alun Munslow, The New History (Harlow: Longman, 2003). For a consideration of a post-
modem approach specifically to medieval history see Gabrielle M. Spiegel, The Past as Text: the 
Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography, Parallax. Re-visions of culture and society 
(Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
Others would say that this is exactly what historians do! 
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an inevitable sense of millenarianism one of its consequences. Even the language 
is a problem. It is tempting to translate late Middle High German words by reference 
to their modem equivalent where the orthography is similar. This can sometimes led 
to a false understandmg as meanings change over time.'^ ^ Notwithstanding these 
reservations, it is possible to say something about this matter while accepting that it is 
only what Jenkins would call 'a tentative understanding'.'^ ^ 
Aged about forty years (on the basis of the estimation of his birth date as discussed 
above), Bruno found himself in a position that he may never have anticipated. His 
early years had been marked with a series of difficult episodes. His mother had died 
while he was still a very small child (in 1341) and his father had followed while he 
was still in his teens m 1362. As the youngest of nine children, by 1377 he had lost 
three of his four brothers. Three of his sisters were in convents. Nothing is known of 
the fourth although she was known to be still alive in 1377.'^ '* He had grown up at a 
time when economic conditions had been more difficult than for previous generations, 
although as Scott suggests, the impact of these may have been less disastrous in 
Alsace than in other parts of Europe.He had survived the Black Death which had 
visited Alsace and taken its toll on the population of Strassburg if not on the region 
around Rappoltsweiler itself but he would have been well aware of its impact, not 
least by virtue of his elder brother Hugo being Domprobst of the Strassburg cathedral. 
He had seen his native lands ravaged by 'English' mercenaries temporarily 
disengaged from the conflict between England and France and his family had been 
party to at least one defence treaty at that time. Subsequently Bruno had become 
directly involved in that conflict, resulting in an extended and expensive captivity in 
Calais, and an unsatisfactory military encoimter which led indirectly to serious losses 
There are numerous studies of the Black Death and its impact at every level of European society. 
For general background see Norman F. Cantor, In the Wake of the Plague: the Black Death and the 
World it Made (London: Pocket, 2002). and Colin Piatt, King Death : the Black Death and its 
Aftermath in Late Medieval England (London: UCL Press, 1996). For a range of source material see 
Rosemary Horrox, The Black Death (Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1994). 
The online version of dictionary begun by Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm in the nineteenth century (but 
only cotnpleted in 1960) is an invaluable resource in the area. This may be found at 
http://germazope.uni-trier.de/Projects/DWB 
''^ For useful background to German society in the medieval period see Christopher R Friedrichs, 
'German Social Structure 1300-1600,' in Germany. A New Social and Economic History, ed. Scribner 
Bob (London: Arnold, 1997). 
See Appendix 1 for he full genealogy 
Scott, Regional Identity, p. 287. 
Page 88 
in his French estates and the later episode with Sir John Harlestone. From a dynastic 
viewpoint, his marriage to Johanna von Blankenberg had produced two daughters 
while Ulrich VII had left a single daughter as his only heir. His sole remaining 
brother, Hugo, was unpromising as a solution to the problem of succession. To 
complete Bruno's problems, his wife Johanna died in 1377. 
At this point, it might be tempting to divert into the realms of psychohistory or 
psychobiography and to seek some explanation for Bruno's later behaviour in the 
traumas of his childhood. There is no surviving evidence of his childhood years but 
lack of real evidence has not always been seen as a bar to such analyses from Freud's 
(in)famous essay on Leonardo da Vinci onwards. Given the earlier comments on 
'empathy' and the lack of detail concerning episodes in Bruno's early life, however, it 
is sufficient to note that while these early experiences were hardly likely to have been 
untypical and it is probably impossible to draw any relevant value from such analyses, 
Bruno would at least have had a deep sense of the transience of human life in this 
world. 
By way of a 'tentative understanding' however, it may be judged that Bruno's view of 
himself would have been closely tied to his sense of dynastic identity. Continuity 
with the past and the provision of heirs to carry forward the family name and fortunes 
were cenfral to the identity of a medieval noble, standing first and foremost alongside 
the duty to preserve and increase the family's assets and to protect the family's 
dependants. 
In the case of the Rappoltsteins, it has already been noted that they had a strong sense 
of dynastic identity. By 1377, as has been shown, the family was well established as 
Uradel and the leading noble family in the region outside of the bishops of Strassburg 
and the Habsburgs. The lack of male heirs would have been a major issue. As 
Ortwein notes 
Die Herren von Rappoltstein waren bis Anfang der siebziger Jahre des 14. 
Jahrhunderts ohne mannliche Erben ... Um die Erbfolge zu sichem, bitten Ulrich VII. 
und Bruno I . ihren Lehnsherm, den Bischof von Basel, ihnen die weibliche Erbfolge 
zu gestatten. Am 17.6.1371 kommt Bischof Johannes dieser Bitte nach. Am 7.5.1372 
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bestatigt Papst Gregor XI. von Avignon aus diese Genehmigung mit der MaBgabe, 
daB, sobald Sohne geboren werden, diese in die Erbfolge eintreten. '^ ^ 
Gaining this permission for succession through the female line would have been a 
time-consuming and expensive process but the alternative, the possible extinction of 
the dynasty, would have been a disaster greater to contemplate than all other 
problems. It is this issue which is at the heart of case study 1. 
As has been shown, the Habsburg-Laufenburg family was in a similar position in 
terms of male heirs. In their case, the branch of the family was relatively young and it 
is known that they were short of money. At all times they must have feared being 
subsumed back into the main branch of the Habsburg family which was consistently 
growing in power and influence. An alliance with the Rappoltsteins would have 
appeared attractive at every level. For both Bruno and his brother, the possibility that 
the chosen Habsburg-Laufenburg husband for Herzlaude was incapable of fathering 
children would have been a cause for grave concern. Following Uhich VII's death, 
Bruno (and his brother Hugo) appear to have tried to be as accommodating as 
possible. They were at pains to state their wish to remain on good terms with the 
Habsburg-Laufenburgs and to proceed with the wedding i f the alleged problem could 
be cured. The subsequent decision to switch the marriage to the cotmt of Saarwerden 
would seem to have been a sensible, indeed necessary, option. Unfortunately, the 
only surviving accounts of this episode are written from the Rappoltstein viewpoint 
and would be expected to have supported their case. It is clear from even these 
accounts that there had been accusations that Bruno had 'sold' his niece to a more 
important family which offered better prospects and an opportunity to redeem 
outstanding debts at a time when the Rappoltsteins themselves appear to have been 
short of money. Indeed, it remains unclear exactly what advantage the family had 
perceived in the proposed original match. The suggestion that Herzlaude's original 
betrothed had subsequentiy fathered children is not clearly supported and the fact that 
he wed a woman of lower status would tend to support a view that his affliction was 
at least well known in noble circles, i f not genuine. 
Ortwein, "Chronik Rappoltstein," p. A133. 
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What is clear from this episode is that the dynastic needs of the family took 
precedence. As Bruno stated himself, he would have preferred to have kept the 
whole of the Rappoltstein lordships intact and under direct family control. The 
decision to seek permission for the estates to pass via the female line indicate that this 
was seen as preferable to the alternative of the family dying out and the estates 
reverting to their feudal lords. Thus, in the absence of male heirs in 1377 and with 
Bruno no longer married, finding a suitable husband for Herzlaude was a priority. 
The Saarwerdens were a considerably better prospect than an impoverished cadet 
branch of the Habsburgs and Bruno was prepared to face the consequences of taking 
that option. The family came first. 
The importance of the Rappoltstein family at this time has been established. In his 
detailed picture of the properties and rights of the Rappoltsteins, Brieger states, 
Nach unten bin war die Herrschaft dort, wo sie die bannherrschaft oder gar die 
Hochgerichtsbarkeit besass, fest abgeschlossen; gleichviel unter welchem 
Rechtstitel die Rappoltsteiner diese Gerechtsame innehalten - ob als 
Reichslehen oder als anderes Lehen-, alle ihre Untertanen standen in strengem 
Pflicht- und Abhangigkeitsverhaltnis.'^ ^ 
Thus, Bruno held in his hands, quite literally, the power of life and death within his 
own domain. 
Beyond his obvious sense of family identity, it can be asked i f Bruno would have felt 
any sense of regional or 'German' identity. In the first case, the geographic and 
economic circumstances of Alsace have shown that it was a natural region. Its 
'buffer-zone' position between the French and German speaking descendants of 
Charlemagne would only have tended to encourage the development of a sense of 
commtmity and identity. Tom Scott points to this. Following an analysis of the 
public peace treaties of the fourteenth century he writes ' I would suggest that the 
freaties do reflect a sense of regional identity on the Upper Rhine in the later Middle 
Ages, an awareness of mutual needs and interests which was bounded by a sense of 
Brieger, Die Herrschaft Rappoltstein, p. 69. 
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place.' '^ ^ The involvement of the Rappoltstein family in supporting these mutual 
needs has been illustrated by participation in a variety of freaties for local defence 
and for the maintenance of peace and good order. Bruno had been brought up in these 
fraditions which would have been of importance to him as a part of the definition of 
his family and personal status. But as Scot points out 'a sense of Landschaft might 
extend beyond the valley to embrace both the Ajoie and the territories lying in and 
beyond the Burgundian Gate.' '^ ^ In Bruno's case, perhaps far more than is evident in 
earlier or contemporary family members, there had been a wider dimension to his 
experiences. As discussed above, Bruno had married the daughter of a Burgundian 
family before 1362 and had acquired a number of properties on the other side of the 
Burgundian Gate. Quite possibly as a result of this, he had been drawn into service 
with Philip the Bold of Burgundy and had seen action (if only briefly) in the French 
cause against the English. After Bruno's death, this connection would grow stronger. 
His eldest son, Smassmarm, served Philip the Bold as Mundschenk at the Burgundian 
court as a young man.^ *'^  He progressed to become Landvogt of the Habsburg Outer 
Austrian lands and was eventually engaged to Philip the Bold's daughter, Katherine 
of Burgundy, the widow of Duke Leopold IV of Austria.^"' The family connection 
was thus far from trivial. As will be discussed below when considering Bruno's 
relationship with the Empire, Bruno maintained his relationship with the Valois to the 
extent of entering into service with Philip's nephew, Charles VI of France in 1386. 
Against this background, it has to be said that there is little evidence of Bruno playing 
any significant role in regional matters, other than in the context of his disputes with 
Strassburg. Of course, for most, i f not all, of the second half of his life, he was 
nominally an outlaw in the empire! 
Scott, Regional Identity, pp. 39-40. Scott writes specifically about Alsace and the Upper Rhine but 
from his point of view as an economic historian. The question of a German identity in the pre-modem 
period is the subject of a vast literature. A discussion of this is not entirely relevant here as Bruno 
shows no sign of a 'German' perspective in any of his actions. 
Ibid., p. 40. The Burgundian Gate is a geological term referring to the gap between the Vosges and 
the Jura mountain ranges. See Figure 1 - the town of Belfort sits in this gap. 
Rathgeber, Die Herrschaft Rappoltstein, p. 4. 
Ibid. Some writers suggest that this marriage took place - see Ortwein's genealogy in Appendix 1 as 
an example. However both Armstrong and Calmette are clear that the marriage was blocked by Philip 
and that Smassman was bought off. See C. A. J. Armstrong, England, France and Burgundy in the 
Fifteenth Century (London: Hambledon, 1983), pp. 312-13. and Joseph Cahnette, The Golden Age of 
Burgundy: the Magnificent Dukes and their Courts (London: Phoenix, 2001, 1962), p. 138. Vaughan 
is silent on the matter. For a definition of "Outer Austria" see Scott, Regional Identity, pp. 56-58. 
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The same can be said to be true in terms of any evidence of Bruno showing any sense 
of national or 'German' identity. In a recent article, Len Scales discusses the question 
of late medieval German identity and the stereotypical view of the German people as 
warlike and 'fiirious'. There is a great deal about Bruno's character that would fit 
him to the prevailing stereotype as described in that article. He conformed to the view 
held by some of the Germans as guilty of 'reckless impulsiveness, which drove the 
Germans not only to plunder others, but also themselves.'^ ''^  He certainly had an 
'innate love of quarrels'^ "'* But there is little to demonsfrate that Bruno thought or 
operated in any 'German' dimension. His concerns were exclusively primarily local 
and overwhelmingly dynastic. Indeed, his relationship with the Empire, considered in 
more detail below, was at all times ambiguous. 
Little is known of Bruno as an individual. There is just the single, telling, comment 
(mentioned in case study 3) during the negotiations to settle the dispute with the city 
of Strassburg, that it might be better to deal with Bruno indirectiy. Taken with the 
indirect evidence of his behaviour throughout the episodes described above, it may be 
concluded that he was a difficult person, someone not easily deflected from pursuit of 
what he considered to be his or his family's rights. His willingness to defy arbitration 
decisions which did not suit him and, indeed, effectively to defy the imposition of the 
imperial bann, points to a stubbornness of mind which was not always to his 
advantage. His predominant sense of himself seems to have been 'Ich bin der Herr 
von Rappoltstein' as stated in the supposed family motto. This encapsulates a sense 
of pride in his heritage, his determination to protect and enhance the family's position 
and a strong sense of his own power within his territories which , as has been seen, 
were second only in compass to those of the Habsburgs in Upper Alsace. It also 
embodies the hubris which would seem to be Bruno's weakness and at the seat of his 
many troubles. An early indication of this may be drawn from his own description of 
his performance at the tournaments accompanying the marriage of Philip the Bold. 
He was in the most illustrious company of European nobility at that gathering but 
L E Scales, 'Germen Militiae: War and German Identity in the Later Middle Ages,' Past and Present, 
no. 180 (2003). For a recent view of German statehood in the medieval period see also L E Scales, 
'Late Medieval Germany: an under-Stated Nation?,' in Power and the Nation in European History, ed. 
Len Scales and Oliver Zimmer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
Scales, 'Germen Militiae,' p. 75. 
Ibid.: p. 67., citing Alexander of Roes, Noticia Seculi 
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from the memorandum of his involvement discussed above he quite clearly 
considered himself to have been one of the stars in that particular firmament. As 
powerfiil as he may have felt himself to be, or indeed, may have been within his own 
domains, the fixture events of his life would demonstrate the limitations of that power 
when pitted against individuals and entities of real power. 
In summary, Bruno was a Rappoltstein, which for him seemed more than sufficient. 
He was a survivor in an uncertain world who was concerned to maintain and fiirther 
the fortunes of the family. It is perhaps unfortunate that his personal character was 
such that he achieved almost exactly the opposite of what he must have intended. He 
most assuredly did 'plunder himself as well as others. 
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Chapter VH Bruno's Relationship with Kings and Princes 
For the head of a locally important but more generally insignificant lordship in a far-
flung comer of the Empire, Bruno seems to have had a disproportionately large 
amount of involvement with kings and princes. Using the information from the case 
studies, it is interesting to examine the nature of these relationships and to examine 
what these can reveal about power relationships at the end of the fourteenth century. 
There are four relationships that bear scrutiny: The Empire, France, Burgundy and 
Austria. 
The Empire 
Bruno grew up under the imperial rule of Charles IV who was succeeded by his son, 
Wenzel as king of the Romans, in 1378. Wenzel was deposed in 1400 and his reign 
thus coincided almost exactly with the period of Bruno's life presently under 
consideration. 
Charles IV had moved the centre of power in the Empire to his native Bohemia with 
Prague at its centre.^ ''^  In 1365 it was an agreement between Charles IV and Pope 
Urban V (1362-70) that had led indirectly to the ravaging of Alsace by the free 
companies under Amaud de Cervole, the Archpriest.'^ '^ ^ When the companies were 
refused permission to cross the Rhine by the bridge at Strassburg, Charles IV (who 
was in the area at the time) was obliged under local pressure to summon support and 
to use his forces to shepherd the companies back towards French territory, albeit 
without the military engagement that the citizens of Strassburg urged upon him. It 
was also suggested at the tune that Charles IV had used the companies to repay the 
city of Strassburg for detaining him within the city against his will during a dispute 
Du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages, p. 39. For general background on Charles IV and 
Wenzel see also Peter Moraw, Von Qfferter Verfassung Zu Gestalteter Verdichtung. Das Reich im 
spaten Mittelalter (Frankfurt am Main: Veralg UUstein GmbH, 1989), pp. 240-259. The whole book 
provides useful background to the period and the issues relevant to this dissertation. Further 
background summarising the trends in modem research (at the time of publication) can be found in 
Karl-Friedrich Krieger, Konig, Reich und Reichsreform im Spatmittelalter, ed. Lothar Gail, 
Enzyclopadie Deutscher Geschichte (Munchen: R Oldenbourg Verlag, 1992). 
'^^  For Urban V see Kelly, The Oxford Dictionary of Popes, pp. 223-225. 
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over the acceptance of external citizens, a practice which he had forbidden in his 
Golden Bull of 1356?^^ As Twinger records 'und geschach groesser schade zuo Elsas 
von des keysers volke und von den frunden, denne von den vigenden was 
geschehen.', to the effect that 'und wart kom tiire, das ein viertel bi ein pfunt gait.' 
Ten years after the first invasion, a second invasion led by the French nobleman 
Enguerrand de Courcy seeking to establish a domain in Alsace, was repelled by the 
local forces of Strassburg and Alsace with no help fi-om the emperor. Charles IV 
was thus no great friend to Strassburg and Alsace. Indeed, his concern with the 
politics of Bohemia left him little time to involve himself in German matters to any 
great extent. His Golden Bull and promotion of the Landfrieden in the latter part of 
his reign served to place day-to-day power increasingly in local hands. Du Boulay 
summarises his reign thus, 'The hallmark of Charles IV's reign is the dynastic 
aggrandisement of the Luxemburg family. All else appears subordinate.' '^^  
I f anything, Wenzel showed even less interest in Alsace. There is no evidence of his 
spending time in the area or visiting Strassburg during his reign.^'' He was again 
primarily concerned with dynastic issues in his native Bohemia, arising from his 
father's legacy. Taken with his reportedly dissolute and drunken lifestyle, the 
German parts of the Empire were left largely to their own devices under the loose 
direction of his appointed officials. Very few historians have had a good word to say 
for Wenzel. Du Boulay considers that he was faced with nine problems and resolved 
none of them.^ '^  Offler is a little kinder but only as regards the early part of the 
reign. '^^  It is of little surprise that the administration of the Empire appears to have 
especially chaotic during this period. By way of an example, the Strassburg city 
authorities sent ambassadors to Wenzel during negotiations to have the city removed 
from the Acht. After their arrival in Prague, they were kept waiting for several weeks 
"^'^  Dollinger, Histoire de I'Alsace, p. 141. 
Konigshofen, Strassburg, 9, p 489. 
Dollinger, Histoire de I'Alsace, p. 141. 
Du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages, p. 37. 
^" See Wenzel's itinerary in Ivan HlavdCek, Das Urkunden- und Kanzleiwesen des bohmischen und 
romischen Konigs Wenzel (IV) 1376-1419, Schriften der Monumenta Germaniae historica (Stuttgart: 
Anton Hiersemann, 1970), pp. 396-431. 
212 
213 
Du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages, p. 45. 
HS Ofifler, 'Aspects of Government in the Late Medieval Empire,' in Europe in the Late Middle 
Ages, ed. JR Hale, JRL Highfield, and B Smalley (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 229. 
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without seeing the king and eventually returned home.^ ''* The extent to which 
imperial authority was ineffective is fiirther apparent when considering the 
relationship between Bruno and the Empire which emerges from the case studies 
above. 
The relationship between the Rappoltstein family and the Empire had been of varying 
quality as indicated above. Anselm II , in particular, had at different times been a 
stalwart supporter of the Empire and the subject of a siege conducted personally by 
emperor Rudolf I . During the first half of the fourteenth century the family appears to 
have remained in good standing with the Empire, as evidenced by references in the 
archive previously shown. Bruno's father, Joharmes I I , seems to have presided over a 
period of stability in the family's fortunes and to have been a respected member of the 
local noble community. 
From the outset of his life, Bruno seems to have had a wider perspective. As has been 
seen above and as Jordan notes, 'Celui-ci [Bruno] se toume alors vers la Lorraine et la 
Bourgogne; il epouse une dame de Blamont, se montre plus interesse par les pays 
d'outre-Vosges, alors en plein tumulte, que par les regions germaniques.' At this 
point in its development the family did not stand in a direct relationship with the king 
/ emperor. Brieger, in his study of the Rappoltstein lordships, devotes a chapter to 
this aspect. From this it is clear that during Bruno's lifetime, the Rappoltsteins were 
subject to the authority of the Landgrafschaft of Upper Alsace which was in the hands 
of Habsburg Austria, notwithstanding certain specific privileges granted by Wenzel to 
Bruno. It is only after Bruno's death that the family is mentioned as being in a direct 
relationship with the king / emperor as reichsfrei and reichsstdndisch?^^ It is perhaps 
for this reason that the final arbitration in the dispute with Strassburg comes fi-om 
Duke Leopold IV of Austria. However, Brieger concedes that the question of the 
Rappoltsteins' position in respect of their various relationships to superior authorities 
is unclear and based upon a very limited number of sources. The family held a 
bewildering collection of lands and rights fi-om numerous parties and even he, in a 
very detailed study, excuses himself from setting all of them down. '^ '^  This knot of 
'^^  Kdnigshofen, Strassburg, 9, p 682. 
'^^  Brieger, Die Herrschaft Rappoltstein, p. 69. 
Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
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relationships, rights and jurisdictions can only have been a source of confusion and 
may well have played its part in the complexity of Bruno's relationships with those to 
whom he was, at least nominally, subject. 
The most immediately striking aspect of Bruno's own relationship with the Empire is 
in the matter of the Acht. As has been seen above, Bruno was first placed under the 
Acht in 1379 on the basis of a complaint by Count Rudolf von Habsburg-Laufenburg. 
The entries in the imperial Achtbuch, reproduced by Battenberg in his study of the 
Acht record a series of such entries.'^This is in line with the sequence of events as 
described by Bruno. 
The first interesting point to arise from this is that Bruno was able to take his case to a 
separate court and have himself removed from the Achtbuch. No details of the 
process have survived. As has been seen, this was not the only occasion when Bruno 
sought an alternative arbiter in a case where the verdict was not to his liking. This 
aspect will be considered fiirther below. 
On this occasion however, as we have seen, his accuser was then able to have this 
acquittal overturned and Bruno's name appears twice in the Achtbuch in 1382. hi the 
second case against Bruno, arising from his capture of Sir John Harlestone there is 
just the one entry against his name, in 1388, on the complaint of Wenzel's sister, 
Anne, Queen Consort of Richard II of England.^ '^  In neither case is there any entry 
against his name to indicate that he had been placed in the Aberacht, or ever released 
from either of the original Acht pronouncements. As mentioned above, Battenberg 
has stressed the importance of entries in the Achtbuch, both in respect of the original 
sentence and its subsequent removal and it is thus puzzling that such entries do not 
appear. The documentary evidence cited previously suggests that Bruno was released 
from the sentence in respect of his capture of Sir John Harlestone. There is also clear 
evidence previously cited that Bruno had been placed in the Aberacht - the extended 
sentence which could follow the simple Acht after a period of one year and one day. 
Battenberg, Reichsacht undAnleite, p. 567. 
Ibid., p. 571. 
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What is both interesting and, at first sight, puzzling is that Bruno's status (or absence 
of it) as an outlaw does not seem to have impeded him in his day-to-day life or in the 
enjoyment of his position as lord in his own domain. Nor does it appear to have 
prevented him from conducting his normal business or from receiving fresh privileges 
from Wenzel himself Yet, from 1379 possibly until his death in 1399 he was under 
sentence of outlawry, the consequences of which were apparently extreme. 
To understand this and to set it within the context of Bruno's relationship with the 
Empire, it is necessary to understand the nature of the Acht and Aberacht in the later 
medieval Empire. 
The Acht is defined by Poetsch thus: 'Unter Reichsacht versteht man das Setzen einer 
Person ausserhalb des Schutzes der Rechtsordnung mit Wirkung fur das ganze 
Reichsgebiet;' The origins of the penalty lie in the notion of Friedlosigkeit 
developed by the Germanic tribes. In effect, the person subjected to the penalty was 
no longer within the 'peace' of the king and thus not subject to his protection. Worse 
still, that person was to be considered not merely as an "outlaw" but as an enemy. 
Poetsch suggests that the imperial sentence of outlawry, die Reichsacht, first came 
into use during the second half of the twelfth century.^ *^^  As a punishment it was 
potentially the threatened sentence for a wide range of offences and for disobedience 
of a variety of orders from the king. Non-appearance before the king himself or his 
courts, both for criminal and civil cases, was a common usage. 
The Acht itself came in two stages. In the later Middle Ages the initial, or simple 
Acht was primarily a device to persuade the offender to submit himself to the courts. 
The second stage, the Aberacht, was a far more serious punishment. Poetsch 
considers this first phase to have been 'nur eine Minderung des Rechtsschutzes, die 
erst nach Ablauf einer gewissen Zeit durch Verhangen der Oberacht (Aberacht) die 
voile Friedlosigkeit nach such zog.' In his view, the simple Acht had originally led 
to the fiill consequences of outlawry but by the later Middle Ages this had reduced to 
^" Joseph Poetsch, Die Reichsacht im Mittelalter und besonders in der neueren Zeit (Breslau: Verlag 
von M & H Marcus, 1911), p. 2. 
Ibid., p. 4. 
Ibid., p. 18flF. 
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a more limited restriction with the fiill force of the sentence only falling on the person 
concerned with the pronouncement of the Aberacht which could be invoked i f the 
Acht had persisted for at least a year and a day. In certain very serious cases however 
he suggests that the fiiU force could be brought to bear immediately and also in cases 
where the Acht had been rescinded against an oath to appear before a court and where 
that oath was not kept. 
The simple Acht, according to Poetsch, had the following consequences. The 
'outlaw' could not stand as representative for another m any court; any complaint that 
he brought to court could be ignored but he would have to answer complaints agamst 
him; he was unable to exercise any judicial powers that had been granted to him and 
he could be neither judge nor witness in any court proceedings. His disposition of any 
property was invalid and no-one was bound by any oath made to him. Although the 
outlaw was outside of the king's peace, this was limited. He could be captured and 
brought before the courts at any time by anyone. I f he resisted arrest he could be 
wounded or even killed, but in the latter case the court was to be informed 
immediately and the body delivered to it.^^^ The point of this was to make it clear that 
anyone subject to the Acht would be brought before the courts, under compulsion if 
necessary, both for the benefit of the original complainant and in the interests of 
public order. In addition to the implications of the sentence for his legal powers, it 
was forbidden for anyone to give any support to the outlaw or to have anything to do 
with him. This would have acted to exclude him from any religious ceremonies, 
irrespective of whether the Acht had been accompanied (as was often the case) by a 
sentence of excommunication. At this stage, the desired outcome was that the outlaw 
had little choice but to flee or to submit to the courts. In practice however, the effects 
of this aspect of the Acht were weakened by the numerous privileges granted to 
various nobles and cities permitting them to give shelter to persons subject to the 
Acht. 
I f the matter persisted long enough for the pronunciation of the Aberacht, the position 
of the offender worsened immeasurably. At this point he became a 'non-person' in 
the eyes of the law. Poetsch summarizes: 'Er verlor seine samtliche Wiirden, Ehren, 
^"Ibid., pp. 156-157. 
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Vorrechte, seine Freiheit, seine Familienrechte. Seine Frau wurde zur Witwe, seine 
Kinder zu Waisen.'^ "^* Any property held by fief reverted to the superior lord and 
other goods were to be confiscated for the benefit of the king. Beyond this, he could 
be killed by anyone at any time and, indeed, it was the duty of others to execute this 
sentence. Poetsch points to examples of such killings in the central Middle Ages but 
suggests that they were infrequent and that by the later Middle Ages such killings 
apparently never happened. He also suggests that the authorities much preferred to 
have the offender captured and delivered for the dispensing of justice via the courts, 
making the point that the consequences were the same whether the origin of the 
sentence was criminal or civil. 
Originally the Acht, and certainly the Aberacht, was a permanent state, incapable of 
being removed once pronounced but by the later Middle Ages both the Acht and the 
Aberacht were frequently removed upon the satisfaction of the necessary conditions. 
These conditions were dependent on the original cause of the sentence. In certain 
cases the payment of an Achtschatz was sufficient. This was the case for the city of 
Strassburg as discussed above. In both cases the outlaw was fiiUy restored to his 
position prior to the sentence although Poetsch points to a degree of ambiguity as to 
whether a person released from the Aberacht was able to reclaim property lost.^ ^^  
In summary, by the time of Bruno's first encoimter with the penalty, the simple Acht 
was principally used as a means to bring a disobedient subject to heel in front of the 
courts. Only with the imposition of the Aberacht did this process become a real 
punishment with serious consequences. 
The enforcement of both the Acht and the Aberacht had also changed by the later 
Middle Ages. Poetsch summarises the position thus. 
Es leuchtet ein, daB die Reichsacht mit ihren gewaltigen Folgen bei 
tatkraftiger Ausfuhrung derselben das allerwu-ksamste Zwangsmittel, die 
fiirchtbarst Strafe sein musste. Bis zum Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts scheint sie 
Ibid., p. 158. 
Ibid., p. 240flF. 
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auch tatsachlich sehr gefurchtet gewesen zu sein. Im 15. Jahrhundert sank sie 
aber praktisch nahezu zur Bedeutungslosigkeit herab.^ ^^  
and goes on to suggest that this is evidenced by the lack of entries evidencing release 
from the Acht and Aberacht. No-one thought it necessary because the penalty was 
itself never enforced. It is suggested that this lack of effect sprang from the weakness 
of the king and his lack of means to enforce a penalty which was the job of the 
imperial authorities to enforce. This, in turn, is traced back to the diminution of 
imperial power arising from the disposal of imperial property in earlier reigns. Thus, 
despite the many letters sent by the king to princes, nobles and cities requiring them to 
enforce the provisions of the Acht against the offender, in practice it was left to the 
original complainant to do what he could to enforce the sentence. 
In his modem consideration of the same issues, Friedrich Battenberg, has some points 
worth adding and some areas where he questions the received position as represented 
by Poetsch. Battenberg's approach is from a specific viewpoint in terms of examining 
the use of the Acht and Aberacht in the context of the decline of feudal relationships 
in the later Middle Ages and as a mechanism for the stabilisation of imperial power. 
His research does however add certain elements worth considering here in a general 
overview of the Acht. 
Battenberg makes the point that the issue of the sentence of the Acht served to give 
legal sanction to the prosecution of a feud against the outlaw. This greatly enhanced 
the chance of the complainant being able to enforce his claim, given the weaknesses 
mentioned above.^ '^ In the case of the Aberacht, he sfresses that the pronouncement 
was not an automatic process upon elapse of the term of one year and one day, but 
required a further application by the complainant and a further invitation to the 
outlaw.^ ^* 
Battenberg challenges the view that the Acht itself was intended as a form of lesser 
punishment. He believes that the pronouncement meant exactly what it said and that 
full Friedlosigkeit was the immediate consequence and that the difference between 
Ibid., p 187. 
^" Battenberg, Reichsacht undAnleite, p. 263. 
Ibid., p. 287. 
Page 102 
this and the Aberacht was a matter of the extent to which the remedies were pursued. 
He also spends some time in trying to overcome the paradox of what was said and 
what was done at a theoretical level. As a part of this discussion he points out that 
multiple, concurrent sentences 'und damit gleichsam Friedlossetzungen von bereits 
Friedlosen, waren deshalb durchaus moglich und im spaten Mittelalter vielfach 
tiblich.'. This, of course, was Bruno's situation. Within his views concerning the 
operation of the Acht and the Aberacht, Battenberg makes the point that for a brief 
period, from the reign of Charles IV to that of Sigismund (king of the Romans 1410-
1437, emperor from 1433), and thus covering the whole of Bruno's lifetime, there was 
indeed a clear and stated difference of effect between the two. As he says, 'Die 
Formulare liessen erkennen, dass erst mit der Aberachtverkundigimg ein Entzug der 
Freiheiten und Privilegien des Achters verbunden war; vorher konnte dieser sich, 
obwohl er der Theorie nach als voll recht- und friedlos anzusehen war, seiner 
Privilegialen Vorrechte noch bedienen.'^ '^ Overall, by the late Middle Ages and prior 
to their subsequent amalgamation in 1495, there seems to have been little practical 
difference between the two sentences. Battenberg states that the purpose of the 
Aberacht itself was no more than that of the Acht - to bring the outlaw to the court for 
settlement of the original complaint. 
Against this background it is not surprising that Bruno's life seemed to pass largely 
unaffected by his status as an outlaw. Although there is no record of his being 
pronounced as in the Aberacht, it is certain that this must have occurred as evidenced 
by a number of documents including the letter from Wenzel of August 1388 
previously quoted. This may be confrasted however with a fiuther letter from 
Wenzel dated June 1389 and addressed to the city authorities in Colmar. In this letter, 
Wenzel begins 'Lieben gefreuen, warm nu ze disen zeiten Brun von Rapoltstein in 
vnser vnd des heiligen Richs achte vnd swere vngenade ist,...' In this case there is no 
mention of the Aberacht. At this point, Harlestone was probably still in captivity and 
there is nothing in the Achtbuch to indicate a change in Bruno's status. It is thus 
reasonable to assume that he was still under two separate sentences of the Acht and at 
Ibid., p. 349ff,p.411flF. 
""Ibid., p. 413. 
"' Ibid., p. 428. 
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least one of the Aberacht, most likely in respect of the long-running dispute with the 
Habsburg-Laufenburgs. 
As mentioned above, there is indirect evidence that Bruno was eventually released 
from the sentence arising from the capture of Sir John Harlestone but no such 
evidence regarding the sentence arising from the Habsburg-Laufenburg complaint. 
Andlau stated 'disser brun ... ist gestorben in ach'. The enmity between the two 
families has been shown to have continued for many years albeit with little or no 
practical impact and the fact that Johann FV von Laufenburg was still agreeing only to 
a temporary truce between them in 1396 suggests that the complaint was unresolved 
and that Bruno most likely did die while still in both the Acht and the Aberacht?^^ 
The lack of any substantial impact of the Acht and Aberacht on Bruno's day-to-day 
life is evidenced throughout the archive by the many references to Bruno carrying on 
with business as usual. There are numerous documents preserved in the archive that 
show Bruno dealing with property in a normal manner but more striking are the 
examples of new properties and rights being granted to Bruno. On 31 March 1392, 
Wenzel granted Bruno and his sons 'das obgenante schultheisambpt vnd helbes vngelt 
zuo Sleczstat...' as an imperial fief and referred to Bruno in the conventional manner 
as 'vunsem vnd des Riches lieben getruwen'.^ ^^ This document follows closely on 
the indirect notification of Bruno's release from the Acht in respect of the Harlestone 
affair and is the reason why Karl Albrecht dated the letter containing this information 
as ' 1392 vor Marz 31'. On the following day Bruno was granted the right to a new 
toll on certain goods, in return for the fact that Bruno 'sich mit alien seinen slossen 
vnd vesten vns czu hulff verbunden hat'. Such grants continued up to the end of 
Bruno's life, notwithstanding his intransigence in the settlement of the dispute with 
the city of Strassburg (in which Wenzel had attempted to mediate) and the apparent 
fact that Bruno was still under sentence of Acht and Aberacht in respect of the 
Habsburg-Laufenburg complaint. In May 1396 Bruno was granted the right that 'er 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 466. 
Ibid., 2, No. 339. 
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ein siberein pfenynng muncze in seinem lande slahen soUe'.^ "^* A few weeks later, in 
June, Bruno received 
diese besundere gnade ... das in von sulcher guter wegen, die er von vns vnd 
dem Reiche zulehen hat, yemande anlangen oder anteidigen wolte, so is vnser 
meynung vnd wollen, das er von derselben guter wegen vor nyemand zu dem 
rechten gesteen solle, dann allein vor vnserm lantvogt zu Elsassen vnd vnsem 
vnd des reiches marmen doselbist.. .^ ^^  
and on the same day he was granted the right another 'besundere gnade' 
das in [Bruno], die lute, vndersessen vnd guter, die zu der herschaft gen 
Obem vnd Nydem Rapoltstein gehoren, fiir dhein lantgerichte noch sust fur 
dhein ander gerichte nyemande laden oder furheischen noch vber sie vrteylen 
solle in dheynweis dann allein fixr die gerichte, dorynne sie gesessen vnd 
wohnhaftig sein... '^ ^^  
Finally, it is noteworthy that a month later in June 1396 during the latter stages of 
Bruno's dispute with the city of Strassburg when war appeared to be about to break 
out, Wenzel wrote to his Landvogt and to all cities belonging to the Landvogtei 
instructing them to defend and protect Bruno against any attack that might be made on 
him by the city of Strassburg and its prime supporter, the duke of Austria. 
There is no evidence to suggest that anyone seriously attempted to apprehend Bruno 
in order to bring him before the courts by force. In his document of 1378, discussed 
in detail above, concerning the dispute over the marriage of his niece, Herzlaude, 
Bruno refused to travel to Rome on the grounds that he would most likely be captured 
and killed en route. This would have been before the first sentence of the Acht 
however. This should however be confrasted with Bruno's report during a dispute 
with Heinrich von Saarwerden in 1384 which arose from the marriage of Herzlaude, 
that he made a number of journeys in the cotirse of his dispute with the Habsburg-
Laufenburgs 'gen Prag, gen Lutzelburg, gen Franckenfurth vnd vmb vnd vmb'.^ ^^ 
There is no suggestion that he was in any way molested during the course of these 
Ibid., 2, No. 450. There is no evidence that Bruno ever exercised this right, probably because he 
lacked the wherewithal to do so. It was only subsequent to his death that silver was discovered and a 
mining industry established on Rappoltstein land. The grant itself is, however, a sign of the standing of 
the family. 
Ibid., 2, No. 453. 
Ibid., 2, No. 454. 
Ibid., 2, No. 458. Although given at Prague, the document bears the inscription ''Per dominum 
Primislaum ducem Teschinensem, Walchnico de Wytenmule". This was the same duke of Teschen 
whose safe-conduct had been carried by Sir John Harlestone at the time of his capture by Bruno! 
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journeys but it is unclear whether they were made before or after the first sentence of 
the Acht. 
Much later, during the course of his dispute with the city of Sfrassburg, Bruno 
complained of physical attacks made or threatened against him. It is unpossible to 
know whether these complaints had any merit or whether they were conventional or 
indeed fictitious accusations but at no time is it suggested that these were made on the 
groimds of Bruno being an outlaw and with a view to bringing him to justice. It 
would seem that these (if they happened at all) were simply a manifestation of the 
then current feud. 
Bruno does not appear to have travelled widely during the main period of his outlawry 
but the absence of evidence reveals very little in an archive which is inevitably 
incomplete. Clearly, there were circumstances in which a sentence of the Acht led to 
direct physical confrontation. Twinger reports that the first sign that the city of 
Strassburg had been placed in the Acht was the capture of its citizens travelling for 
purposes of trade.'^ ^^  Given the later circumstances of a plot between the bishop of 
Strassburg, the Landvogt and a group of nobles to exploit the city's status in order to 
extract cash from the authorities it is possible that the imprisonment of the city's 
merchants was orchesfrated rather than evidence of normal practice. 
Finally, there is no evidence that Bruno was in any way ostracised or shunned by 
anyone. When the plot against the city of Strassburg was being hatched Bruno was 
present as one of the initial conspirators.^ "*" Again, it is the case that he was at that 
time released from the sentence in respect of the Harlestone affair but not necessarily 
from that relating the Habsburg-Laufenburg complaint. 
Overall, it seems clear that outlawry had little practical impact on Bruno. It is evident 
in this case that the decline of the Acht and Aberacht as feared punishments was 
already under way during the reign of Wenzel, quite probably due to his lack of any 
real means of enforcement other than through the offices of the local justice system 
KOnigshofen, Strassburg, 9, 682. 
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and the generally chaotic nature of imperial administration during the latter part of his 
rule. If the impact of the sentence was negligible and the dire threats contained in 
imperial letters towards those who did not follow the king's instructions to enforce the 
sentence were ignored, it is hardly surprising that it became a matter of derision. 
This lack of imperial authority is reinforced by reference to Wenzel's attempt to 
become engaged in the settlement of the long-running feud between Bruno and the 
city of Strassburg. Wenzel's first involvement came in 1396, as mentioned above. 
Having taken the matter into his own hands, Wenzel deputed the archbishop of Mainz 
to arbitrate. Despite various attempts to conclude matters the initiative simply 
appeared to fizzle out with no conclusion. It was at this point that the city of 
Strassburg once again referred matters back to the duke of Austria as Bruno's feudal 
overlord. 
Overall, Bruno seems to have had such relationship with the Empire as suited him. 
His status as an outlaw for most of his adult life appears to have had no practical 
impact on his day-to-day affairs and he was clearly happy to ignore the imperial 
authorities and even Wenzel himself as and when matters did not suit him. This did 
not prevent him from acquiring significant new imperial privileges from time to time. 
Perhaps it was primarily a case of pragmatic politics on both sides in the context of 
the wider complexities of relationships between the king, the nobility and the cities. 
Perhaps also it was symptomatic of that wider malaise that would see the deposition 
of Wenzel from his position as king of the Romans very shortly after Bruno's death. 
By way of a brief postscript, matters changed significantly during the lifetime of 
Bruno's son, Smassman. It was under the latter's rule that the Rappoltstein family 
became much more directly concerned in the affairs of the Empire and in the wider 
politics of the region generally. '^" 
Benoit Jordan's book - Jordan, La Noblesse d'Alsace. - derived from his doctoral thesis, is primarily 
concerned with the later history of the family and deals fully with this change of status. 
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France, Burgundy and Austria 
The details of Bruno's involvement with France, Burgundy and Austria have been 
detailed above in the case studies. At first glance it is far from clear how these 
matters were inter-related and why Bruno became bound up in them but when seen in 
the context of the complexities of the latter part of the fourteenth century, things 
become clearer. 
There is nothing to suggest any special relationship between the Rappoltstein family 
and the French monarchy prior to Bruno. Nor is there anything to link Bruno with 
France apart from his brief appearance as a participant in the Hundred Years War. 
The only comment that Bruno has to make about his early experience as a combatant 
is the comment in a note which must have been written after 1384 'vndt stehen herm 
Brunen noch vff den heiittigen tag wegen des konigs in Franckhreich gemeltten zugs 
halber inn die 8000 francken seiner besoldung aus.'^ '*^  Money, as ever with Bruno, is 
a problem. 
It is thus something of a surprise to read the document of September 1386 in which 
Bruno accepted eight thousand gold francs to become the vassal of Charles VI of 
France - albeit with payment spread over a number on instalments. This was not a 
case of dual or multiple vassalage based on property or other rights. Such things were 
far from uncommon and normally the documents would make clear the hierarchy of 
obligations involved with action against existing overlords excluded.^ '*^  The 
Rappoltsteins held fiefs from a variety of greater lords in this way as has been shovra 
by Brieger. 
In Bruno's case, as noted in case study 2, he agrees to hold his castles open to the king 
of France and excludes only the Dukes of Burgundy, Lorraine and Austria, the city of 
Strassburg, and the bishops of Basel and Strassburg. He quite specifically allies 
"^^  Albrecht, RV, 2, No. 63. 
For a discussion of dual vassalage on the borders between France and Germany see Kurt-Ulrich 
Jaschke, 'Reichsgrenzen und Vasallitaten - zur Einordnung des franzOsisch-deutschen Grenzraums im 
Mittelalter,' Jahrbuch fiir westdeutsche Landesgeschichte 22 (1996): pp. 113-178. 
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himself with France against Wenzel and the English. The language of the letter from 
Charles VI is significant: 
Et pour ce le dit chevalier nous a fait foy et hommage et en est devenu nostre 
homme et nous apromis et jure tenir et acomplir, ce qui s'ensuit: 
Premierement, que lui et ses successeurs perpetuelement seront noz hommes 
et vassaulx et aussi de noz successeurs perpetuelement roys de France, et que 
il et ses successeurs serviront nous et noz diz successeurs en tous faiz de 
guerre contre le roy d'Angleterre et sez alliez, contre le roi des Romains, se 
mestier estoit, et qui'l aveinst que nous eussions guerre contre lui, et contre 
touz autres qui peuent viure et mourir, se requis en est, excepte ... [the 
exclusions are listed here].^ '*^  
This is not a short-term involvement. Bruno pledged both himself and his heirs to 
perpetual support of the French king in war against England, The Empire and their 
allies. Further, it makes clear that Bruno was the subject of the king of the Romans 
and that he is aware of the fact that France is at war with the Empire. For the 
relatively small sum of eight thousand gold francs, this was a very significant 
commitment which Bruno is unlikely to have made without some contemplation of 
the possible consequences. It is hardly surprising that he chose to keep this matter 
secret! 
This was a difficult time for Bruno. He was under sentence of outlawry over the 
Habsburg-Laufenburg matter which had, as he claims, cost him a considerable sum in 
travelling costs alone and although not yet sentenced similarly over the Harlestone 
matter, he was under considerable pressure on all fronts from some of the most 
powerful figures in Europe. He was also engaged in a dispute with his new brother-
in-law relating to the inheritance of his niece Herzlaude and had lost control of the 
largest Rappoltstein castle. Gross Rappoltstein and of half of the town of 
Rappoltsweiler, quite possibly permanently if the dispute went against him. This was 
certainly a low point in his fortunes. 
It is tempting in these circumstances to suggest that money was at the root of the 
problem. Given that the king of France was himself unable or unwilling to find the 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 263. 
Page 109 
cash in one lump sum, this may not be a complete explanation.^ '*^ It is perhaps more 
likely that Bruno was seeking a safety-net i f things were to escalate much fiirther. 
This is certainly the view taken by Trendel.^ '*^ For Trendel this is the complete 
answer and he suggests that this alliance had been initiated by Bnino. Certainly, 
Bruno would have had in mind that it was less than one hundred years since his 
predecessor had been besieged by the king in person. While Wenzel may have been a 
less threatening figure than Rudolf I of Habsburg, the pressure from all sides 
politically and religiously must have concerned Bruno greatly. He was clearly going 
to get no help from the city of Strassburg which was trying its best to distance itself 
from the whole matter and he had received threats from both Wenzel and the pope. 
He may well have believed that both his life and his soul were in danger at the same 
time as his hold on the family inheritance was faltering and, as usual he was short of 
cash. In these circumstances Bnmo may well have felt that an alliance with France 
might leave him with a way out given his holdings of property to the west of the 
Vosges or provide him with a powerfiil ally in the event of serious hostilities. What is 
less apparent is why the king of France would be interested in recruiting Bruno. But 
this agreement was not really about France. It was entirely about Burgundy. 
Charles VI had succeeded to the throne of France in 1380 at the age of eleven 
years.^ "*^  Following initial jostling for power amongst his three uncles, from 1382 the 
government of France was effectively imder the control of Philip the Bold of 
Burgimdy until Charles VI took confrol of his own affairs in 1388. This control was 
largely regained after 1392 when Charles VI displayed the first signs of a recurrent 
madness that was to be a feature of the rest of his life. At the time of Bruno's 
agreement with Charles VI in 1386, Philip was firmly in control. That Philip had an 
interest in Alsace is without doubt. Vaughan writes 'In the last two decades of the 
fourteenth century the European political context was favourable for the emergence of 
a new power, and by far the most propitious area for this was along the boundary 
Ibid., 2, No. 290. This document sets out the deferred payment terms of the sum originally promised 
to Bruno. 
Trendel, 'Brunon de Ribeaupierre,' p. 7. 
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Marmousets., Vaughan, Philip the Bold, Chapter 3 The First Peer of France & Chapter 5 The 
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between the kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire, ...'^''^ A substantial part 
of Philip's territory, the County of Burgtandy (in which Bruno held some of his 
possessions) lay within the boundaries of the Empire and he was, in effect, a buffer 
zone between the powerful monarchy of France and an Empire whose ruler had little 
control over what happened on its western borders and no army with which to support 
its diplomacy. 
Evidence of his interest is shown by the first marriage alliance sought by Philip for his 
children with the Habsburg duke of Austria, Leopold III , in 1377. At this time, the 
Habsburg dominions had been partitioned between Leopold III and his brother, Albert 
III who both styled themselves as 'duke of Austria'. In practice Leopold controlled 
Tirol, Carinthia and the Swiss territories with Albert controlling the remainder. This 
made Leopold a neighbour of Philip with substantial interests in Alsace, as previously 
outlined, and hereditary possession of the position as Landgraf of Upper Alsace. By 
marrying his daughter Margaret and Leopold's son and namesake. Philip negotiated a 
marriage contract which would bring substantial interests in the county of Ferrette and 
Upper Alsace thus extending his influence in Alsace and reducing the problem of 
conflicts along his borders in this area.^ "*^  In practice, matters were complicated by 
other considerations on Philip's part, which led him to request that Margaret be 
replaced by her sister Catherine, and subsequently by the death of Leopold III on the 
field at Sempach fighting against the Swiss in July 1386 just a few weeks before the 
agreed date of the marriage. The marriage was eventually concluded in 1387 but 
related issues arising from the payment of the dowry and the settlement of property 
dragged on into the reign of Philip's son, John the Fearless. Nonetheless Philip had 
secured a foothold in Alsace and made a Habsburg ally at no great financial cost."^ *^^  
Finally, on top of everything else, at the time of the agreement with Bnmo, Philip was 
engaged in the preparations for an invasion of England and, according to Vaughan 
who accepts the view of Froissart, he was probably the author of them. Philip desired 
peace with England in order to minimise disruption to the trading interests of Flanders 
and was prepared to negotiate it or to enforce it. These plans were eventually to come 
Vaughan, Philip the Bold, p. 79. 
Ibid., p. 84. 
Ibid., p. 85. 
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to nothing but in 1386 they were very much alive. An invasion of England would 
likely have led to conflict with the Empire as Wenzel had been allied to Richard II of 
England since the latter's marriage to his half-sister Anne in January 1382. 
As a potential vassal of France, Bruno would have certainly been attractive to Philip. 
With strongholds (the three castles at Rappoltsweiler and Burg Hohnack) securing 
two important routes through the Vosges mountains (see Figure 13) and a lordship 
which, as shown, was second only in importance to the Habsburgs in Upper Alsace, 
effective control of the Rappoltstein family would have added even more to Philip's 
influence in Alsace and might have proved very useful in the event of an armed 
conflict with the empire following an invasion of England.^ '^ 
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Figure 13 Routes Through the Vosges Mountains 
The threat of an invasion of England by France had been a factor for some time. For the background 
to this and to the surrounding diplomacy see Nigel Saul, Richard II (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale 
University Press, 1997), Chapter 7., Vaughan, Philip the Bold, pp. 47-51. By the end of 1386 Richard 
was in some political difficulty at home. For a detailed account of this period see Goodman, The Loyal 
Conspiracy. 
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In addition, the treaty between Bruno and Charles VI was signed in September, three 
months after the death of Leopold III . As already shown, the Rappoltsteins did not 
stand in direct relationship to the Empire at this time; they were subject to the 
Landgrafschaft of Leopold III. Thus, at a time of inevitable uncertainty foUowmg the 
defeat at Sempach, the opportunity to secure the allegiance of a major Alsatian noble 
family, thereby detaching them from the Habsburgs, would certainly have been 
attractive. 
How the alliance arose is also open to debate. Trendel seems to be sure that this 
would have been at Bruno's instigation.^ ^^ Presumably he sees this to have been an 
act of desperation in the face of mounting odds in the Harlestone affair. Given the 
points made above, it is worth considering an alternative. There is no direct evidence 
to indicate which party instigated the matter. Nor is there any evidence of the nature 
of Bruno's contact with the Burgundian court after his service with Philip in 1369. 
However, there is evidence that such contact had existed at a senior level relatively 
recently. 
During the Harlestone affair it was noted that Bruno sent the English knight away 
from Hoh Rappoltstein into the custody of Guy de Pontaillier, Marshall of Burgundy. 
Aside from his title it is evident that de Pontaillier was a trusted aide of Philip the 
Bold, having been given charge of the 1377 negotiations for the marriage alliance 
with Leopold III of Austria.^ ^^ The fransfer of Harlestone to Burgundy and to de 
Pontaillier in particular suggests that contact had been maintained by Bruno. De 
Pontaillier was of an age with Bruno (he was bom in 1348) and it is entirely possible 
that the two had met and served together in 1369. Thus, it may well be the case that 
the suggestion of an alliance had come from Burgundy via de Pontaillier rather than 
from Bruno. This would have fitted very well with a range of Philip's interests and 
there is an abundance of evidence to suggest that the Burgimdian were skilled 
diplomats. 
Trendel, 'Brunon de Ribeaupierre,' p. 7. 
Vaughan, Philip the Bold, p. 83. 
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The threatened invasion of England by the French came to nothing and Httle more is 
heard of Bruno's relationship with France or Burgundy until the time of Bruno's feud 
with the city of Strassburg some ten years later. At the point at which all-out war with 
Strassburg appeared inevitable the king of France sent his chamberlain to the city in 
order to broker a peace. By this time, Charles VI of France had been seized by bouts 
of madness and Philip the Bold was again largely in control of the French 
government. This intervention appears to have been at Bruno's direct request 
following his intransigence in the face of Wenzel's proffered solution and the 
knowledge that Strassburg had placed the matter before Leopold IV, duke of Austria 
and son-in-law to Philip. The city authorities were keen to establish their version of 
the facts in a letter which was addressed to Philip rather than to Charles VI. They 
recognized that Bruno had a good relationship with both France and Burgundy by 
closing with the words 'Doch hofften sie, [Strassburg - writing in the third person], 
dass sich beide [Burgundy and France] lediglich nach Recht und Gerechtigkeit und 
nicht parteiisch fur Bruno entscheiden wiirden.' ^^ "^  The practical outcome of this 
intervention may be reflected in the support which was forthcoming from the duke of 
Lorraine. Matters were overtaken however by the settlement pronounced by Leopold 
IV which finally seems to have broken Bruno's resistance. 
The close relationship which seemingly existed between Bruno, France and Burgundy 
could be said to have been mirrored in his early relationship with the Habsburgs. In 
1384 Bruno notified 'daz ich dez durchluhtigen fiirsten mins genedigen herren 
hertzog Lupoldes diener worden bin,...' and pledged his support against all 
enemies of the duke with the exception of anyone to whom he already owed 
allegiance and of the city of Strassburg.^ ^^  The agreement was for three years and 
while there is nothing in the archive to indicate that this was repeated, the later 
references by the city of Strassburg as having referred the dispute with Bruno to the 
duke's son, Leopold IV, because the latter was Bruno's superior lord, suggests that 
the arrangement may have continued or been made permanent in due course. 
Fritz, SU, No. 1151. The language in the source is modem and is noted to be from a Latin original. 
The editor suggests that the letter may not have been sent as it has many corrections in the original 
although it also bears traces of seals. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 233. At this point, the duke of Austria in question was Leopold III. 
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With the death of Leopold III at Sempach, the question of succession within the 
Habsburg family became complex. From 1396 however, Leopold IV had taken 
control of the areas previously controlled by his father, as outlined above. Leopold IV 
was twenty five years old at that time. 
There is little in the archive to indicate any detail of the relationship that Bruno had 
with Leopold IV. It is known however that the Habsburgs' previously cordial 
relationship with Wenzel deteriorated in 1388 when Albrecht III suspected that 
Wenzel was seeking to place his own man into the see of Passau, the diocese in which 
part of Austria was situated. This came on top of a dispute between Leopold III and 
Wenzel concerning the Swabian League and the Swiss Confederation in 1385. 
Given Wenzel's support for Bruno in his dispute with the city of Strassburg, it is 
perhaps thus unsurprising to find Leopold IV acting in support of Strassburg. In the 
space of two days in June 1396, both made their positions clear. On 14 June Wenzel 
wrote to his Landvogt and all towns subject to the authority of the Landvogt to 
instruct them to defend Bruno against attack from the city of Strassburg.^ ^^  The next 
day, Leopold IV's Landvogt wrote to Strassburg in his master's name to promise 
support for the city at a forthcoming meeting to resolve the dispute. 
As outlined above, the final settlement pronounced by Leopold IV was substantially 
in favour of the city of Strassburg and left Bruno with no choice but to pledge the 
heart of his lordship to Leopold IV who stood as guarantor for the payments due to 
the city. 
With what has been surmised regarding the intentions of Burgundy, it is reasonable to 
suggest that the Habsburgs were not unaware of the issues and the attractions of 
control over the Rappoltstein lordships. Leopold IV was, after all, married to the 
daughter of Philip the Bold. The Habsburgs would be well served both in 
consolidating their own position in Alsace and in removing a possible increase in the 
For background on the Habsburgs in this period I have referred primarily to Karl-Friedrich Krieger, 
Die Habsburger im Mittelalter (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994). 
^" Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 458. 
Ibid., 2, No. 459. 
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power of Burgundy by bringing the Rappoltsteins within their ambit. In due course, 
over the course of the next century, this is exactly what they did.^ ^^ 
In all his dealing with the greater lords and princes described above, it would appear 
that Bruno was no more than a small pawn in a wider game. There is no evidence that 
Bruno had been manipulated into creating the various disputes which led to his 
difficulties but it is clear that others saw an opportunity arising from these to exploit 
his rather rash and aggressive nature to suit their wider ends. 
See Silss, Rappoltstein, pp. 2-3. SUss (following Brieger) points to the family status as 
Reichsfreiherren prior to the sixteenth century and the exercise of superioritas territoralis. He 
describes the Rappoltsteins as the most powerful of the Habsburg vassals (for a part of their territories) 
after the bishops of Strassburg and the abbots of Murbach. Presumably he is only speaking of Alsace 
or the Habsburg home territories but this is not made clear. He then goes on to suggest that the 
Habsburgs worked over a long period to remove the family's reichsfrei status and to bring them fully 
under control as vassals. 
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Chapter VIII Bruno's Relationship with Strassburg 
By the middle of the fourteenth century the city of Strassburg had largely completed 
the evolution of its internal government in a manner broadly equivalent, i f not always 
as violent, as would be the case with many of the larger towns and city of later 
medieval Germany. Control of the city had passed fi-om the bishop in the late 
thirteenth century into the hands of an urban patriciate derived fi-om the ministeriales 
who had provided the administrative support for the bishops. In due course, this 
control had been seized by the merchant class of guildsmen and had eventually settled 
into a complex form of shared power between them and the remaining members of the 
patriciate. With some minor modifications this structure would serve the city for 
many years.^ *^^  Thus, by this point the city was to a large extent an independent 
entity buttressed by the many privileges that it had been granted, most notably under 
the imperial rule of the Hohenstaufen and the first of the Habsburgs. As previously 
discussed, Strassburg derived its merchant wealth primarily from its geographic 
location and its control of the northenmiost bridge across the Rhine, which made it an 
important trans-shipment centre. This, together with its limited territorial ambitions, 
appear to have created a rather self-centred society. Given its attitude when greater 
powers sought its assistance in freeing Sir John Harlestone, it would appear to have 
been rather self-important, and possibly naive, in believing that it could simply ignore 
the matter and expect no consequences. The internal governmental structures 
developed by the city give some indication of the culture of the ruling class after the 
removal of the patricians in 1332. These comprised a series of committees and a 
complex bureaucratic fi-amework dedicated to a fine degree of control over life in the 
city.^^' By the end of the fourteenth century this cuhure of bureaucracy was already 
well-developed. Unlike, perhaps, the situation in the city states of medieval Italy, at 
no point did any of these committees seek to take overall control. 
See Chapter 11 above. 
Chrisman, Lay Culture, Learned Culture, p. 14. Chrisman details the committee structure. Once 
created, committees were never disbanded even if their original purpose became obsolete. Neither 
were they renamed; thus for example the Council of XXI actually included all members of the Council 
of X V and the Council of XIII, neither of which necessarily had at all times the number of members 
suggested by the name. 
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Thus, the city seems to have been more inward-looking than expansionist, concerned 
primarily with the prosperity of its citizens (or at least those of them who had a 
political voice) and the maintenance of its status and privileges. As mentioned above, 
the city stood outside of the Decapole league of Alsatian imperial cities, perhaps 
having less concern, as a free city, that the king might seek to pledge his rights to 
some great prince to raise money. 
The city's relationship with the local lesser nobility in general appears to have been 
relatively uneventfial in terms of any major conflicts. Twinger's chronicle provides 
numerous examples of conflict in which the city participated but nothing, beyond the 
dispute with Bruno, that suggests similar problems with the other local nobility of 
Alsace. 
Prior to Bruno's rise to control of the main Rappoltstein lordships the Rappoltstein 
family itself appears to have enjoyed a harmonious relationship with the city 
authorities. As previously shown, the authorities had shown no indication of wishing 
to build a wider power-base or to seek to control the region of Lower Alsace in 
competition with its bishops or the local nobility. The family had an established place 
within the chapter of Strassburg cathedral and while the chapter would have felt itself 
to be above involvement in local politics, it shared with the city a generally suspicious 
relationship with the bishop and Bruno's brother, Hugo, would certainly have been 
well-known, as provost of the cathedral, in the city. In 1365 the family had joined 
with the city in league against the ravages of the 'English' under The Archpriest even 
i f this support appears to have been short-lived.'^ ^^ Various documents in the archive 
testify to a working relationship in dealing with matters of local and regional interest. 
It is only with Bruno that the relationship seems to have encountered difficulties, but 
these were intermittent and interspersed with moments when the relationship was 
seemingly cordial. There are documents showing Bruno acting in concert with the 
city in the settlement of disputes and others indicating disputes between the two with 
Bruno having been banned fi"om the city at various times. Inevitably, these 
documents show only a fragment of the detail of the relationship but it had clearly 
See Chapter 111 above. 
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never broken down irretrievably prior to 1383 when Bruno was granted his status as 
an Ausburger. Given that such disputes between the family and the city do not seem 
to be a feature of the archives in earlier times, and in the light of everything else, it is 
reasonable to imagine that Bruno's personality may have been at the root of many of 
the issues between the two. 
The breakdown of the relationship from that point has been documented above.'^ ^^  
The city authorities were in no doubt that it was Bruno's fault that they had been 
dragged into the Harlestone matter. Twinger can be taken as speaking with the voice 
of the city authorities in his account of the affair and he leaves no doubt that the 
blame lies with Bruno. It is arguable that this is a little imfair and that the city's 
problems were due to its poor handling of the diplomatic issues. This does not 
however excuse Bnmo from his active participation in the subsequent opportunistic 
'war' against the city waged under the leadership of its bishop solely as a means of 
financial gain. Given Bruno's poor standing with the city by this time and the fact 
that his estate was in substantial (overdue) debt to various citizens of Strassburg, it is 
reasonable to believe that his motive in taking a part in this war was solely for what 
he might gain from it. The outcome was, of course, that none of the participants 
received any gain, let alone the recovery of their costs, with the exception of Wenzel 
who was paid to release the city from the Acht. Bruno was left not only out-of-pocket 
but with a relationship that was by now completely destroyed. 
It appears that the city authorities recognised that they would not get very far in 
pursuing their former bishop or any of the greater nobles who had conspired against 
them. With Bruno, it was different. The city seemed unwilling to forgive him for his 
actions against them because he was their citizen and had sworn not to act against 
them. For the city authorities the breaking of this oath was not a matter that could be 
dropped. In addition, the recovery of monies owed by the Rappoltstein family and of 
the costs incurred m the course of the dispute were clearly of great importance. The 
archives suggest a sense of both outrage and weariness as the matter dragged on 
without any real prospect of a settlement until the final intervention of Leopold IV of 
Austria. Ultimately, it was not the strength of the city that proved too much for 
See Chapter II and III above. 
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Bruno. The archives suggest that he was content to continue to dispute matters 
indefinitely. Even the commencement of armed conflict with the city laying siege to 
Gemar does not seem to have been a deciding factor. Quite why this intervention 
proved decisive when so many earlier attempts to end the matter had failed will be 
considered below. 
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Chapter IX Bruno von Rappoltstein - Knight or Pawn? 
In previous chapters consideration has been given to Bruno's various power 
relationships. This final chapter will take a broader view and consider the extent to 
which Bruno was acting under his own motivation or whether he was being 
manipulated by others. In 1997 Hillay Zmora suggested a view of feuding, based on 
an analysis of fifteenth century Franconia, which proposed the thesis that much of the 
feuding activity was in fact controlled (directly or indirectly) by princes seeking to 
draw the lesser nobility into their orbits as a part of the construction of their own 
states. Taking Zmora's methodology as a starting point, Bruno's various feuds will 
be considered to examine whether he fits into the pattern that Zmora claims to have 
detected. 
Almost every serious work of scholarship which concerns itself with feuding in later 
medieval Germany includes the following quotation fi-om Werner Rolevinck, writing 
some time in the later fifteenth century: 
they [the German nobility] are of great bodily power, of active disposition, and 
naturally benevolent... It is only in times of need that they are violent... 
Unfortunate poverty teaches them many evils... You cannot look at these 
handsome squires without shedding a tear, struggling daily for little food and 
clothing, risking the gallows in order to overcome hunger ^ 
Zmora labels this as the locus classicus for every student of the knightly feud, and it is 
a view that has dominated modem historiography of this period until recent times. 
This view of the robber barons has found its way into the wider public consciousness 
both through a multitude of school and university textbooks and such dramatic works 
as the young Goethe's romantic drama, Gotz von Berlichingen mit der eisernen 
Hand?^^ It has survived until the present day and still finds expression in recent 
works of general history such as Philippe DoUinger's Histoire d'Alsace as noted 
above. Similarly, Robin du Boulay writes in a book still used in UK imdergraduate 
teaching: 
This translation is taken from Zmora, State and Nobility, p. 3. Zmora cites the printed edition of 
Werner Rolevinck, De Weslphalorum sive Antiquorum Saxonum Situ, Moribus, Virtutibus, et Paudibus 
Libri III (Cologne: 1602), pp. 190-191. 
For another romantic account see Heinrich von Kleist's Michael Kohlhass (1810). 
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The disappearance of the Hohenstaufen, the Interregnum, and the rivalry of 
Habsburg, Wittelsbach and Luxemburg left many areas unsubjected, or not yet 
subjected, to higher nobility, with the consequences that there were 
iimumerable occasions for dispute and many men able to eke a living by 
taking sides. This is where the Raubritter had their heartlands, where they 
lived in their country castles or fortified houses, sometimes in conditions of 
poverty.^ ^^ 
It is striking how similar is this description to that given above by Rolevinck nearly 
400 years earlier. 
Zmora provide a review of these long held views, which may be summarized as 
follows: 
Rolevinck's much-quoted analysis was followed in the nineteenth century by the 
coining of the term Raubritter itself by Friedrich Gottschalk at the start of that century 
and its uncritical adoption in the historiography of the time. In the early part of the 
twentieth century the German economic historian, Wilhelm Abel, produced a study 
which has formed the basis for later scholars who adhere to the theory of a late 
medieval agrarian crisis in Germany as the cause of the feuding activities of nobles 
driven to desperate acts by the reduction in their circumstances.^ ^^ More recently 
Werner Rosener, has championed the view that the nobility were badly hit by the 
demographic decline of the late middle ages and competition with town patriciates 
and thus were forced to operate in a grey area between feud and robbery - what 
Zmora describes as 'the classic robber-knighthood thesis'. 
Du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages, p. 73. 
Zmora, State and Nobility, pp. l - l l . 
Wilhelm Abel, Agricultural Fluctuations in Europe: from the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Centuries, 
trans. Olive Ordish (London: 1980). It is noteworthy that this book, first published in 1935, was 
considered current enough to be translated into English for the first time in 1980. 
^ '^Zmora refers to : Werner ROsener, 'Zur Problematik des spatmittelalterlichen Raubrittertums,' in 
Festschrift fur Berent Schwinekoper zu seinem siebzigste Geburtstag, ed. Hehnut Maurer and Hans 
Patze (Sigmaringen: 1982). The argiunents are repeated more recently in English in : W. ROsener, 'The 
Agrarian Economy 1300 - 1600,' in Germany. A New Social and Economic History, ed. Bob Scribner 
(London: Arnold, 1996). 
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The break with this received view of the later medieval German nobility came with 
Otto Brunner's seminal work. Land und Herrschaft, first published in 1939.^ *^^  
Brunner argued that the feud had to be understood in the context of a period in history 
which could not be analysed by reference to modem notions of 'state', 'society' and 
'economy'. In his view the feud was a lawfiil practice, carried out in accordance 
within an accepted set of rules. In the absence of a state the feud was both 'Right' 
and 'Might', the accepted and acceptable means of upholding one's rights. The 
nobility was the only group with the power and means to prosecute feuds and those 
who were bound to them received their protection and safeguard in this way. Thus, 
for Brunner the feud was an essential part of the nobility's role within the Land and 
not the result of some external force, economic or otherwise. 
For modem historians, Brunner's view of the feud is no longer considered adequate. 
Rosener, in the works mentioned above, has argued that the feud was little more than 
a rationalization of what was, in reality, illegitimate violence. Zmora points to 
numerous late medieval measures to control or outiaw feuding indicating that the 
contemporary view of feuding was not generally in line with Brunner's analysis and 
writes, 'Indeed, there was generally a strong movement to criminalise the feud'.^^' 
For Zmora, in accepting that feuding was not the means of pursuing 'Right', his 
interest lies in what drove the nobility in later medieval Germany to feud. It is in this 
area that he has opened up a new strand of analysis. Basing his work on a detailed 
study of the feud in Franconia in the period 1440 to 1567, Zmora has developed a 
rationale for feuding which ties it closely to the state-building of local Princes. At the 
start of his work, he writes. 
the feud both resulted from, and helped to shape, an interplay between 
princely state building and social stratification among the aristocracy. ... This 
interplay was probably already at work before 1440. But it is then that the 
links become apparent in the extant documentation.^ ^^ 
270 Otto Brunner, Land und Herrschaft: Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte 
Osterreichs im Mittelalter, 4., verSnderte Aufl. ed. (Wien: R. M. Rohrer, 1959). 
Zmora, State and Nobility, p. 8. 271 
Ibid., Preface xi. The literature, especially in German, surrounding the 'Raubritter' and the 'Fehde" 
is enormous. Zmora gives a comprehensive bibliography. For an overview which is contemporary 
with Zmora's book, see Kurt Andermann, ed., 'Raubritter' oder 'Rechtschaffener vom Adel? Aspekte 
von Politik, Friede undRecht im spdten Mittelalter, Oberrheinische Studien (Sigmaringen: Jan 
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Since the intention, for part of this study, is to consider whether his views have any 
resonances in a very different imperial territory and in the period immediately 
preceding 1440, it is necessary to look in some detail at Zmora's argimients and 
conclusions. 
Zmora's starting point is to dismiss out of hand Rosener's view that the late medieval 
German nobility were the victims of an agrarian crisis. He brings three arguments to 
bear. 
First, he challenges the factual evidence put forward by Rosener, suggesting that 
feudal rents in western Germany were predominantly paid in kind, not cash, which 
protected the nobility against currency devaluation and inflation and that the 
economic studies, upon which Rosener has based his view of the economic sufferings 
of the nobility, are inconclusive. Second, he challenges the theoretical basis of 
Rosener's work on the grounds that it is too narrowly focused and ignores whole areas 
of noble activity. Finally, he challenges Rosener's methodology, suggesting that it 
stops at the point of asking those questions which might invalidate its basic premises. 
As mentioned above, Tom Scott is similarly unconvinced that there was an agrarian 
crisis which can be linked to noble violence and feuding. 
Having thus disposed of the robber-knighthood thesis, Zmora substitutes a new thesis 
which links knightly violence to the more complex interactions between nobles and 
princes. Using a carefully expounded methodology (which will be discussed below), 
Zmora suggests that the key to understanding the knightly feud is 'proximity to 
princes'. To quote from his conclusions. 
Thorbecke Verlag, 1997). This collection of essays tackles a number of the central issues. In 
particular the editor's opening chapter, Kurt Andermann, 'Raubritter - Raubfttrsten - Raubbilrger? 
Kritik eines untauglichen Begriffs,' in 'Raubritter' oder 'Rechtschqffener vom Adel'? Aspekte von 
Politik, Friede und Recht im spdten Mittelaiter, ed. Kurt Andermann (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke 
Verlag, 1997), pp. 7-29. discusses the usefulness of the term 'Raubritter' in some detail in the context 
of late medieval feuding. 
This dissertation is not itself concerned with the merits of the views expressed by historians in this 
area. Its concern is to measure Bruno's life against Zmora's thesis, which, for this purpose, is thus 
described rather than analyzed. 
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Feuds turned upon lordship as a central constituent of noble status on the one 
hand and of princely rule on the other. ... Those nobles who came into 
possession of important lordships were in a favourable position. They had 
higher chances than those who did not of installing themselves around the 
person of a prince; of being invested with offices; of striking advantageous 
marriage alliances. They made up the elite. State-building thus exerted 
massive social pressure on the nobility, so much that it cut not only into the 
class as a whole, but into individual families as well. It touched off a violent 
contention over lordship. 
This is the essence of his argument. Nobles were feuding in order to ensure that they 
became members of this elite as the nobility itself became more stratified while 
princes encouraged, manipulated and sometimes sponsored, the feud as a way of 
bringing nobles into their own sphere of influence and thus increasing their ability to 
create states at the expense of their own rivals. Beyond this, Zmora concludes that the 
use of the feud by princes and nobles was a form of organised crime, a 'protection 
racket', which produced its own need for protection and thus lordship. 
Fundamental to Zmora's case is his contention that feuding was essentially a practice 
of high status nobility - very far-removed from the Raubritter driven to violence by 
poverty. To show this, he has undertaken a prosopographic analysis of the 
Franconian nobility for his period of study, using this data to consider the feuds of 
that period and to show that by far the largest proportion of fenders (some three-
quarters) were 'rich and powerful nobles drawn from prominent families' with the 
resources needed to prosecute the feud and to defend against the inevitable 
reprisals.^ ^^ Spoils gained were, thus, a means of financing feuds rather than the aim 
of the feud hself 
The detailed justification of Zmora's methodology need not be repeated here. Its 
value here is to establish whether an individual noble was of high or low status.^ "^^  To 
do this Zmora uses a series of individual parameters as his primary guide plus a 
number of family parameters by way of a secondary or control classification. 
Scott, Society and Economy in Germany, p. 164. 
Zmora, State and Nobility, Chapters 3 and 4. 
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The individual parameters are: 
1. the holding of high offices in princely administration 
2. financial transactions with princes as either a creditor or a guarantor or both 
3. the quality of individual matrimonial alliances^ ^^ 
The family parameters are: 
1. the status of the individual nobleman's father 
2. family access to membership of cathedral chapters 
3. continuity of the family line 
Zmora's view suggests that the use of the feud was confined primarily to high-status, 
powerfial individual nobles whose goal was to establish themselves as a part of a new 
elite in competition with other nobles, sometimes from within their own families. 
This new elite would be close to a successful territorial prince who would, in his tum, 
use the feud as a means to draw nobles into his nascent state in competition with other 
territorial princes. 
Zmora's study is confined to Franconia, centred on Nuremberg, in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. Zmora suggests that these processes may have begun earlier. The 
question to consider now, is whether this can be shown to be tme in Alsace in the 
latter part of the fourteenth century by consideration of the feuding activities of Bruno 
von Rappoltstein and, i f not, to consider what alternative suggestions might be put 
forward by way of explanation of Bnmo's activities. 
Before turning to Bmno's feuding, it is necessary to confirm that both he and the 
Rappohstein family conform to the parameters established by Zmora, as outiined 
above, and thus that Bmno is of comparable status to those considered by Zmora. To 
take these in order: 
1 Individual Parameters 
Ibid., p. 38. 
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a) The holding of high office in princely administration. There is no evidence of 
Bruno holding such office. 
b) Financial transactions with princes as either a creditor or a guarantor or 
both. Tthere is evidence of Bruno acting as guarantor for the cotmts of 
Wurtemburg. There is no other evidence of this nature in the family archive. 
c) The quality of individual matrimonial alliances. Bruno married twice. His 
first wife was Johanna von Landenberg, Frau von Mangers, the daughter of a 
Biu^gundian noble family. Following her death, Bruno married Agnes von 
Grandson, daughter of a Swiss noble family. 
Family Parameters 
a) The status of the individual nobleman's father. Bnmo's father, Johannes I I , 
was certainly a figure of some status within the region. He married twice, 
both times into branches of the von Geroldseck family. He corrunanded a 
substantial number of vassals. The documents fi-om the family archive 
indicate without doubt that Johannes II was recognised as a leading figure in 
the political life of the region during the first part of the fourteenth century. 
b) Family access to membership of cathedral chapters. Membership of cathedral 
chapters appears to have been a feature of the Rappoltstein family over a 
lengthy period. Heinrich I is mentioned in 1185 as a member of the 
Strassburg chapter; Hermann III was similarly a member in 1381 as was 
Ulrich V in 1338; Ulrich VI was a member first of St Die and subsequently 
Strassburg. Two of Bruno's brothers were members at Strassburg (Heinrich 
VIII and Hugo), with the latter rising to the position of chapter Provost. 
c) Continuity of the family line. The Rappoltstein family continued throughout 
the later middle ages. The direct male line finally came to an end with the 
death of Johann Jakob in 1673. 
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Overall, the family parameters are perhaps more closely aligned to Zmora than the 
individual parameters. However, the lack of office holding may simply reflect the 
lesser opportunities that existed in fourteenth century Alsace when compared to 
fifteenth century Franconia. With no-one having succeeded in establishing princely 
jurisdiction over the territory the main offices were either imperial or in the service of 
the bishops of Strassburg. There is no evidence of any close relationship between the 
Rappoltstein family and the bishops. Indeed, given the history of conflict between the 
bishops and the Strassburg cathedral chapter, where various members of the family 
had held office and where Bruno's brother was Domprobst, it seems unlikely that the 
Rappoltstein family would been supporters of the bishop. Such imperial offices as 
were available in Alsace were held within families on an hereditary basis and it was 
not until the lordship of Bruno's son Smassman that closer relationships developed 
with the imperial family. 
Similarly, the absence of regional princes would seem to reduce the opportunities for 
involvement in financial transactions with them. As the youngest of five sons, it is 
not surprising that Bruno does not appear to have been involved in such transactions 
in his younger days. In his later years, Bruno may well have been unable to afford 
such transactions as a result of the partition of the family estates, the economic impact 
of the Black Death and his own activities. Certainly, there is some evidence that he 
was short of money. 
In summary, the evidence that is available suggests that the Rappoltstein family as a 
whole were a part of the highest rank of Alsatian nobility in the fourteenth century 
and that Bruno himself would have been considered a leading, high-status noble by 
both his peers and his betters. I f the purpose of Zmora's prosopographical analysis is, 
in his own words, 'merely to identify the social lineaments of the feuders' then, given 
the differences of period and region, Bruno von Rappoltstein satisfies his criteria well 
enough. 
Before turning to the specifics of Bruno's life, it is worth considering briefly the 
extent to which feuding and violence were a normal part of life in later fourteenth 
Ibid., p. 68. 
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century Alsace. And, indeed, if the region was any more or less violent than other 
parts of the Empire. 
Both Reuss and DoUinger refer to the period as one of constant feuding but each 
declines to say much more than this. Reuss dismisses the whole area with the words 
'Quant aux querelles incessantes que les representants de I'anarchie feodale 
amor9aient, puis terminaient entre eux, pour les recommencer ensuite a nouveaux 
frais, sous I'impulsion d'appetits momentanes ou d'un besoin de vengeance, ce sont 
des manifestations de la seul force brutale, du Faustrecht, dont le detail serait ici sans 
interet.'^ ^^ Dollinger is no more interested in the violence of this period, devoting no 
more than a sentence to the topic except to mention Bruno's feud with Harlestone. 
Beyond this it is difficult to find sufficient evidence to form a view as to whether 
Alsace was a particularly violent area. Certainly, there are many instances of violence 
catalogued in Twinger's chronicle but these are inevitably selective and concentrate 
almost exclusively on disputes that involved the city of Strassburg directly. The 
archives of that city also record violent episodes but these say little of the surrounding 
region. Many of the episodes thus described are accounts of feuds or relate to judicial 
punishments. There is nothing in the general literature which suggests that Alsace 
was more or less violent than its surrounding areas. 
The fourteenth century generally is seen to have been a violent era. Michael E 
Goodrich writes: 'Bribery, violence and corruption were common means of settling 
disputes. ... The noble class and the rural peasantry seem to have shared a particular 
penchant for violent behaviour... The employment of violence as a means of dealing 
with conflict, however petty, had become a widely learned cultural trait.'^ ^^ Speaking 
specifically of the feud, Du Boulay comments 'Private war was a more fi^equent and 
natural condition in those numerous parts of Germany which were politically 
fragmented.'^ ^^ As described above, fragmentation was the condition of Alsace in the 
later Middle Ages. 
Reuss, Histoire d'Alsace, p. 39. 
Michael E Goodrich, Violence and Miracle in the Fourteenth Century (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 42-43. 
Du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages, p. 73. See also F . R . H . Du Boulay, 'Law 
Enforcement in Medieval Germany,' History 63, no. 209 (1978). 
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In addition, the growing strength of the towns in this period led to increased conflict 
between towns and nobles and between towns themselves. Du Boulay suggests that 
this was a factor in the increase in public disorder.^ *^^  On top of all of this was the 
inability of Wenzel to continue the work of his father in maintaining some semblance 
of law and order by means of the Landfriede, the Public Peace. 
The use of the Landfriede under Charles IV was as much about achieving wider 
political aims as about reducing disorder but the whole process crumbled under 
Wenzel whose distractions on account of his kingship of Bohemia and personal 
failings led him to play little active part in promoting peace within the wider Empire, 
in contrast to his father. 
In Alsace, Wenzel renewed his father's Landfriede in 1383 but by his seeming lack of 
appreciation of the politics of the region 'hat er nicht nur jeder weiteren 
Einungspolitik im Elsass selbst den Riegel vorgeschoben, sondem unbewusst auch die 
Intensivierung der stadtischen Biindnisbestrebungen im Elsass und am Rhein 
gefbrdert.'^^' In 1389, the comprehensive general Peace of Eger which sought to 
stamp out every kind of disorder was much more the work of the regional princes than 
the king. Du Boulay notes that 'it did not now exclude collaboration against the king, 
whose passivity was complete.^ *^ 
In 1393 and 1395, Wenzel promulgated two further regional Landfrieden in respect of 
Alsace. In reality however neither Wenzel nor his local representative, the Landvogt, 
played any substantial role in these treaties. In both cases the Landfrieden were 
essentially the work of the regional nobility, church and towns. Interestingly, 
Angermeier links the Landfriede of 1393 directly to the outcome of the disputes 
surrounding Bruno von Rappoltstein.^ ^^ 
Du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages, p. 44. 
Heinz Angermeier, Konigtum und Landfriede im deutschen Spdtmittelalter (Mllnchen: Beck, 1966), 
p. 267. 
Du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages, p. 81. 
Angermeier, Konigtum und Landfriede, pp. 312-313. 
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Finally, it can be noted here that, under Wenzel, even the serious punishment of 
Reichsacht, the imperial bann or outlawry, had little impact, as will be seen below 
when it is considered in the context of Bruno von Rappoltstein. 
Thus, it is clear that Alsace in the latter part of the fourteenth century was subject to 
feuds, disputes and violence at all levels. ,It is difficult to establish that it was an 
especially violent area except in the general sense that it was one of those politically 
fragmented regions with little or no direct control by the king or a regional prince in 
which violence and disorder may, as a consequence, have been a more frequent 
occurrence. 
It is against this background that consideration can now be given of the extent to 
which Bruno fits the pattern suggested by Zmora. 
There is very little that has emerged directly concerning Bruno's character. The 
archive reveals a single comment that Duke Leopold IV of Austria considered that 
Bruno was easier to deal with in his absence. His reputation, however, when he is 
described by historians from his own times onward, is that he was a prime example of 
the feuding nobleman. Indeed, this appears to be all that he is remembered for apart 
from having been placed under the Acht and died leaving substantial debts. 
It is inevitable that the picture that emerges of Bruno from the surviving record is 
partial. There is no record of his family life, his relationship with his wives and 
children or his freatment of his feudal dependants. Such clues as exist are fleeting, 
such as reference in a document given close to the end of his life, after the settlement 
with Strassburg, in which he makes provision for his illegitimate daughter Susan on 
her marriage.^ *'* Nothing fiirther is known of this child but the document reveals 
something of Bruno but only at a time when his general demeanour suggests that age 
and the stress of the previous years had taken its toll. 
With all of the caveats that must be made, it seems likely that Bruno was an agressive 
and difficult character. Nothing is known of his inteUigence. The fact that he appears 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 606. 
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to have been unable to read speaks nothing to that question. He does not appear to 
have been a man of great subtlety and it may well be the case that he was not 
especially bright. The fact that, as the youngest son, he seems to have been set for a 
military career rather than as a man of the church may give some clue as to his natural 
abilities and disposition from an early age. 
In each of the three detailed case studies presented above, it appears that Bruno 
himself was the instigator or, at least, the perpetrator of the deeds that led to the 
dispute. The feud with the Habsburg-Laufenburg family over the marriage of 
Herzlaude may be felt to have been a genuine case of concern and a wish to fiilfi l his 
dead brother's wishes. And, of course, he was supported by his older brother Hugo in 
this matter. The suggestion that Bruno 'sold' Herzlaude has to remain a possibility, 
however much he protested against this accusation. The lengthy dispute over 
Harlestone was quite clearly initiated by Bruno's action in capturing him while the 
latter was on a pilgrimage and exacerbated by his refusal to give up his prisoner and 
his apparent breaking of his word over H l^rlestone's release following payment of the 
first part of the ransom. The alleged root of the feud dating back to the time of 
Bruno's service with Philip the Bold may have been seen by Bruno himself as 
justification enough but it is his handling of the diplomatic storm arising from the 
capture that brought down the wrath of his peers and betters. The war with Strassburg 
would seem to have arisen from a combination of Bruno's unwillingness or inabilty to 
repay long overdue loans and to reach any sort of compromise with the city which felt 
that he had befrayed it in various ways - not least by joining the bishop in his 
opportunistic war. In the latter two cases it would be difficult to portray Bruno as the 
injured party and in the first case there is a suspicion that he may, at the least, have 
manipulated the situation to bring about a better match for his niece. 
One striking feature of Bruno's feuds is the absence of serious or sustained violence. 
Despite the success of the count of Habsburg-Laufenburg in having Bruno placed in 
the Acht, there is no evidence that the family ever attempted to prosecute their claim 
by force. Given that family's parlous state at the end of fourteenth century it may be 
that they simply lacked the means for this. 
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The Harlestone matter involves force and violence on Harlestone's part i f Bruno is to 
be believed and from what else is known of Harlestone, it is certainly the case that he 
was a man of violence. Even at the time of the first encounter it would appear that 
Bruno gave in to demands to release Harlestone. The latter's capture many years later 
is unlikely to have required much in the way of force if he was travelling as a pilgrim 
at the time. The remainder of that feud was played out in quasi-legal processes rather 
than on the battlefield. 
In his last great feud with the city of Strassburg there are accusations of violence 
against Bruno but it is unclear as to whether these can be believed or whether they 
should be read as formulaic. Bruno's involvement with his gunners perhaps suggests 
a love of the latest toys more than a military nature. 
Thus, overall the picture is of a man who is secure in the heritage and glories of his 
family; a man who is master of his domain and an important figure within his region; 
a man who is conscious of his personal and dynastic identity and who sees himself as 
superior to the non-noble merchant rulers of Strassburg. It is also a picture of a man 
who is impulsive and probably a bully; a man perhaps so used to his position within 
his own boundaries that he feels no reason to behave any differently when dealing 
with individuals and bodies of much greater power and authority. 
Throughout the period covered by the case studies Bruno seems shows no great fear 
of Wenzel or his Acht. Although Bruno claims to have spent large sums of money in 
fighting the sentence in respect of Herzlaude (but he claims to have spent large sums 
of money on many other things too and is not a reliable witness to his own actions), 
he does appear to have been able to carry on regardless of the Acht or the Aberacht. 
He is quite content to take privileges from Wenzel but at the same time to enter into a 
treaty promising to support the Empire's potentially most powerful enemy. As to 
Wenzel's attempts to mediate between Bruno and Strassburg, Bruno simply appears 
to ignore any decision that does not suit him. 
Similarly, Bruno is clearly not the least afraid of the city of Strassburg. He is not the 
least persuaded by them to release Harlestone and he is happy to join others in 
declaring war on the city. Even when the war is over the dispute between the two of 
Page 133 
them continues and Bruno shows no sign of being intimidated. The presence of the 
city's armies outside the walls of Gemar is dealt with by the use of Bruno's artillery 
and eventually it is the city that is the more worried by the arrival of mediators from 
France and Burgundy and news of an impending invasion by the duke of Lorraine, in 
support of Bruno. 
But, of course, Bruno did in fact concede in the latter two of the three case studies. In 
the first case study the matter clearly remained open for many years, as evidenced by 
the truce referred to in case study 1. In the second case study Harlestone was 
released and there is no record of anything beyond the first part of the ransom ever 
having been paid. Nor is there any mention that the release was approved by Charles 
VI of France but this might be taken as read given that Harlestone was in custody in 
Burgundy and would appear to have been released from there. In the third case study 
Bruno is finally brought to account and is obliged to do the very thing that must have 
been the most difficult for him: he pledged the greater part of the the family estate 
against non-payment of his debts to Strassburg. 
In seeking the reasons for his capitulation, the archive is of little help. The evidence 
for the release of Harlestone is all indirect. There is one document in the family 
archive and the reappearance of Harlestone in the English archives to confirm that he 
had in fact been released. There is no surviving evidence of the nature of the dealings 
that produced this change of heart in Bruno. Previous commentators have taken the 
view that the pressures from so many different directions finally forced his hand. 
This may be the case but it does seem to be out of character. It is possible that further 
money changed hands. It is possible that the release was instigated by Burgundy at a 
time of truce with England. It is possible that of the various threats against him. 
Bruno was concerned that his sentence of Acht might be followed by Papal 
excommunication. Of these, the most likely explanation is that the release was in 
some way connected to the various truce negotiations held at the instigation of Philip 
the Bold between 1387 and 1393.^ ^^  If this is the case then it is less a case of Bruno 
buckling under the pressure than playing a role on a bigger stage, at least in his own 
Vaughan, Philip the Bold, p. 50. 
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eyes. Given the treacherous nature of his recent treaty with France, it is unsurprising 
that there seems to be little written evidence of this matter. 
Bruno's final capitulation is altogether different. By the time of Leopold IV's final 
ruling in 1396, Bruno would have been close to sixty years old. Given that he was 
within two year's of his death, it is possible that he was in poor health although there 
is no evidence to confirm this. Certainly, he is likely to have been wearied by his 
constant struggles with authority over the best part of twenty years and his thoughts 
may well have been turning towards his death and his legacy. Until the final 
settlement Bruno had continued to defy all attempts to settle matters with the result 
that the city of Strassburg seems to have lost patience with him by sending its army to 
retake the disputed town of Gemar. While this attack failed Bruno may have 
anticipated others. Against this, however, was the threatened and very real prospect 
of the duke of Lorraine coming to Bruno's aid with his armies. Alternatively, it may 
have been the involvement of Leopold IV, Bruno's feudal overlord as Landvogt of 
Upper Alsace which tipped the balance. Leopold had previously shown himself to be 
ready to support the city of Strassburg against Bruno. Once again, there is no 
definitive evidence to indicate what brought Bruno to concede. What is very 
noticeable however is the change of tone in Bruno's various communications after the 
settlement with Strassburg. The tone of defiance is gone. The giving of the major 
parts of his estates by way of pledge to Leopold IV and others to cover the sureties 
that they had given to Strassburg for the payment of Bruno's debts, would seem to 
have been the act that finally broke his resistance. If he was not in poor health before 
this, it may well have been this which led to his death so soon thereafter. 
What is not documented in any surviving archive is the extent to which Bruno was put 
under pressure to settle. His sons might well have feared (correctiy) that their 
inheritance was at risk.^ *^ As the next generation of Rappoltsteins they would most 
certainly have inherited their father's sense of the importance of their family identity 
and the need to preserve and expand the family's possessions. Bruno's eldest son, 
Smassmann, would in due course prove a redoubtable feuder in his own right in 
Fritz, SU, No. 1632. This document records the receipt of two thousand guildin from Bruno's son 
Ulrich as a payment towards Bruno's debts. This payment was made very shortly after Bruno's death. 
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defence of his rights and interests although he would also find himself drawn more 
closely into the orbit of the Leopoldine Habsburgs, probably as a direct result of his 
father's failings. In these circumstances it is quite possible that there was a feeling of 
'enough is enough' within the younger generation of the family. 
In summary, it is clear that, for most of his life, Bruno was never afraid of those who 
might have expected to exercise power and jurisdiction over him. At the end he was 
forced, for whatever reasons, to bow under the weight of the repercussions of his past 
actions. Only at the very end did this defiance seem to have left him. 
In Chapter V some detailed consideration was given to the recent work of Hillay 
Zmora and his thesis that feuding was, in essence, a part of the process of princely 
state-building. It should be noted at this point that Zmora's work has passed entirely 
unchallenged. Writing in 2000, Klaus Graf has raised questions which do not seek 
to contradict Zmora's views but which suggest that further research is needed in this 
field to cover a number of wider issues and a wider temporal and geographic spread. 
One of his questions concerns the extent to which the strands that Zmora has 
identified can be seen in different places or at different times.^ *^  The examination of 
Bruno's life in that context may make a small contribution to that process. 
In the first of the case studies there is no evidence of any external involvement. 
Bruno appears to be acting solely in what he considers to be the best interests of the 
family and probably of himself Irrespective of the purity of his motives he does not 
appear to have been the subject of pressure or manipulation from other, more 
powerful lords. 
The second case study is a little different. The root of the matter, Bruno's earlier 
encounter with Harlestone and the seemingly opportunistic capture of his prey, 
appears to be the result of Bruno's sense of grievance and his impulsive and 
aggressive nature. The opportunity to turn a profit was also doubtless in his mind. 
There is no evidence that his capture of Harlestone was stimulated by anyone else. It 
See the online version of G r a f s paper: Klaus Graf, Gewalt undAdel - Uberlegungen zur Fehde 
(2000 [cited); available from http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/beitrag/essays/grkl0500.htm. 
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remains possible, of course, that someone had informed him in advance of 
Harlestone's presence in the region. His most likely route, as shown above, would 
have taken him through Burgundian territory under the protection of his safe-conduct 
and his pilgrim status and thus it is possible that Bruno was forewarned of an 
opportunity to gain vengeance on his old enemy. The warning may even have come 
from an old comrade who had fought in the same actions in 1369. This, however, 
strays into the reahn of conspiracy theory. It is doubtful that anyone passing on such 
a warning would have been able to predict the events that followed. 
Once the matter had escalated it is a different story. As discussed, it seems clear that 
the Burgundians recognised an opportunity to gain a foothold in Alsace by taking 
advantage of Bruno's increasing difficulties with the Empire. There is nothing to 
suggest that Bruno was manipulated or encouraged to take any particular course of 
action but simply that the Burgimdians were alert to the opportunity that had arisen 
and knew Bruno sufficiently well to turn this to their possible advantage. 
As the matter turned into a war against Strassburg, there is again no evidence that 
Bruno was brought into the matter for any other reason than that he was a potentially 
useful local ally with access to the latest military technology. No-one, from the 
bishop of Strassburg down, appears to have sought to bring Bruno under their control. 
This does seem to have changed, however, as the matter evolved over the following 
three years. Wenzel's involvement seems peripheral and ineffective. Burgundy, 
through the medium of France, was still interested as is evidenced by the fact that the 
city authorities felt it necessary to write to Philip the Bold requesting that he should 
not take Bruno's side in a partisan maimer i f the matter came to him for arbitration. 
Similarly, the willingness of the duke of Lorraine to invade Alsace in support of 
Bruno should perhaps be taken as another instance of opportunistic intervention as 
much as a gesture of support for a family with whom the Duchy had maintained 
broadly good relations over a number of years. 
Finally, of course, the ultimate winner in the whole affair was Leopold IV of Austria. 
Having made clear his support of Strassburg, he was finally able to bring Bruno to 
heel in a way that left him with substantial power over the Rappoltstein family estates. 
Page 137 
This would prove to be only the first step in the process of mediatisation which led, 
ultimately, to the Rappoltstein lands and titles passing into the hands of the Habsburgs 
during the seventeenth century. 
In terms of Zmora's thesis, it must be said that there is no real evidence to support a 
view that Bruno's feuding was an intentional aspect of princely state-building within 
Alsace. At the end of the fourteenth centiuy, as described above, Alsace remained a 
fi"agmented territory and would continue in this way for some years to come. It is 
however equally the case that various princes had an interest in Alsace. Given its 
strategic importance, Alsace was a territory worth controlling. Burgundy, France, 
Lorraine and Austria (or at least the part under the control of Leopold IV) were all 
aware of the opportunity that Bruno's actions had presented to them and each tried, 
with more or less success, to exploit this. 
This study does nothing to contradict Zmora's thesis and might be seen a a small sign 
of the beginnings of the processes he claims to see in Franconia during the next 
century. It is, thus, more in line with the views of Graf, that further work is needed to 
be able to appreciate the larger picture. 
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Appendix 1 The Rappoltstein Genealogy 
The early genealogy of the Rappoltstein family is complex. The best representation is 
to be found in the recently published Chronik Rappolstein. The relevant section is 
reproduced here. Two points should be noted. 
First, on page A145, Ortwein represents Bruno's father as 'Johannes II d. A.' And his 
uncle as 'Johannes III d.J.'. Albrecht in his RUStammtafel rather confusingly labels 
them as 'Johannes^  and 'Johannes^  respectively. I suspect that Ortwein had intended 
to label the both as 'Johannes I I I ' as the designations as to their respective seniority 
otherwise make no sense. I have followed Albrecht's numbering within the body of 
this dissertation (as Bruno's uncle is not an important figure) but have preferred to 
reproduce Ortwein's genealogy as it is the more recent and complete of the two. 
Second, there is one small point to record concerning Bruno's children. Albrecht 
credits him with seven children, all legitimate. Ortwein agrees that there were three 
daughters by his first marriage and four legitimate children by his second. He adds, 
however, a reference to 'Ulrich der Bastard' as an illegitimate son by an unknown 
mother. The source of this reference is not given. Both authors omit any reference to 
'Susan', an illegitimate daughter who is specifically mentioned in the archive at the 
end of Bruno's life. Albrecht apparentiy found this document after most of volume 2 
(which includes the Stammtafel) had been typeset and it actually appears completely 
out of sequence at the end of the volume. It is likely that Ortwein simply did not see 
it. 
Ortwein, "Chronik Rappoltstein," pp. A142-A147. 
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Mb Stammfolge der Herren von Rappoltstein 
von den Anfangen bis 2000 (Auswahl) 
Das Rappoltsteiner Wappen durch die Jahrhunderte 
Anselm II . 
(1283-1311) 
Zuricher Wappenrolle 
um 1340 
Maximilian II . 
Smassmann 
(1456-1517) 
EgenoIfrV. 
(1548-1585) 
Waldeck-Pyrmont 
Altere Linie 
NN von Rappoltstein 
00 Bilitrud t um 1022 
1 Sohn REINBOLD 1. (s. B) 
REINBOLD I. von Rappoltstein, env. 1022-1038 
00 NN 
? Kinder 
Zwischengeneraiion fehll 
A D E L B E R T I. von Rappoltstein 
00 Adelheid t 1156 Kloster Beinwyl; Tv Notger, Graf zu Froburg (?), Hochmann des Baseler Stiftes 
3 Kinder A D E L B E R T 11. (s. D) 
Reinhard I. erw. 1141-1156, t 17.2.1157(?), Domprobst in StraBburg 
Kuno von Rappoltstein, Kreuzritter, t 1148 im 2. Kreuzzug (?) 
A D E L B E R T II. von Rappoltstein t 1147 (?) 
00 NN 
4 Kinder |Reinbold 11., f 1148 im 2. Kreuzzug (?); (erw. 1156) 
Bertholf, t 1148 im 2, Kreuzzug (?) (erw. 1156) 
Reinhard 11., f 1148 im 2. Kreuzzug (?) (erw. 1156) wohl 
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EMMA(Hemma) (s. 1.1) 
Jiingere Linie 
1. Generation 
I jEMMA Herrin von Rappoltstein t > 1147 
00 um 1156 Egenolf (I.) Heir von Urslingen, SchultheiC von Piacenza, Herr zu Rappoltstein; erw. 1162-1188, t 1188; Sv 
Konrad 1. von Schwaben zu Urslingen; Bv Konrad II. Herzog von Spoleto 
3 Kinder |Heinrich 1. Herr von Urslingen und Rappoltstein; erw. 1185, Domherr in StraBburg 
ULRICH 1. (s. 2.1) 
Tochter NN oo Anselm, Vogt von StraBburg 
B. Generation 
ULRICH I. Herr von Urslingen und Herr zu Rappoltstein, erw. 1186-1193, t 1193 
00 Guta (?) 
2 Kinder EGENOLF II. (s. 3.1) 
ANSELM I., Herr zu Rappoltstein, erw. 1219-1236 
. Generation 
EGENOLF II. Herr zu Rappoltstein, erw. 1219-1221, t 1221 
00 NN 
2 Kinder |SOHN NN (s. 4.1) 
ULRICH II. ts. 4.2) 
.Generation 
SOHN NN Herr zu Rappoltstein, t >1249 
1 Sohn HEINRICH II. (s. 5.1) 
ULRICH II. Herr zu Rappoltstein, erw. 1227-1259, t >I262 
00 Richenza Grafin von Neuenburg (?) erw. 1262 
4 Kinder Elisabeth I., erw. 1258; oo Walter von Hunenburg, erw. 1244-1288; SchultheiB in SfraBburg 
ULRICH 111, (s. 5.2) 
HEINRICH 111, (s. 5.3) 
Tochter, erw. 1281; oo Ludwig von Blumenberg 
. Generation 
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1 HEINRICH 11. Herr zu Rappoltstein, 11242 
00 Loretta von Blieskastel am Hofe der Grafen von Lun6ville t 09.1269; Tv Heinrich von Blieskastel; [sie: co2 Heinrich IV. 
Graf von (Ober-) Salm ? 1292] (kinderlos) 
I ULRICH III. d.A. Herr zu Rappoltstein, erw. 1260-1283, t 114.1283 
ool NN 
oo2 1267 ReginaN; • umI244 
3 Kinder Johannes I., erw. 1262-1267, f 1268 
Veronika; oo Hugo Graf von Montfort-Tettnang f 1309 
Bertha, erw. 1262-1292, oo Heinrich Sigbert Graf von Wfirth, Landgraf vom Unter-ElsaB; t 1278 
! HEINRICH in. Herr zu Rappoltstein, erw. 1249-1272, f 1279 
ao Anna (?) GrSfin von Froburg; tritt 1279 in das Kloster Paradies (bei Schaflhausen) ein 
6 Kinder ULRICH IV. (s. 6.n 
ANSELM II. (s. 6.2) 
Hermann I., erw. 1277-1283, t 283 
HEINRICH IV. (s. 6.3) 
Anna, Ordensftau zu Unterlinden (Colmar) 
Hermann II. (seit 1288), Herr zu Hohenack, erw. 1288-1291 
. Generation 
ULRICH IV. Herr zu Rappoltstein, erw. 1273-1283, f 1283 
00 Adelheid I. von Hohen-Geroldseck t 1300; Tv Hermann Graf von Geroldseck in Lahr 
1 Sohn HEINRICH V. Herr zu Hohenack, erw. 1288-1328, t 1351; 
001 Elisabeth von Usenberg; * 6.4.1322; Tv Rudolf III. von Usenberg Herr zu Kflmberg und Kenzingen; 
002 Adelheid III. von Geroldseck-Lahr, t 1346; Tv Simon II. von Geroldseck in GroB-Geroldseck (kmderlos); 
003 >1246 Suse von Staufenberg [sie oo2 Ritter Konrad Snewelin] 
ANSELM 11. (seit 1283) Herr zu Hohen-Rappoitstein, (seit 1298) Herr zu GroB-Rappoltstein (Ulrichsburg und Giersberg) und 
der Oberstadt, erw. 1277-1311,1 1311 gefallen vor Brescia (?) 
00 Elise Grafm von WOrth t 1298; Tv Sigbert Graf von WOrth 
6 Kinder Anselm III., erw. 1298 
Heinrich VI., erw. 1298 
ULRICH v., (seit 1341) Herr zu GroB-Rappoltstein (Ulrichsburg) und der Oberstadt; vorher(1338) Domherr in 
StraBburg; erw. 1298-1341, t 1351 
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JOHANNES II. d.A. Is. 7.1) 
BgenolfIII.,erw. 1298-1310 
Lucia, erw. 1315-1332; oo Burchard 11. von Horburg; begOtert mit einem Hof in der Oberstadt 
oo2 Gertrud von Rappoltstein (kinderlos) 
oo3 Bertha von Rappoltstein (s. 5.2 ident.) (kinderlos) 
J HEINRICH IV. (seit 1288) Herr zu Hohen-Rappoitstein und der Unterstadt t 1313 
00 1293 Susanna von Geroldseck am Wasichin; Tv Burchard III. von Geroldseck am Wasichin 
7 Kinder JOHANNES III. d.J. (s. 7.2) 
HEINRICH Vn. (seit 1313) Herr zu Hohen-Rappoltstein und der Unterstadt (gemeinsam mit Johannes III.); erw. 
1313-1316.11318 
Hermann III., 1318 Domherr in StraBburg 
Ulrich VI., erw. 1313-1333; Komtur des St. Johannes-Ordens zu Dorlisheim, Domherr zu St. Di6 und StraBburg 
Kunigunde I. , erw. 1313; QO 1320/22 Wilhelm II. Graf von Monfort-Tettnang 11352 
Susanne I., erw. 1313-1351; oo Walter IV. von Geroldseck-Lahr, erw. 1299-1354, t 1355; [ftr ihn 2. Ehe] 
Sophia I., 1333 Abtissin im Kloster Andlau 
Generation 
JOHANNES 0. d.A. (seit 1311) Herr zu GroB-Rappoltstein (Ulrichsburg) und der Oberstadt, (seit 1351) Herr zu Hohenack, t 
1362 
00 1 Elisabeth von Geroldseck-Lahr t 17.2.1341; Tv Walter IV. von Geroldseck-Lahr 
9 Kinder JOHANNES rv., (seit 1338) Herr zu Hohen-Rappoltstein und der Unterstadt (seit 1351) Herr zu Hohenack 
(gemeinsam mit Ulrich VII. und Bruno I. bis zu seinem Tod); 11368 
Heinrich VIII., erw. 1330-1355; Domherr in StraBburg 
ULRICH VII. Is. 8.1) 
BRUNO 1. (s. 8.2) 
Hugo, erw. 1329-1363, t 1386; Domprobst in StraBburg 
Elisabeth II., tritt 1340 als Klosterfrau in das Kloster Unterlinden (Colmar) ein 
Sophia II., erw. 1349; Klosterfrau zu Alspach 
Elsa (Elisabeth III.), erw. 1362-1397, Abtissin zu Erstein 
Adelheid, tvorl388 
oo2 NN von Geroldseck am Wasichin, Tv Hugo von Geroldseck am Wasichin (kinderlos) 
JOHANNES III. d.J. (seit 1313) Herr zu Hohen-Rappoltstein und der Unterstadt (gemeinsam mit Heinrich VII. bis 1318), erw. 
1298-1336, t 1335 
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00 Elisabeth von Geroldseck-Lahr 
3 Kinder Katharina I . , erw. 1337-1340, f 1353; oo Sigmund von Hattstadt, erw. 1325-1370, f 1372 
ANSELM rv. (seit 1335) Herr zu Hohen-Rappoltstein und der Unterstadt, erw. 1336-1338, t 1341 
JOHANNES V. (seit 1335) Herr zu Hohen-Rappoltstein und der Unterstadt, erw. 1336-1338, t 1341 
S. Generation 
1 ULRICH VII. (seit 1348) Herr zu Hohen-Rappoltstein und der Unterstadt (seit 1351) Hen zu Hohenack (gemeinsam mit 
Johannes IV und Bruno I . bis 1368) und (seit 1368) Herr zu Giersberg; vorher (1344) Domherr in Basel, (1347) Domherr in 
Strafiburg, erw. 1335-1377,1 1377 
Qol 1353 Herzlaude (Lowdelme) Grflfm von FOrstenberg-Haslach, erw. I353-I363, f 1363; Tv Gottfried Graf von Filrstenberg 
1 Kind HERZLAUDE (seit 1397) Herrin von GroB-Rappoltstein (Ulrichsburg) und Hohenack, erw. 1372-1400, t 1400; 
001 Heinrich III . Graf von Saarwerden, (seit 1377) Herr zu GroB-Rappoltstein (Ulrichsburg) und der Oberstadt; 
erw. 1378-1397, t 1397 (kinderlos); 
002 Johann Graf von Lupfen, (seit 1400) Herr zu GroB-Rappoltstein (Ulrichsburg) und der Oberstadt (bis 1419), 
Herr zu Hohenack (bis 1436); Landgraf von Sttlhlingen t 1436 (kinderlos) 
oo2 1364 Margarethe Herzogin von Lothringen t 1374 (kinderlos); Tv Friedrich IV. Herzog von Lothringen 
Qo3 1376 Kunigunde von Geroldseck, erw. 1376-1398 2 1379 Rudolf von Ochsenstein t«j(kinderlos); Tv Friedrich von 
Geroldseck; [sie: 1400] 
1 BRUNO I . (seit Volljahrigkeit ca. 1350) Herr zu Hohen-Rappoltstein und der Unterstadt, (seit 1351) Herr zu Hohenack 
(gemeinsam mit Johannes IV und Ulrich VII. bis 1368); (von 1362-1377) Herr zu GroB-Rappoltstein (Ulrichsburg) und der 
Oberstadt; erw. 1344-1398, t 15.5.1398 
001 vor 1362 Johanna von Blankenberg, Frau von Magnieres, erw. 1351-1377; Tv Emich von Blankenberg in Denuvre; [sie: 
001 Heinrich von Fausigny] 
3 Kinder Isabella, erw. 1369-1409; oo 20.3.1377 Wilhelm von Vergy in Pont-sur-Saone-Montenot t 1396 
Blancheflor, erw. 1371-1425; ool 20.1.1371 Burchard I I . von Finstingen und SchOnecken, erw. I377-I389; oo2 
Dietrich Beyer von Boppard, Herr zu ChSteau-Br^ hain 
Johanna I . , erw. 1377-1416; ool Volmar von Geroldseck am Wasichin in GroB-Geroldseck, erw. 1378-1384, t 
1390; oo2 Egon 11. Graf von Habsburg-Kyburg t 1414 
oo2 urn 1381 Agnes von Grandson, erw. 1363-1397 
5 Kinder MAXIMIN SMASSMANN I . (s. 9.1) 
Johann VI., erw. 1392-1399; "im Rhein ersoffen", t 1399 
ULRICH VIU. (seit 1398) Herr zu Rappoltstein (gemeinsam mit Maximin I . Smassmann bis 1419), (seit 1419) 
Herr zu GroB-Rappoltstein (Ulrichsburg) und des Erbhofes in der Unterstadt); erw. 1392-1431, f (gefallen) 
2.7.1431; 
00 NN Grafin von Habsburg-Laufenburg 
Elsa, erw. 1397-1415; oo Hans Ulrich vom Huse von Isenheim, erw. 1388-1434 
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Adelheid (?), erw. 1415 
Mutter unbekannt 
1 Sohn Ulrich 'der Bastard', Kirchherr von Reichenweiher; oo Barbel Brunin 
>. Generation 
MAXIMIN I . SMASSMANN * ca. 1382; (seit 1398) Herr zu Rappoltstein (gemeinsam mit Ulrich VIII. bis 1419), (seit 1419) 
I Herr zu GroB-Rappoltstein (Ulrichsburg) und der Ober- und der Unterstadt, (seit 1431) Herr zu Rappoltstein, sowie (seit 1437) 
Herr zu Hohenack; erw. 1390-1451, t 25.2.1451 
aol NN Grafin von Habsburg-Laufenburg t I4I4; Tv Johann II . Graf von Habsburg-Laufenburg und Verena Grafin von 
Neuenburg 
2 Kinder Amalie oo 1412 Claus Krietheim 
Magdalena, erw. 1431; Klosterfrau zu Alspach 
oo2 1415 Katharinavon Burgund, Herzogin von Osterreich; * 5.1378, t 24.1.1425; Tv Philipp KOnig von Frankreich, Herzog 
von Burgund; [sie: <»I 1393 Leopold IV. Herzog von Osterreich und der Steiermark 11411] (kinderios) 
oo3 1434 Else Wetzel, ab 1434 Else von der Dicke und Spesburg t 1451; Tv Hannemann, Edelknecht 
10 Kinder KASPAR fs. lO.n (unehelich. 1434 leeitimiert) 
WILHELM I . (s. 10.2) (unehelich. 1434 leeitimiert) 
Stephanie I . , erw. 1434-1475, ab 1446 Klosterfrau in Unterlinden (Colmar) (unehelich, 1434 legitimiert) 
Beatrix I . , erw. 1434-1475, ab 1446 Klosterfrau in Unterlinden (Colmar) (unehelich, 1434 legitimiert) 
Emichen, erw. 1434, t jugendlichem Alter (unehelich, 1434 legitimiert) 
Verena I . , erw. 1434-1492; 1 1492 (unehelich, 1434 legitimiert) 
MAXIMIN SMASSMANN II . um 1437; (seit 1456) Herr zu Rappoltstein und Hohenack (gemeinsam mit Wilhelm 
I . , Bnmo II . und Wilhelm II.) und (seit 1484) Herr zu Geroldseck am Wasichin; Rat Seiner Rfimisch-Katholischen 
Majestat; t 31.8.1517 (unehelich, 1434 legitimiert) 
Ursula, erw. 1451-1480, ab 1453 Klosterfrau zu Alspach 
Helena I . , erw. 1451-1480, ab 1453 Klosterfrau zu Alspach 
Afra, erw. 1451-1480, ab 1453 Klosterfrau zu Alspach 
n. Generation 
KASPAR * ca. 1426; (seit 1451) Herr zu Rappoltstein und Hohenack (gemeinsam mit Wilhelm I . und Smassmann II.); erw. 
1434-1456; t >6.11.1456 wahrend der Pilgerfahrt nach Santiago de Compostella 
oo 1452 Imagina Grflfin von Leiningen f 1468 Rixingen; Tv Rudolf Graf von Leiningen und Rixingen 
1 Sohn BRUNO II . * ca. 1453; (seit 1469) Herr zu Rappoltstein und Hohenack und seit ca. 1485 Herr zu Geroldseck am Wasichin; (gemeinsam mit Wilhelm I . und Smassmann II.), erw. 1457-1513, t 12.3.1513; (ehe- und kinderios) 
WILHELM I . • ca. 1427; (seit 1451) Herr zu Rappoltstein und Hohenack (gemeinsam mit Kaspar, nach dessen Tod 1451 mit 
Bruno II. und Smassmaim II.); und (seit 1484) Herr zu Geroldseck am Wasichin; t 20.6.1507 
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Appendix 2 Sir John Harlestone - Biographical Note 
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a most remarkable and eminent man in his time.' 
Sir John Harlestone is a something of an enigma. His presence throughout the second 
half of the fourteenth century is akin to that of a minor character in one of 
Shakespeare's historical dramas. He seems always to be there in the backgroimd, 
sword at the ready, while the great lords take centre stage. From time to time he 
emerges from the crowd briefly to occupy centre stage then withdraws. The efforts 
made on his behalf by so many significant figures to secure his release from captivity 
at the hands of Bruno von Rappoltstein indicate that he was a man of some 
consequence. Yet, for all that, he has left relatively little trace in the archives. To 
gain some understanding of why Harlestone's release fi-om Bruno's dungeons 
engaged the interest of Richard II of England, Wenzel, king of the Romans, Pope 
Urban VI (1378-89) and many others of high rank, this appendix summarises what 
little is known of this English knight.^ ^*' 
The evidence for Harlestone's origins is sparse. There is unsupported genealogical 
data that suggests Harlestone was bom in Essex in 1327 in the manor of Wanton. If 
this is correct it connects him to a well-documented Essex Harleston family albeit in a 
manner which cannot be divined unambiguously from the available sources. The 
position is far fi-om clear but given the facts of his later life, an Essex family 
Francis Blomefield and Charles Parkin, An Essay Towards a Topographical History of the County 
of Norfolk, etc (London: William Miller, 1805), iii, p. 111 Note. 
For Urban VI see Kelly, The Oxford Dictionary of Popes, pp. 227-228. 
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connection for Sir John Harlestone seems plausible. Both Ward^ '^ and Given-
Wilson^^^ treat him as an Essex man. 
Harlestone first appears in the royal archive in the middle of the fourteenth century. 
The initial mention is as witness to a deed in January 1342^ "^* Little further is heard of 
him until he receives two commissions to arrest various individuals in 1347.'^ '^ There 
is no evidence that Harlestone fought at Crecy or Poitiers or that he engaged in any 
military activity at this time. His duties for a number of years appear to have been 
confined to the fiuther witnessing of deeds and the occasional arrest of felons. These 
years of service were however the foundation for a more prominent fiitvire role. As 
Vale writes, 'The chamber provided its own career structure for the able and 
ambitious, often fi-om well-bom families: men rose from valet, or yeoman, to knight 
through their service there.'^ ^^ 
Jennifer C Ward, The Essex Gentry and the County Community in the Fourteenth Century, Studies 
in Essex history; 2 (Essex Record Office, 1991), p. 9. Ward includes Harlestone in a table of 'Essex 
Gentry on Commissions of Array 1377 - 1392'. 
'^•^  Chris Given-Wilson, The Royal Household and the King's Affinity: Service, Politics, and Finance 
in England 1360-1413 (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 283. Given-Wilson 
includes Harlestone in a table of 'Knights of the chamber and lay officers of the household' under 
Richard 11 and indicates his area of'Local Interests' as Essex. 
I am grateful for assistance received from Mr Paul Reed in connection with the Essex Harlestone 
family. Mr Reed, Fellow of the American Society of Genealogists, has researched the medieval origins 
of the family in connection with his article. The English Origins of John Harleston, Colonial 
Immigrant to South Carolina, (The Genealogist, Fall 1988). There is a substantial amount of 
genealogical data on various medieval Harlestone families at http://www.familvsearch.orp/. Some of 
this data has been provided by Mr Reed. Other data has been compiled anonymously without 
supporting detail of its source, including the entry relating to the birth of 'John de Harleston' at 
Wantons Manor, Essex circa 1327 and that of'Sir John Herloveston' circa 1300. 
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CCR, 1341 
Ibid., 1345 
1343,470. 
1348, 313 & 316. 
M. G. A. Vale, The Princely Court: Medieval Courts and Culture in North-West Europe (Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 61. A comprehensive picture of the role and duties of 
the esquires and knights of the royal court under Edward III, Richard II and Henry IV is given in 
Given-Wilson, The Royal Household and the King's Affinity: Service, Politics, and Finance in 
England 1360-1413, p. 167 - 174 & p. 204 - 212. On pages 201 & 202 Given-Wilson charts the career 
of Sir George Felbridge which shows some remarkable parallels with that of Sir John Harlestone, 
including his longevity and service across three reigns and his association with Thomas of Woodstock, 
duke of Gloucester. Felbridge was, however, more of a diplomat than a soldier and, unlike Harlestone, 
suffered through his association with Gloucester at the end of Richard's reign. 
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The first mention of Harlestone as a soldier occurs in 1359 when he was credited with 
the capture of Flavigny-sur-Ozerain, some thirty miles north-west of Dijon. The 
French considered Flavigny sufficiently secure to have stored a substantial quantity of 
provisions within the town; enough, Froissart says, to feed Edward Ill's army for a 
month.^ '^ The town itself was almost immediately handed back to the French during 
the negotiations leading to the Treat of Bretigny but Harlestone's role in capturing a 
substantial quantity of desperately needed supplies and such a valuable fortress is 
unlikely to have passed the notice of the king and his senior commanders. 
Following his success at Flavigny, Harlestone's official military career appears to 
have stagnated during the years of truce between England and France but it is clear 
that he did not spend the whole of his time in England. There is only one mention of 
his name in the royal archive in this period, relating to his appointment of attorneys 
while 'going beyond the seas by the king's licence' in July 1366.^ ^^  This entry, 
together with the absence of any record of duties at court during the whole of the 
1360s suggests that Harlestone may have been abroad for a substantial part of this 
time. The question of what activities he might have been engaged in during this 
period is considered below. 
With the resumption of hostilities between England and France in 1369, Harlestone 
was appointed to his first significant post as Captain of Guines in July 1370 and held 
this post until at least November 1376. For part of 1379 he was Captain of 
Froissart and Kervyn de Lettenhove, Chroniques, VI, 256. 
Thomas Gray, Scalacronica. The Reigns of Edward I, Edward II and Edward III, tr. Herbert 
Maxwell (Glasgow: 1907), p. 148 - 159. 
CPR, Edward III 1364 - 1367,291. 
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Cherbourg. The progression fi^om Guines to Cherbourg was a natural concomitant 
of successful service. Given-Wilson writes, 'Castles in occupied France ... were 
generally entrusted to men of proven military ability' and points to Cherbourg as 
being one of those castles that would normally be held by one of the king's chamber 
knights. Of Guines he says, 'Numerous other castles in Aquitaine and in the marches 
around Calais, such as Fronsac, Guines and Oye, were held by the kuig's knights 
(these lesser castles were rarely held by chamber knights).'^"' 
It is during the decade following 1369 that Harlestone appears regularly in the 
chronicles of that period. Froissart mentions him on several occasions.^ *^ ^ In most 
cases he is named only in passing but in others he is central to the matter. The best 
known of these episodes is, perhaps, the capture of the French knight, William de 
Bordes, in the vicinity of Cherbourg in July 1379. During this engagement Froissart 
describes Harlestone in combat: 'D'autre part, messires Jehans Harleston, capitaine de 
Chierbourc, se combatoit bien et vaillaument, une hache en sa main, pie avant I'autre, 
et bien y besoignoit, car il avoit a dure partie affaire et durs combatans.'^ "^  
Harlestone appears to have profited substantially fi-om the capture of William de 
Bordes. The prisoner was handed over to Richard II in return for which Harlestone 
received a grant of ten thousand francs.^'''* 
Goodman, The Loyal Conspiracy, p. 99. The indenture for Harlestone's custody of the castle and 
town of Cherbourg survives in the National Archives at E101, Exchequer, King's Remembrancer, 
Accounts Various, ElOl/68/8 178 & 179. 
Given-Wilson, The Royal Household and the King's Affinity: Service, Politics, and Finance in 
England 1360-1413, p. 171. 
Froissart and Kervyn de Lettenhove, Chroniques. The references to Harlestone may be found at: 
VIII, 280; VIII, 328ff; VIII, 399; VIII, 403; VIII, 414; IX, 92ff; IX, 96; IX, 134flf; IX, 244; IX, 306 and 
XII, 60ff. 
""Ibid., IX, 138. 
VH (ed) Galbraith, The Anonimalle Chronicle 1333 to 1381 (Manchester: The University Press, 
1927), 1377- 1381: 311,495, 543 & 586. 
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This positive view of Harlestone as a fighting man is echoed by other chroniclers. He 
is mentioned on various occasions in Walsingham's St Albans Chronicle.^ *'^  Once 
again he is depicted as a fighting man, given to chivalric words and deeds. In another 
episode from 1379 he is depicted as leading the mercenary soldiers who formed the 
garrison at Cherbourg on a raid into the countryside in an attempt to secure 
provisions. The French had apparently blockaded most of the approaches to 
Cherbourg and the situation was becoming desperate. After professing himself as 
'prepared to face life or death' for the welfare of his men, Harlestone leads them on a 
successful raid but is ambushed on the return journey. Once again, Harlestone is at 
the heart of the battle, as described by Walsingham: 'Sir John Harlestone, 
commander-in-chief of the English was the first to fall: he attacked the French with 
courage, but was horribly cut down and pitifiilly laid low, a host of the enemy 
surrounding him like bees.'^ '^ ^ On this occasion he was rescued by Sir Geoffrey 
Worseley who lead the reserve force onto the field at a critical point in the skirmish. 
The capture of William de Bordes described above by Froissart is also recorded in 
The Anonimalle Chronicle, where Harlestone is again seen in the heart of the battle. 
Harlestone was again apparentiy knocked to the ground and rescued by his 
companions - possibly lead again by Sir Geoffrey Worseley.^ ^^ Restored to his feet, 
Harlestone continued to fight until victory was achieved.^ ''^  
"^^  John Taylor, Wendy R. Childs, and Leslie Watkiss, The St Albans Chronicle : The Chronica Maiora 
of Thomas Walsingham. I, 1376-1394, Oxford Medieval Texts. (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003), The 
references are at pages 269, 283 - 289, 343, 365 - 367, and 515 - 517. 
Ibid., p. 287. 
Froissart and Kervyn de Lettenhove, Chroniques. In his biographical note on Harlestone, 
Lettenhove writes,: 'Ce fut Gauthier Worseley qui sauva la vie a Jean d'Harleston et qui decida la 
victoire des Anglais au combat de Cherbourg en 1379'. As he had previously written a lengthy note 
concemmg the passage in the St Alban's Chronicle and the role of Worseley, it is likely that this later 
section refers to the action in which William de Bordes was captured. The role of Worseley in that 
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Interestingly, Harlestone is reported to have fallen in combat and to have been rescued 
by his companions in both of the episodes described above. There is a further episode 
in Froissart where something similar occurs. During Woodstock's campaign of 1380 
Harlestone is instrumental in fightmg off a raid by French knights whilst the English 
are besieging Nantes. In this engagement, Harlestone and his men are surroimded and 
attacked in their lodgings at daybreak. Dressing and arming themselves quickly they 
defended their position but would, apparently, have been overcome but for the arrival 
of reinforcements.^ "^ 
None of the chroniclers treats these setbacks as a sign of any weakness or lack of 
fighting skill on Harlestone's part. Rather, his willingness to be at the heart of the 
fighting, whatever the odds, is seen as a confirmation of his courage in the field and of 
his chivalric standing. In a later passage Walsingham includes Harlestone in a list of 
captains described as ' men to whom each of the armies could with good reason have 
been entrusted because of their wisdom, their fortitude, and their military ability.'^"^ 
and in his biographical note on Harlestone at the end of his edition of the Froissart's 
chronicles, Kervyn de Lettenhove sums up with this view of Harlestone, 'Dans un 
temps de decadence pour I'Angleterre, il avait fait revivre les plus nobles traditions de 
la chevalerie' Allowing for a point of view that is distinctiy French, this may, in the 
light of other events, be an overstatement of Harlestone's reputation but as Keen says, 
battle is not mentioned in the accounts of Froissart or The Anonimalle Chronicle and Lettenhove gives 
no reference for his assertion. 
Galbraith, The Anonimalle Chronicle 1333 to 1381, p. 130. 
Froissart and Kervyn de Lettenhove, Chroniques, IX, 306. 
'^^  Taylor, Childs, and Watkiss, The St Albans Chronicle : The Chronica Maiora of Thomas 
Walsingham. I, 1376-1394, p. 365. 
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'those who were remembered as the flower of knighthood earned their name and fame 
311 hard, in face of real and ugly dangers.' 
Following his brief tenure at Cherbourg, Harlestone's next substantive appearance is 
in the context of the Peasants' Revolt of 1381. On July 10 1381 Harlestone was 
commissioned, under the leadership of Woodstock, to punish insurgents in Essex and 
on October 26 he received a further commission to arrest and punish traitors in the 
Essex and Kent. '^^  Once again, Harlestone's deeds were recorded by a contemporary 
chronicler. 
In the St Alban's Chronicle, Walsingham relates how the rebels of Essex were 
pursued to Sudbury, Suffolk by the king's men. He describes their fate in stark terms. 
'Lord FitzWalter and Sir John Harlestone,..., pursued them with armed men, and 
when the peasants were making their customary proclamations on behalf of the 
common people, the lords suddenly and unexpectedly assailed them, and killed as 
many as they wished.'^'^Although not specifically named in other commissions, it is 
known that Harlestone was also involved in the slaughter of Essex rebels near 
Billericay^''* under Woodstock's command and it possible that he would have been 
amongst the forces commanded by Woodstock in Oxfordshire, Gloucestershire and 
Herefordshire. '^^  He was clearly a man for whom extreme violence was a part of 
daily life. 
^" Maurice Keen, Chivalry (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 223. 
' " C P R , 1381 - 1385, 73 &79. 
Taylor, Childs, and Watkiss, The St Albans Chronicle : The Chronica Maiora of Thomas 
Walsingham. I, 1376-1394, p. 517. 
^"''Aiastair Dunn, The Peasants' Revolt. England's Failed Revolution of 1381 (Sfroud: Tempus 
Publishing, 2004), pp. 169 - 170. 
315 Taylor, Childs, and Watkiss, The St Albans Chronicle: The Chronica Maiora of Thomas 
Walsingham. I, 1376-1394, p. 516 note. 
Page 152 
Outside of the writings of chroniclers there is other evidence of Harlestone's military 
activities. He was with Thomas Woodstock on his expedition of 1380 and he took 
part in the ill-fated 'crusade' lead by Henry Despenser, Bishop of Norwich in 1383.""^  
It is also known that he was able to muster a substantial retinue of followers for 
military campaigns. Harlestone's indenture for service as a part of Woodstock's 
1380 expedition survives. In this he contracts to supply six bannerets, seventy three 
knights and eighty archers.^  
Alongside his role as a military leader there is occasional mention of Harlestone in the 
context of diplomatic missions. Lettenhove states that Harlestone 'eut un debat 
devant le conseil du roi de France contre le sire de Campremy' in 1364 and that 
Edward III gave him 'de pleins pouvoirs' in January 1366, although it is not clear in 
what context these were granted. He fiirther mentions that in October 1376, 
Harlestone was 'un des conservateurs des treves conclues avec France'. '^^  This latter 
mission was connected with the implementation of a truce concluded in June 1375 for 
which Harlestone was chosen as one of four 'conservators'. '^^  While captain of 
Cherbourg, Harlestone is recorded by Froissart as having played a minor role in 
securing the freedom of John of Brittany, cousin of the duke of Brittany, who was at 
that time being held for ransom in England.^ *^^  Toward the end of his life, after his 
return from captivity in Alsace and Burgundy, the Westminster Chronicle records 
Saul, Richard II, p. 52. Perroy, Richard U, p. 196. 
JW Sherboume, 'Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France, 1369 - 1380,' The English 
Historical Review 79, no. 313 (1964): p. 732. 
Froissart and Kervyn de Lettenhove, Chroniques, XXI, 525. 
^" Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, pp. 195 - 197. The arrangements for the truce were considered a 
novel attempt to secure compliance. Fowler describes the role of Harlestone and his fellows in some 
detail. 
Froissart and Kervyn de Lettenhove, Chroniques, XII, 60flF. 
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him as being with Woodstock in the context of negotiations with the French to 
prolong the 1389 truce of Leulingam '^^ ' and Lettenhove has him 'charge d'une 
mission outre mer' in 1398. 
None of these accounts suggests that Harlestone was instrumental in the negotiating 
process itself Given his background it seems more likely that he was included in 
these various retinues for what might best be described as 'security' purposes. 
Harlestone's relationship with Thomas of Woodstock is worthy of closer examination. 
Woodstock most probably first met Harlestone while he was growing up at his 
father's court. The first record of Harlestone's service with Woodstock is an entry 
in the Patent Rolls relating Harlestone sitting with Woodstock in a military court in 
March 1380.^ ^^ * Upon his later elevation to a dukedom (1385) he received a fiirther 
annuity of the same sum but Richard never showed any inclination to swap the cash 
grants for lands of an equivalent value, leaving Woodstock dependent on an 
exchequer that was itself pressed for cash during the 1380s. On top of this, 
Woodstock found himself in competition with the de Vere family for influence within 
Essex and must have resented the de Vere's greater favour at court. As Saul says, 'He 
needed a powerful following of his own both to bolster his own prestige and to keep 
watch over his interests in the county, but... he found it difficult to recruit one. His 
greatest attraction to the gentry was probably his ability to offer them opportunities to 
L. C. Hector, Barbara F. Harvey, and Corpus Christi College (University of Cambridge). Library., 
The Westminster Chronicle, 1381-1394, Oxford medieval texts. (Oxford 
New York: Clarendon Press ; 
Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 515. 
Froissart and Kervyn de Lettenhove, Chroniques, XXI , 525. 
Goodman, The Loyal Conspiracy, p. 102. 
'-"CPR, 1377 - 1381,485. 
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seek honour and renown in war.* Harlestone, an established military figure of 
some repute by the late 1370s and someone that he had probably known since 
childhood, would have been an ideal person to form the core of such a following. The 
close nature of the relationship between Harlestone and Woodstock is fiirther 
illustrated in the foundation statutes of the religious college that Woodstock 
established at Pleshey in 1393.^ ^^  In statute 22 Harlestone is listed amongst those for 
whom mass was to be said on designated dates. In 1395 Harlestone was amongst 
those to whom Woodstock granted his Stafford and Moleyns wardships.^ ^^ 
Harlestone's capture by Bruno von Rappoltstein in 1384 was, perhaps, the greatest 
good fortune of his life. In 1386 Woodstock, as duke of Gloucester, was one of the 
leading members of the Lords Appellant, that group of nobles who came so close to 
deposing Richard I I . By this time, Harlestone had been away from domestic 
politics for a considerable period and seems thus to have escaped any implication in 
the matter, unlike many of Woodstock's other knightly adherents.^ ^^  Indeed, in 
February 1393, after his release by Bruno, Harlestone was granted an annuity by 
Richard I I of 100 marks for life specifically to compensate him for losses whilst 
imprisoned in Germany.^^° 
Saul, Richard II, pp. 178 - 179 See also Anthony Tuck, Thomas, Duke of Gloucester (1355-1397), 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
The foundation statutes of Pleshey College are reproduced in full in Richard Gough, The History 
and Antiquities of Pleshy, in the County of Essex (London, 1803), Appendix, 69ff. 
Goodman, The Loyal Conspiracy, p. 100. 
There are many accounts of the 'Lords Appellant' affair. The most comprehensive may be found in 
Saul, RichardII, Chapter 8 and. Goodman, The Loyal Conspiracy. 
Sir George Felbridge (see above) was the only other knightly follower of Woodstock mentioned by 
name in statute 22 of the foundation statutes of Pieshey College. 
""CPR, 1391 - 1396, 240. 
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A possible ftirther factor in the absence of any consequences to Harlestone when 
Woodstock fell is the fact that Harlestone appears to have played no active role in 
domestic politics. There is no evidence for him being involved, at any level, with 
local or central government outside of his military activities, a fact that may be 
connected with limited landed wealth.^ '^ Although there is evidence that he held 
some lands in Essex he does not appear to have been a man of substantial property 
interests. Harlestone's share in the ransom of William de Bordes (see above) was ten 
thousand marks. He is known to have sold other prisoners to the king. McKisack 
mentions his share in the proceeds of the ransom of a French knight as £1,583 6s 
8d.^ ^^  This most likely relates to the sale of two prisoners to Edward III in 1374, 
while Harlestone was captain of Guines.^ ^^  The extent to which Harlestone also 
enjoyed the fruits of war gained from less chivalrous activities is closely connected to 
the reason for his capture and imprisonment by Bruno von Rappoltstein in 1384 and 
relates to the unanswered question of what he may have been doing during the years 
prior to his appointment as captain of Guines in 1370. 
In a letter of 1385, probably addressed to the city authorities in Stfassburg, Brxino 
seeks to justify the ambush and imprisonment of Harlestone by accusing him of 
having raided properties in France and Burgundy which belonged to Bruno by right of 
his first wife. The details are given above in case study 3. 
For a detailed discussion of local politics in Essex in the 14"' century, see : Ward, The Essex Gentry 
and the County Community in the Fourteenth Century. Harlestone does not figure in the work except 
as mentioned above in terms of a military Commission of Array at the time of the Peasants' Revolt. 
May McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399, Oxford history of England; 5 (Oxford, 1959), 
p. 247, citing Issues of the Exchequer (Devon, 1837) 153 & 217. 
CPR, 1374- 1377, 36. 
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As a part of his complaint against Harlestone, Bruno cited an episode, told to him by 
another knight who claimed to have seen Harlestone and his followers with their table 
set with more than one hundred chalices which they had stolen from a variety of 
religious houses, including those in Bruno's villages. To underline the horror of this, 
Bruno relates that the knight in question could not bring himself to drink from a 
chalice looted from the Church and was accordingly brought another drinking vessel. 
It should be borne in mind that Bruno had good reason to paint as black a picture as 
possible of Harlestone. Alongside the general accusations of looting, murder and 
pillage, none of which was necessarily imusual behaviour for English knights on 
campaign during the Hundred Years War, the accusation of membership of the free 
companies would have had a special resonance with the authorities in Strassburg 
which had suffered from the attentions of the Archpriest, Amaud de Cervole in 
1365.^ '^* The final accusation of Harlestone as a despoiler of churches and looter of 
holy chalices would have served to put him fitlly beyond the pale. 
By piling these accusations one upon another, Bruno could portray Harlestone as the 
epitome of evil and himself as the victim seeking recompense for his losses through 
ransom and as a good Christian in avenging wrongs done to the Church. The question 
thus arises as to whether these accusations were justified or simply a construct by 
Bruno to justify his actions. 
Taking the question of Harlestone's membership of the free companies first, it must 
be said that there is no evidence of his formal involvement. In the detailed study of 
Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, p. 130ff. 
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this subject previously cited. Fowler does not list Harlestone as a captain or member 
of any of the companies.^ ^^  No mention is made of him by Sumption or Wright in 
their work in this area.'^ ''^  In fact, none of the modem or contemporary sources which 
refer to Harlestone give any indication that he was a member of any company. It 
seems likely therefore that this aspect of Bruno's complaint may well be fiction and 
added to the more specific charges in order to sway his audience. 
Moving to the question of the despoilment of churches and the looting of church 
property, there is evidence to support the story told by Bruno of the chalices on 
Harlestone's table. Fowler's sole mention of Harlestone is in connection with this 
story. Describing Harlestone as 'infamous in his exploits', he goes on to tell exactly 
the same tale as is told by Bruno by reference to an inquest into pillaging held in 
Champagne in 1375.^ ''' Fowler's source for this is a 19* Century French study of the 
Companies by De Freville. In this, De Freville writes. 
Tous les historiens s'etendent sur le luxe el^ rene des gens de guerre; mais 
toutes les declamations ne valent pas le fait suivant: dans une enquete au sujet 
du pillage de la Champagne, en 1375, un temoin declare qu'il a vu sur la table 
ou Jean de Harlestone, capitaine anglais, soupait avec ses camarades, plus de 
cent calices qui leur servaient de verres.^ ^^  
As three of Bruno's villages allegedly pillaged by Harlestone are named in the letter 
of 1385 as being 'in der graffschafft zu Schampanien'^'^^, it seems reasonable to 
Ibid. 
Sumption, The Hundred Years War. Nicholas Wright, Knights and Peasants : the Hundred Years 
War in the French Countryside, Warfare in History (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell, 1998). 
Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, p. 146. 
de Freville De Lorme Charles Ernest, Des grandes Compagnies au quatorzieme Siecle (1842-44., 
1842). 
Ibid., ii, 246, Note. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, No. 205. The three villages are named as 'Humbescort',' Vrvil ujf der Marnen' 
and 'Ruffier.' See case study 3 above. 
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imagine that Bruno would have been aware of such matters and that he would 
naturally have kept himself in informed of events in an area in which he held 
substantial interests. Bruno's retelling of the knight's story does therefore some 
weight. Further evidence to Harlestone's participation in the looting of churches may 
be inferred from the fact that he was, in fact, on a pilgrimage at the time of his capture 
by Bruno. Such a journey was in compliance with a papal bull of 16 November 1366 
which specified pilgrimage to Rome as one of the acceptable penances.^ "" 
Fowler also suggests that Harlestone later accompanied the future marshal of 
Burgundy, Gui de Pontailier, on a pilgrimage to the church of Our Lady in 
Nazareth.^ ''^  He cites a reference from a nineteenth century French work by Chereste 
as his source for this. The passage reads. 
Chose encore plus etrange! Vers al meme epoque, Jean d'Arleston, cet ecuyer 
du roi d'Angleterre qui s'etait empare de Flavigny, en Janvier 1360,s'associa 
avec plusieurs seigneurs bourguignons, et notamment avec G. de Pontailler, le 
futur marechal de Bourgogne, pur aller ensemble faire im pelerinage a Notre-
Dame de Nazareth 
This is certainly possible as Harlestone was moved from Bruno's castle at Hoh 
Rappoltstein in Alsace to Burgimdy in 1387 and was in the custody of Gui de 
Pontaillier as is evidenced by two documents given by Harlestone in which he 
promises to remain as Bruno's prisoner whilst in Burgundy.^ '*'* As Harlestone had 
failed to compete his first pilgrimage he may have felt the need to make this second 
journey for the same reasons as had prompted him to travel to Rome. 
Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, p. 145. 
Ibid., p. 146. 
Alexandre Cherest Aim6, L'Archipretre. Episodes de la Guerre de Cent Ans au XlVe Siecle (Paris, 
1879), p 203 Note. 
Albrecht, RU, 2, Nos. 233 and 258. 
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Finally, there remains the question of whether Harlestone was guilty of the alleged 
offences against Bruno's people and properties.^ "*^  There is no firm evidence to 
support Bruno's contentions. Against this, the charge of looting churches looks to 
have some foundation and Bruno's specific charges of violence against his properties 
and the circumstances in which they arose are persuasive, even allowing for a degree 
of exaggeration that Bruno may have added to help his case with the authorities in 
Strassburg. There is no evidence to support a case for Harlestone as a member of the 
free companies but this, in itself, is not proof that he did not have a cormection with 
them at some point. After all. Sir Geoffrey Worseley who served under Harlestone at 
Cherbourg and who saved Harlestone's life on at least one occasion was most 
certainly 'a company man'.^ "*^  Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that Harlestone 
was no better and no worse than many English fighting knights of that period.^ '*^ 
Wright summarises this when he observes, 'the lines of demarcation between war and 
brigandage, and between chivalrous knights and highway robbers, were not at all clear 
in practice.'"''*^ 
The date of Harlestone's release fi-om Bruno's custody is not recorded but it is 
possible to gain a general idea of when this occurred from surviving documents in the 
Rappoltstein family archive which place his release as having occurred in March 
1392.^ ^^  
'^'^  See case study 3 above for the details of the alleged attacks on Bruno's properties. 
Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries, p. 300. 
For a detailed discussion of 'Chivaby & War' see Keen, Chivalry, especially Ch 12. 
Wright, Knights and Peasants : the Hundred Years War in the French Countryside, p. 53. 
'^^  Albrecht, RU, 2, Nos. 337, 338, 340, 341 & Note. 
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From this point, Harlestone seems to have lived a quieter Ufe and appears only 
infrequently in the archives. In 1393 Harlestone was granted an annuity of 100 marks 
for life as compensation for losses whilst imprisoned. This annuity Was subsequently 
confirmed by Henry IV in October 1399.^ ^^ * He was not, however, entirely inactive at 
court. In 1397 he was a guarantor for the appearance before the Council of Thomas 
Feriby, Woodstock's secretary, who was being held in the Tower.^ '^ He is further 
recorded in 1395 as being a supporter of the Order of the Passion, a short-lived 
crusading order founded by Phillipe de Mezieres, a friend and advisor to Charles V of 
France.^ ^^  It seems imlikely that Harlestone was seriously considering participation in 
a crusade at this stage of his life. His inclusion in a list of patrons and members of the 
order alongside John of Gaunt, his friend Woodstock and many others, suggests that 
he was invited to add his name and reputation to the venture primarily as an 
encouragement to other potential recruits. 
The writ for Harlestone's inquisition post mortem was issued on 25 January 1406.^ ^^  
The writ refers to lands held in Kent but there is no subsequent record of the 
inquisition itself As the annuity of one hundred marks granted in 1393 was to be 
paid from the issues of Kent, it is possible that there was a belief that he had held 
lands m that county from the king. It may be that this was shown to be erroneous and 
thus the inquisition itself rendered unnecessary. 
""CPR, 1399- 1410, 29 & 123. 
Goodman, The Loyal Conspiracy, p. 100. CPR, 1396 - 1399, 155. 
Maude Violet Clarke, L . S. Sutherland, and M. McKisack, Fourteenth Century Studies (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1937), p. 288. 
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